



PHD

Newcomers in organised crime

A case study of Giuseppe Rogoli's Sacra Corona Unita, 1979-1999

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Newcomers in organised crime:

A case study of Giuseppe Rogoli's Sacra Corona Unita,
1979-1999

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

University of Bath

Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences

March 2012

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Thesis Abstract

This thesis focuses on newcomers in organised crime, employing a case study on the Apulian Sacra Corona Unita (SCU) clan. The thesis tackles the following questions: Do newcomers in a crowded national context adopt their organisational structure in response to predominantly structural or agency factors?; Is the adopted organisational configuration stable or subject to change and fluctuations?; Finally, does this organisational configuration impact upon the success or failure of newcomers in the field of organised crime?

In order to respond to these questions, the SCU was selected as a representative example of a newcomer in the Italian national context. A historiographical analytical approach was adopted and the thesis is, therefore, divided into three distinct time periods; the pre-organised crime era in Apulia and the emergence of the first native organisation (the SCU); the early years of the SCU and emerging weaknesses at the heart of the organisation; and the era of the state counter-offensive and organisational decline.

A structure and agency approach has been applied to the case study in order to address the different ages of the organisation *vis-à-vis* our research questions. Data, in the form of material from the principal trials, have been analysed to produce a narrative history of the organisation, enabling us to draw conclusions about the factors which may account for organisational success or failure.

We focus on Italy as the home of European organised crime, but the SCU represents a distinct case due to its status as a newcomer, its relative anonymity, particularly on a global scale, and its complex and often incongruous history. It is in the interests of researchers and policy makers alike to investigate even the smaller, less successful organised crime syndicates if any cohesive and effective approach to combating the phenomenon is ever to be reached.

Natasha Kingston, 2012

List of Abbreviations

| | |
|------|---|
| FSL | Famiglia Salentina Libera |
| NGCP | Nuova Grande Camorra Pugliese |
| NSCL | Nuova Sacra Corona Libera |
| NSCU | Nuova Sacra Corona Unita |
| RDV | Rosa dei Venti |
| SCU | Sacra Corona Unita |
| TLE | <i>Tabbachi lavorati all'estero</i> [contraband tobacco] |
| CPA | Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia [Parliamentary Antimafia Commission] |

Introduction to the thesis

1. The revived public interest in organised crime

Following the publication of his international bestseller *Gomorra* (2006, Mondadori), Neapolitan writer and journalist Roberto Saviano described his *fatum inevitabilis* with his claim that:

Barely a day goes by without someone announcing my death. But, in order to attack me, my enemies simply need to wait for the media spotlight shining on me to fade. What keeps me going today is not just the police protection – for which I am deeply grateful – but it is the interest of ordinary people and the success surrounding my work which truly protects me. Even Carmen Schiavone [prominent *camorrista*] told *Il Tempo* that they are simply waiting until the myth surrounding me dies down and attention on me and my stupid books declines...I am not afraid. I know only too well that they will make me pay a very high price. (Living with the threat of death, *Euronews*, 2009)¹

Saviano's book, and the homonymous 2008 Garrone film, captured global attention for the subject of organised crime. With its 'neo-neo-realist' (Bradshaw, 2008, Film review: *Gomorra*, *Guardian*, 10 October)² representation of a phenomenon most considered to have long lain firmly in the realm of fiction, the film was a worldwide success. Saviano has been criticised by some for being a hypocrite (Riotta, 2010, *Destra-Sinistra il partito che attacca Saviano*, *Il sole 24 ore*, 9 June³) who has marred the reputations of both Naples and Italy (Corriere della sera, 2010, "Lucra su Napoli", Borriello contro Saviano ma poi ci ripensa, *Corriere della sera*, 2 June⁴). However, there is no doubt that he achieved his goal of '...bring[ing] to public awareness what the modern Camorra is, what the mechanisms are that go to make up what is called "the system"... [to] expose these mechanisms and... [encourage] people to try to act against these' (Saviano, 03/10/2008).⁵

¹ <http://it.euronews.net/2009/02/04/roberto-saviano-living-with-the-threat-of-death/>. Accessed 20/05/2011.

² <http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2008/oct/10/crime>. Accessed 01/06/2011.

³ <http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2010-06-09/destrasinistra-partito-attacca-saviano-091000.shtml?uuid=AYWUL9wB>. Accessed 24/05/2011.

⁴ http://www.corriere.it/sport/10_giugno_02/borriello-saviano_753ed710-6e47-11df-b855-00144f02aabe.shtml. Accessed 24/05/2011

⁵ An interview with Roberto Saviano, <http://www.panmacmillan.com/displayPage.asp?PageID=5683>. Accessed 01/06/2011

A heightened consciousness emerged of the vice-like grip which the principal *mafia*-style organisations still held on Italy and beyond. This meant that public discourse returned to the topic of Italian organised crime in a way not seen since the 2006 arrest of Bernardo Provenzano, the 2000 death of Tommaso Buscetta or even as long ago as the 1992 assassinations of Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino. However, a cursory glance at popular engagement with the phenomenon of organised crime is revealing. What it indicates is the presence of an over-arching focus on the three principal *mafia*-style organisations, namely Cosa Nostra, the Camorra and the 'ndrangheta, the most notorious and highly publicised examples of this form of criminal gang. Given the existence of the so-called *quarta mafia* [fourth mafia] in the form of the *pugliese* [Apulian] Sacra Corona Unita (SCU), one wonders how and why this form of organised crime is so neglected in the popular literature, and whether this neglect extends further. An examination of the way in which the scholarly and popular literature approach the phenomenon can enable us as researchers to investigate the role played by organised crime in contemporary politics, society and culture. Moreover, this type of investigation can reveal to us the way in which thinkers and practitioners alike approach the phenomenon within these sectors.

Saviano and Falcone came to be some of best-known public faces of the Italian anti-*mafia* movement, both in Italy and further afield. In fact, Saviano himself cited Judge Falcone when he argued that:

[He] used to say that the Mafia is a human phenomenon and like every human phenomenon it has a beginning and an end. He was right, partly because this wasn't an optimistic statement. Presently, organized crime in Italy— especially the Camorra and 'ndrangheta – is an extremely strong reality. (Saviano, 03/10/2008)⁶

It is clear that Falcone and Saviano represent distinct perspectives on the organised crime debate. However, Saviano's fatalistic statement of 2009 echoed those of Falcone in 1991, just one year before his assassination. The judge recalled a failed attempt on his life in 1989, stating 'It's true they haven't killed me yet...But my account with Cosa Nostra remains open. It will only be settled with my death, natural or otherwise.' (Falcone, 1991, cited in collaboration with Padovani, M., 1993, p. 10) The parallels between Saviano and Falcone's chilling acceptance of their destiny are striking, as is the way that their public images were able to capture the imagination of the Italian people and those further afield.

⁶ An interview with Roberto Saviano, <http://www.panmacmillan.com/displayPage.asp?PageID=5683>. Accessed 01/06/2011

In the period following the publication of Saviano's text, stories on organised crime swept the international press, one of the most famous coming in the form of a report published on the financial aspect of the phenomenon:

Mafia...(S.p.A.) "is a large holding company with a turnover of approximately €130 billion and a net profit in investments and funds approaching €70 billion". The sole commercial branch of *mafia* and *mafia*-style criminality has exceeded €92 billion, a figure that represents at least 6% of [Italian] GDP. "Every day an enormous amount of money goes from the pockets of dealers and businessmen to those of the *mafiosi*, something around €250 million every day, €10 million every hour, €160 thousand every minute". This is the announcement made in the 2008 6th Annual Report published by SOS Impresa in collaboration with Conferescenti (Italian confederation of traders and hotel owners) entitled 'Businesses in the hands of criminality), which reports on the growing influence of *mafia*-style organisations on the economic fabric of Italy. (Anon, *Mafia SpA fattura 130 miliardi di euro*, 2008)⁷

This economic analysis of organised crime exacerbated the already complex and often negative reputation that Italy had acquired in relation to criminality. Italian reality made international headlines and it seemed as though the underestimation of the phenomenon was over. Saviano claimed 'were the Mafia a registered firm, it would be the largest in Italy... these pretty frightening figures [represent] a conservative estimate, based on just a part of what has come into the open through the judicial process.' (Saviano, 03/10/2008)⁸ This was not the first time the debate on organised crime had been polarised. Years earlier, Falcone himself conceded that '[he] lived within an 'institutional' culture that denied the existence of the mafia... Confusion reigned supreme: There were those who said, "Everything is mafia" and others who declared, "The mafia does not exist" (Falcone, 1991, in collaboration with Padovani, M., 1993, p. 39). This institutional disparity has hindered the fight against organised crime in Italy since the emergence of the phenomenon in 18th century Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The focus continues to be on the Sicilian and, to a lesser extent, Campanian forms of organised crime in the popular literature. More recently, even the 'ndrangheta has been garnering attention following the high-profile assassination of politician Francesco Fortugno in Locri in 2005, and the Duisburg massacre in 2007. This is further illustrated by the publication of the first full text in English on the 'ndrangheta (but also featuring the Camorra) published last year (Dickie,

⁷ <http://www.sosimpresa.it/news.php?id=5225>. Accessed 18/05/2011

⁸ An interview with Roberto Saviano, <http://www.panmacmillan.com/displayPage.asp?PageID=5683>. Accessed 01/06/2011

2011). The popularisation of the topic has undoubtedly taken place due to publishing houses and newspaper editors alike recognising the phenomenon as capable of grabbing the headlines. However, it is clear that the focus remains firmly placed on the largest Italian organisations and the headlines and attention continue to centre on the *traditional* forms of organised crime.

But what of the other regions of the Italian *Mezzogiorno* [or South]? We have Falcone's contribution to the battle against Cosa Nostra, and Saviano's investigations into the Camorra, among many other authors, researchers and representatives of the state. These both offer vast sources of information, whether from a judicial or a journalistic perspective, from which we can learn more about certain facets of the phenomenon of Italian organised crime. There is also the growing profile of the 'ndrangheta, emerging in recent years, to be borne in mind. Saviano said:

I'd like to ask people not to consider my story as that of a southern Italian and thus of a man who lives in an underdeveloped country of violent men, but to regard it as a European - very European – story. (Hooper, J., 2008, Gomorrah writer hunted by mafia tires of life in hiding, *Guardian*, 1 November)⁹

Even the most famous figures of the popular literature acknowledge that engagement with the debate is not always exhaustive or fully inclusive, least of all in geographical terms. Further, this focus on very specific geographical areas (Sicily and Campania) has had a profound effect on the broader perceptions of the organised crime debate, and no doubt a similarly profound effect on efforts to quash these ever-growing and ever-evolving organisations. Let us now consider the scholarly debate so we may examine if this absence and neglect extends beyond the popular engagement with the phenomenon.

2. The scholarly debate on organised crime

Similarly to the debate in the popular literature and in the media, the scholarly literature on organised crime remains divided. Of its perceived threat, Longo states:

[It] has increased its salience in the agenda of policy makers and social scientists in the last decade, yet there is little consensus over the definition of characters of these phenomena and over the models of the activities for controlling them...Organised

⁹ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/01/italy-gomorrah-roberto-saviano>. Accessed 1/6/2011.

crime is a very complex phenomenon...[which] affects social, economic, political and cultural sphere[s].’ (2010, p. 1)

As such, the need for definitions has lain at the core of scholarly engagement with the debate, and still a clear consensus has yet to be reached.

In order to gauge the scope of the argument, let us consider the case of Von Lampe’s website on organised crime research, which includes more than 150 definitions and is still growing¹⁰. As well as being concerned with defining the phenomenon, the scholarly debate has also developed theoretical concepts and models. These will be discussed in more detail with full references in Chapter One of the thesis. From the days of the Kefauver US Senate hearings in the 1950s, the literature tended to focus on hierarchical interpretations of the phenomenon. Ever since the publication of Cressey’s seminal *Theft of the Nation* (1969) interpretations were based on the idea of crime organisations as some form of parallel illegal state. Gambetta’s work on the concept of private protection (1993) formed another crucial part of the hierarchical, rational-choice approach. These definitions apply organisational theory to the study of the phenomenon, defining the various *mafie* as ‘classic’ organisations (Longo, 2010) and focusing on their structure, activities, division of labour and formalised internal roles. Here we can see that the focus of the earliest school lay with the larger organisations and most notorious forms of organised crime, namely the Sicilian and American Cosa Nostra organisations, appearing to mirror a similar gap in the popular literature.

On the basis of a growing dissatisfaction with these definitions, a shift occurred at the heart of the scholarly debate. Theories emerged that focused on more anthropological explanations for organised crime and the interpersonal power relationships therein. Interpreting criminal groups as more fluid, fluctuating and interdependent networks, as opposed to strict overarching hierarchies, the new-found consensus maintained that what characterised organised crime syndicates was internal and external interaction based on kinship and inter-family control. A focus on kinship ties and behavioural patterns emerged, as investigations on webs of influence contributed further to the body of literature. Here again, however, we are dealing with scholars writing on Sicily. This still implies a focus on the larger and better-known organisations, all of which the thinkers were attempting to interpret according to classic theoretical constructs and application of distinct models.

¹⁰ <http://www.organized-crime.de/organizedcrimedefinitions.htm>. Accessed 10/6/2011.

Nevertheless, dissatisfaction persisted and the scholarly debate shifted once more. The subsequent development was a rejection of both the pure hierarchical and local-ethnic interpretations, instead defining business enterprise as key to the phenomenon of organised crime. Similarities between the characteristics of legal and illegal businesses were identified and the focus shifted to the role of supply and demand and economic considerations. Scholars emerged who argued that *all* organised crime syndicates are in fact underpinned by economic motivations, focusing on entrepreneurs and market economies. Recent trends in the literature on organised crime have centred around more innovative facets of the debate, concentrating on inter-clan communication methods and migratory movements. The next chapter, outlining the theoretical framework of the thesis, will provide further detail on the evolution of this type of engagement with the phenomenon.

The scholarly debate, therefore, features the aforementioned focus on models which, whilst useful in terms of analysing organised crime, have yet to be applied or tested in relation to newcomer organisations or actors. A number of organisations have emerged in Italy to which the theoretical models have simply never been applied. How can we best test a model if we do not attempt to apply it to newcomers in the field? These questions came to form an integral part of the thesis and the research behind it and here I would like to outline how and why my project came to life.

3. Motivations behind the research

As illustrated in the preceding sections of this chapter, both the popular and the scholarly literature share a predominant and arguably distorted focus on certain areas, geographical or otherwise, of the organised crime phenomenon. This creates a gap, which could be filled by a study of *pugliese* organised crime in the form of a history of the Sacra Corona Unita (SCU). Such a study would address the geographical void previously identified. However, my initial research and subsequent findings proved vital in revealing that Giuseppe Rogoli's *pugliese* [Apulian] model is in itself an interesting object of analysis, and certainly more so than the scarce secondary literature might indicate. As such, the principal motivation behind the thesis is two-fold: firstly, I wanted to carry out research on the SCU in order to go some way to addressing the geographical gap which has emerged as a result of the neglect of the SCU in the popular and scholarly literature; secondly, and arguably more importantly, I decided to take an interdisciplinary approach to my research. I made the choice to apply the aforementioned theoretical interpretations to the SCU in an attempt to test some models, interpretations and approaches at the heart of the organised crime debate on an original case study.

In more personal terms, prior to my PhD research, I had a pre-existing interest in Puglia. I spent my Year Abroad in the region as part of my first degree in 2003-04. During that period, I came to know the area and began to engage with some of the more important issues relevant to contemporary Puglia. The more time I spent there, the more I encountered the discourse on the role of the so-called *mafia*. My initial assumptions seemed to be incorrect as I was under the initial impression that organised crime no longer existed in the region. Even that which had existed was largely alien to me. Moreover, the local media is still full of reports relating to the criminal underworld and the Sacra Corona Unita or the Nuova Sacra Corona Unita. Whilst I found the reports at times confused, misleading and contradictory, I soon became aware of the fact that organised crime in the region was a more complex phenomenon than I had first thought, and certainly more than the popular literature on the broader topic indicated. My desire to understand more about the debate grew as the shadow cast by the SCU in the region continued to loom large, particularly at the sub-regional level and predominantly within the southern section of the peninsular, namely Salento.

When I began to investigate the phenomenon more closely, I learnt about the organisation's history, the state counter-offensive and the oscillating pattern of death and rebirth. This seemed anomalous to me in comparison with the other criminal organisations I had learnt about, particularly given the SCU's status as a newcomer, and I wanted to investigate how the organisation compared to its counterparts. As such, my interest in carrying out PhD research on the topic of organised crime in Puglia grew as I recognised that there was a profound level of neglect in both the popular and the scholarly literature. Furthermore, I became increasingly aware of how important the organisation had been, however briefly, for the region of Puglia and its inhabitants, as well as its continued influence and presence even today.

Alongside my personal reasons for wanting to carry out the research comes my academic interest in the debate, both relating to Puglia and, in broader terms, organised crime on an international scale. I found that the existing theoretical models are rich and can be fruitful when applied to specific organisations. However, I am primarily interested in testing their validity when it comes to these relative unknowns or newcomers, such as the SCU, and the way in which they evolve and develop over time. I sought to carry out a project which attempts to apply the existing dominant theoretical models to an organisation that was not as large, successful or stable as the principal examples of Italian criminality.

The thesis therefore emerged as a result of my own engagement with existing literature on organised crime in general and my perception of what I saw as the somewhat reductive and undoubtedly skewed focus on *le tre sorelle della mafia* [the three mafia sisters] (in conversation

with the author, Ravveduto, M., 2011), namely la Cosa Nostra, la Camorra, and la 'ndrangheta. It is this lack of attention and disregard for the smaller, lesser-known and less stable forms of Italian organised crime that represents the linchpin of this thesis. The principal aim here is the attempt to formulate an analysis of one of the more neglected Italian organised crime syndicates along with the application of existing interpretive models to a new case study. I believe that an organisation's lack of notoriety does not necessarily imply that it does not pose a serious risk to democracy in Italy, across Europe and indeed beyond. Furthermore, the smaller scale and scope of the lesser-known organisations does not necessarily dictate that an analysis cannot be fruitful in relation to broader themes.

Indeed, an analysis of the evolution of an as-yet overlooked form of *criminalità* from the Italian south, and the inter-personal relationships therein, can provide us with further analytical tools. This analysis will serve to deepen our understanding of such a complex and difficult phenomenon, one that has been hitherto shrouded in secrecy and rife with confusion and misconceptions. Identifying some of the crucial factors, both internal and external or rather structural and agential, behind the development and evolution of the organisation will enable us to draw general conclusions surrounding the phenomenon. Only through full understanding can we ever hope to move towards the eventual death of organised crime which Falcone predicted so many years ago. Here again the judge's words strike a chord:

Men of honour are not evil, nor are they schizophrenic. They would not kill their own father or mother for a gram or two of heroin. They are men like us. The tendency of the western world, Europe in particular, is that of exorcising evil by projecting it on to ethnicities and behaviours which appear different to our own. However, if we want to effectively combat the mafia, we must not transform it into a monster, and nor should we view it as an octopus or a cancer. We must recognise that we are the same. (Falcone, 1991, cited in collaboration with Padovani, M., 1993, p. 83)

It is on the basis of this philosophy that I have chosen to focus on the region of Puglia. The thesis is based on the belief that an analysis of a newcomer in Italian organised crime may increase understanding, not only of the local aspects of the phenomenon, but also of manifestations of *mafia*-style organisations across the globe. The rationale behind my research will be explored in greater detail later in the thesis.

I therefore explore a critique of relevant interpretive models, and assess how and why the SCU appears to have shifted from one organisational configuration to another. I believe that a group which has struggled to sustain in-fighting, structural change and judicial pressure, as

has been the case with the earliest form of the SCU under founder Giuseppe Rogoli, can be just as useful and informative to the debate on the phenomenon of organised crime as an organisation that is considered to have been highly successful, lucrative, stable and enduring. What I set about trying to do was to apply the various models in the literature so far *vis-à-vis* the SCU in relation to certain challenges presented by the case study.

Study of the SCU is problematic precisely because as an organisation it represents a newcomer in the national context. How are we best supposed to study an organisation which emerged many decades after its counterparts? Can we apply the same theoretical interpretations to these organisations and, if so, how can this be done? Does a newcomer not manifest distinct characteristics from those of the traditional organisation and, as such, represent new challenges in theoretical terms? Moreover, the SCU's relative lack of success means that it is somewhat difficult to analyse in comparison with the *mafie tradizionali*. Can an organisation which emerged and was essentially defeated by the state counter-offensive all within 14 years (1983 to 1999) be analysed according to the same models which have been tested in relation to organisations which proved able to withstand considerable judicial pressure? Given that the SCU was officially founded in 1983 and already under trial just 3 years later in Bari in 1986, how may we best form a comparison when we consider how long the other criminal organisations in Italy were able to operate without this external pressure? Considering that SCU rituals were born largely out of mimicry of the traditional organisations by which it was inspired and, without which, it would never have existed, how may we analyse this complex aspect of the phenomenon?

In summary, I chose to study the SCU in Puglia from the pre-SCU years (1979-) to its near-destruction (1999) from the perspective of the principal interpretive models as I believe that a focus on the less successful and famous criminal organisations can make a small contribution to our understanding of the phenomenon today. If we believe that without a full understanding of *mafia*-style organisations, no such organisations will ever be eliminated, we also need to examine those organisations which fail in their mission and break down. If we want to understand how to combat the more successful organisations, an analysis of those less successful can be revealing, showing what it takes to 'succeed' as a criminal syndicate and what factors contribute to failure.

4. Overview of the thesis

Chapter One sets about defining the key terms at the heart of the thesis, beginning with an in-depth examination of the much-debated concept of organised crime. Furthermore, it presents a critique of some of the principal models used to analyse organised crime gangs and reviews existing literature on the topic, identifying some of the gaps. The chapter also outlines the key theoretical concepts, through which the empirical data will be analysed, specifically the structure and agency debate, success and failure in criminal organisations, in-fighting among organisations/clans and the thesis of “weaknesses of networked structures” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2010). The research questions and hypotheses, the rationale behind the focal points of my chosen case study and my methodology, including potential problems and solutions are also presented.

The remainder of the thesis is organised chronologically and is divided into three parts/time periods: 1979 to 1985; 1985 to 1991; and 1991 to 1999.

Chapter Two is the first empirical section of the thesis and it presents the case study of the Sacra Corona Unita (SCU), providing an analysis of the regional context before the emergence of the SCU from 1979. This is followed by an analytical history of the arrival of external *mafia*-style organisations in the region and an assessment of the affect this had on the local criminal underworld until 1985. Both the hierarchical and the network models are applied to the SCU and the thesis of “weaknesses of networked structures” is presented as the SCU evolves over its first few years of life. An extensive assessment of the birth of the SCU, the development of its organisational structure, economic activities and recruitment processes is provided and the notion of successful and failing criminal gangs is discussed. The chapter then addresses the theoretical framework in reference to my findings, arguing that the organisational structure was not static but underwent rapid and almost uncontrollable change. These changes took place in response to a series of internal and external variables and the reasons responsible for such changes are then examined.

Chapter Three accounts for SCU development from 1985 to 1991, the date of the appearance of the first rival splinter group until the first maxi-trial in Lecce (1990-1991). The notion of hierarchical networks (in relation to the evolving organisation) is discussed and success and failure of criminal syndicates in relation to organisational characteristics is explored. In order to best analyse the events of the relevant time period 1985-1988, three further agency factors were identified which were able to shed light upon some key episodes in SCU history, namely sub-regional loyalty, greed and short-termism. Further factors responsible for

organisational decline were identified as in-fighting, poor leadership, continued factionalism, and fragmentation. The effect of heightening judicial pressure on an organisation already rife with difficulty and conflict is assessed and related to the theoretical framework on the interpretive models of organised crime.

Chapter Four explores the history of the SCU from 1991 to 1999 from the perspective of the state counter-offensive and subsequent continued organisational decline. An overview of Italian anti-*mafia* legislation is provided due to its instrumental role in deciding the fate of the organisation which Rogoli founded. The history of the SCU in court is provided, including the first and second maxi-trials (1990-1991 and 1997 respectively) and the influence judicial pressure and intervention had over the evolution of the organisation is explored. The role of collaboration with the authorities is assessed, a widespread phenomenon among SCU affiliates of the period. Statistics relating to the role of strict prison regimes are presented, along with an analysis of the role of collaboration with the authorities and a brief comparative study between the SCU and the other principal *mafia*-style organisations in Italy. The role of women in the SCU is also explored, challenging the consensus within the literature and concluding that their role is crucial to organisational decline. The rapid changes and deterioration internally of the organisation are examined in relation to the theoretical framework on local-ethnic ties, weak networks, and the related notions of trust, embeddedness and success and failure in criminal organisations. An overview of more recent SCU history (1999-2012) is incorporated at the close of the chapter.

Chapter Five brings the findings of the study together and offers conclusions to the research questions and hypotheses presented in Chapter One. The chapter also considers future implications of the research and places the thesis within the wider body of literature.

This chapter has provided an introduction to the subject of the revived public interest and scholarly debate on organised crime in Italy, identified the most pertinent gaps in the literature that I will seek to address, and outlined the rationale behind the chosen case study. The following chapter offers a more in-depth examination of the field of organised crime research with a thorough review of the literature. Further, within the next chapter I present the theoretical framework, relevant interpretive models, research methods and hypotheses and the research design and methodology.

Chapter 1. Theoretical framework

1.1. Introduction

Organised crime emerged in Italy with Cosa Nostra (Lupo, 2004), in China with the Triads (Booth, 2001), in Japan with the Yakuza (Hill, 2003) and, as an offshoot of the Italian group syndicate, the USA's own branch of Cosa Nostra (Raab, 2006). Countless studies have been carried out on these organisations, from books (Cressey, 1969; Ianni, 1972; Arlacchi, 1986; Hess, 1988; Duggan, 1989; Abadinsky, 1990; Tranfaglia, 1992; Gambetta, 1993; Lupo, 1996; Varese, 2005; Dickie, 2011) to journal articles (Maltz, 1976; Shelly, 1995; Van Duyne, 1995; Edwards & Gill, 2002; Paoli, 2002; Morselli, 2003; Campana, 2011) and newspaper articles to popular culture references (The Godfather Trilogy, 1972-1990; La Piovra, 1984; The Sopranos, 1999-2007). Both the popular and the scholarly literature remain focused largely on the more traditional, largest, best-known and most successful organised crime groups. It is, however, the more modern, new-wave of criminal gangs which remain neglected both in terms of serious research and in popular culture. Accordingly, due to their relative anonymity they continue to pose a high threat and risk to democracy, peaceful society and international security. Engagement with the debate is further complicated by the difficulty in finding a consensus over definitions of exactly what the term *organised crime* actually means. It is clear that 'over the years...fact has mingled with fiction, speculation with fantasy, to such a degree that any clear assessment of what the mafia is has become very difficult' (Duggan, 1989, p. 1).

Ranging from post-war groups which have emerged in Italy to those which have developed in the more disparate states of Russia and the Balkans, it is these new, contemporary *mafie* which need to be examined more closely if the phenomenon of organised crime is to be fully understood. Since research into the phenomenon informs law enforcement and political engagement with organised crime as a political, economic and social matter, it is crucial that we include a broad-ranging spectrum of examples and case studies. Misunderstandings and misinterpretations represent an obstacle to combating organised crime. A better-informed perspective on the more contemporary models, in conjunction with a full understanding of the classic historic examples of the phenomenon, strengthens this battle.

The scarce existing literature on these contemporary forms includes those theorists who have assessed patterns of migration of existing *mafie* to 'non-mafia' areas, as opposed to

examining organisational structures, goals and activities of new types of ‘home-grown’ criminal groups. Examples include Sciarrone who looks at southern Italian organised crime groups operating in the north of the country (1998), and Varese who examines the Russian *mafia* branches in Italy (2007; 2011) and migratory movements from south to north, citing the case of the ‘ndrangheta (2008) (See also Gorgoni, 1995; Gambetta, 2011; Varese, 2006; 2011). This type of analysis contributes to a previously neglected facet of the debate in that they do not only examine the genesis, development, activities and interactions of the traditional *mafia*-style organisations. Rather, they consider innovative processes of growth, development, migration and adaptation of both traditional and more contemporary organisations. As such, this analysis may prove helpful to law enforcement agencies and law-makers alike in their long and difficult battle against organised crime. This is as a result of the shift of focus from a simple analysis of traditional organisations operating on their native territory to the threat of newcomers *or* those who successfully migrate, evolve and undergo serious adaption. In this chapter I will present the choice of topic, the selected case study and the research questions and emerging hypotheses. I will then go on to provide an assessment of the principal theoretical approaches, my chosen model, research design and, finally, the methodology.

1.2. Rationale

Theorists, writers, journalist and film-makers engage primarily with the Sicilian Mafia, and, less so, the Campanian and Calabrian cases. It is vital, however, that we also have a fully developed knowledge not only of the classic historical *mafie* but also of their more innovative counterparts. This thesis, therefore, focuses on the Sacra Corona Unita (SCU) as a neglected, contemporary example of Italian organised crime, based on the notion that an analysis of this organisation allows us to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. As such, this thesis emerged as a result of my belief that an analysis of a relatively contemporary and, as yet, neglected organisation such as the SCU can contribute to the debate on organised crime in a meaningful and insightful way.

The early SCU was chosen as a point of departure, but the selection of key figures and events within the organisation’s history was a complicated procedure. This process will be outlined later in the methodology. To begin, I carried out the review of the existing literature on the organisation. Even in Italy, there is relatively little popular engagement with the topic of organised crime in Puglia on a national scale; it is very much a local issue. Today the local law enforcement bodies are careful to refer not explicitly to the SCU or the NSCU, but rather to *le*

mafie pugliesi [Apulian mafia clans], illustrating the characteristic factionalism and plurality in the region. The SCU is widely considered to have posed relatively little threat to the local and national state, democracy and society. Indeed, there are those who are convinced that it no longer truly exists, particularly when viewed in comparison with the more traditional *mafia*-style organisations. The scholarly literature seems to reflect this belief. Paoli refers to the ‘so-called Apulian Organised Crime and Other Groups’, stating that the SCU ‘never controlled the whole Apulian organised crime... [and] no longer exists as a single viable organisation’ (2004, p. 278). Recent Italian press coverage echoes this, with Denigris claiming that the ‘SCU was all but dead and buried’ (2010, *Sacra Corona Unita, smantellato il clan che si stava riorganizzando* *Antenna Sud*, 29 September¹¹). Let us be clear that there is no question as to whether the SCU or NSCU continues to exist; in some form it does and it is still the subject of numerous judicial investigations (e.g. *Operazione Augusta*, Lecce, 2011-). It is simply seen as marginal and weak in comparison with its counterparts, as opposed to non-existent.

The scarce existing literature emerged in the 1990s shortly after the organisation had undergone a serious battle in the courts and its profile had been raised, but the analysis and findings proved to be as problematic as they are limited. Longo (1997) published his thesis on the topic of the SCU, analysing the genesis, growth and evolution of the organisation from a sociological perspective. Longo’s text was helpful in providing an initial overview of the organisation, and he was the first to identify some key issues which I also bring to light in this thesis. However, his work covers a relatively short period, as it was written and published while the second maxi-trial against the organisation (1997) was still under way. As such, the vital effects of the judicial crackdown upon the organisation were not taken into account when the author was presenting his findings.

Similarly, Massari (1998) presented her interpretation of the organisation having worked in collaboration with Judge Cataldo Motta, the chief prosecutor in Lecce and in all the judicial trials against the SCU. Her version of *pugliese* history is considered to be more accurate than Longo’s (Motta, in conversation with the author, 2006), and indeed Massari offers a detailed overview of the genesis of the organisation, considers internal interaction, principal economic activities and the evolution of the clans. However, her book was published only one year after Longo’s text, hence the author was unable to address the aftermath of the judicial

¹¹ <http://www.antennasud.com/sezioni/news/cronaca/sacra-corona-unita-smantellato-il-clan-che-si-stava-riorganizzando/>. *Sacra Corona Unita, smantellato il clan che si stava riorganizzando*, 29/09/2010. Accessed 1/10/2011

intervention in a meaningful way.

Additional books and articles have been published on the topic, including Gorgoni's (1995) journalistic analysis of crime in Puglia which was more creative than it was informative. Massari worked in collaboration with Motta to write an article on the role of women in the SCU (2003) but this was restricted to a discussion of certain roles, more specifically those working as 'post women' or debt collectors, and did not appear representative of the broader role that women played following the aforesaid maxi-trial of 1997. A student from Lecce, Apollonio, also published a short text on the SCU (2010) which focuses on the organisation's money-laundering and contraband activities from its genesis to the present day. This volume is very useful in that it is a comprehensive study of the more recent years of SCU activity but the author does not bring a theoretical perspective to his analysis of the development of the organisation.

I decided to carry out my research on the organisation with the benefit of hindsight, analysing the region from the era *before* the emergence of the SCU up until the period immediately following the key maxi-trials of 1990-1991 and 1997 and focussing on the role of the so-called father of the organisation, Giuseppe 'Pino' Rogoli. The reasons behind the specific choice to focus on Rogoli's SCU are based upon his role as the historic founder of the organisation and, subsequently, the most important protagonist at the heart of SCU history. As the founder and the most famous member of the SCU, even to this day Rogoli represents the public face of the organisation. Finally, I concluded that Rogoli himself was directly involved with events which led to vital changes and struggles in the organisation he himself had established, predominantly in relation to risk-taking, the breakdown of trust and in-fighting. Accordingly, an analysis of the development and evolution of his own network of affiliates, from the pre-SCU era to the virtual breakdown of the organisation some 18 years later, will allow us to best link the theoretical issues to our findings based on primary data.

Let us now consider the research questions and hypotheses which will allow us to examine the case study in question.

1.3. Research questions and hypotheses

The research questions which will help to form the narrative structure of this thesis are

1. In an already crowded national context, do ‘newcomers’ or ‘emerging’ groups in organised crime adopt their organisational structure in relation and response to local socio-economic factors or in relation and response to pre-existing rival organisations?
2. Is the organisational structure adopted by newcomers or emerging groups in organised crime stable over time or subject to change and fluctuations?
3. Does the organisational structure impact upon the success or failure of a newcomer or emerging group in organised crime?

The hypotheses which emerge from these research questions are

1. In an already crowded national context, newcomers in organised crime adopt their organisational structure *in part* autonomously but *above all* in relation and response to pre-existing rival and/or sponsoring external organisations.
2. The organisational structure adopted by newcomers in organised crime is likely to be subject to change and fluctuations, in view of the complicated balance between adapting to the local socio-economic context and responding to rival organisations.
3. The organisational structure has a clear impact upon the success or failure of a newcomer in organised crime. In particular, whether a hierarchy, a network or a hybrid hierarchical-network, each organisational configuration has both strengths and weaknesses. If those weaknesses prevail, the organisation is likely to fail. In the case of a network configuration, the flaws and weaknesses that may lead to failure are those identified in the scholarly literature on terrorist organisations.

Here it is necessary to define the key terms by which this thesis is underpinned: what do we mean by organised crime; what do we consider to be traditional as opposed to modern organised crime; and what do we mean by newcomer?

1.4. Defining terms

The understanding of the term organised crime is fundamental but remains a difficult task, as Ianni stipulated:

Not only criminologists, but sociologists, anthropologists, historians, economists, political scientists, and legal scholars along with journalists and jurists have joined with criminal justice professionals to define, describe, [and] analyse...what is clearly a world-wide...phenomenon (Foreword: ix, eds. Kelly, Chin, and Schatzberg, 1994).

The matter of definitions is a contentious one, but we must also consider why we see the need to define the term and, furthermore, why it has proven so difficult to find a generally acceptable definition. Adamoli, Di Nicola, Savona, & Zoffi explain:

Defining the concept of organised crime has long been a source of controversy and contention... Nevertheless, there has been a need for an unequivocal, common definition of organised crime that, due to the cross-border character that this form of crime has assumed, could make co-operation among different countries easier. The essential characteristic of the term “organised crime” is that it denotes a process or method of committing crimes, not a distinct type of crime itself, nor even a distinct type of criminal (1998, p. 4).

Further explanations for the need to find a coherent and all-encompassing definition for organised crime are highlighted by Maltz (1976) as follows:

There are a number of reasons for wanting to define organized crime. One is to determine how resources should be allocated and how effectively they have been expended in attacking it...Another reason for defining it is for legal purposes. If a specific penalty, for example, obtains for a person convicted of an offence when the offence is considered an organized crime, there should be some means of distinguishing organized crime-related offences from others... [A third reason is] Territorial. Are there any criteria for deciding whether a given case should be investigated and prosecuted by federal, state, or local agencies, if all the agencies can rightfully claim jurisdiction? (p.

It is clear that there is no agreement about what the phenomenon represents or why the phenomenon itself requires definition. Maltz declares a fourth and final need for definition as useful in helping us to:

Understand it as a phenomenon. While some still maintain that the proof of its existence, like the proof that God exists, is a leap of faith best left to theologians, others have traced its different manifestations over the past century and are interested in tracing its growth and evolution. (1976, p. 22)

In addition, Maltz offers a list of characteristics taken from a variety of definitions of organised crime in order to provide a clear picture of an organised crime group and to aid the process of defining it, including corruption, violence, sophistication, continuity, structure, discipline, ideology (or lack thereof), multiple enterprises, and involvement in legitimate enterprises (1994, p. 26). In order to be classified as an organised crime syndicate, a potential candidate organisation can be characterised by its involvement in corruption, usually in the political and/or economic spheres, often employing violence and intimidation to achieve its goals. Frequently engaging in highly sophisticated methods, these organisations can be characterised by a pre-defined structure, with at least some degree of continuity. However, there are some instances in which this level of embeddedness in the legal or semi-legal economy is neither possible nor is it desirable, as some smaller, sub-regional groups may remain embedded in a marginalized subculture (Von Lampe, 2008). Discipline is certainly a key attribute, as is ideology (or, indeed, the absence thereof), and they are often pluralistic, with their activities breaching in to licit, as well as illicit, enterprises. What this illustrates is the many distinct factors, attributes and forms by which groups which can be classified as organised crime are characterised.

1.4.a. My definition of organised crime

For this study, accordingly, I define organised crime, organised crime syndicates and *mafia*-style organisations as:

Structured groups of individuals engaging in crime, ranging from groups of individuals who act together to commit different types of crime, to crime syndicates as well-structured groups with varied hierarchical roles seeking profit, to *mafie*, the most specialised type which focus on using politics to make profit (Armao, 2003, p. 28, eds. Allum and Siebert). These may range from rudimentary, embryonic forms right through to highly sophisticated syndicates (Von Lampe, 2008). The groups and individuals act in order to achieve the aim of committing serious crime. They do so in order to increase economic gain and territorial control. Intimidation and violence are employed to this end and structures are subject to change, be it rapid or gradual, over time.

As per the organised crime genus continuum, a distinction must be made between *mafia*-style organisations and non-*mafia* organised crime. The former is more commonly characterised by family allegiances, cultural ties and shared values, as well as seeking monopoly control; and, at the opposite end of the spectrum, we can expect to find market-based, loosely-connected entrepreneurs, working on a more *ad hoc* basis, focussing on similar goals but often employing different methods.

Within this thesis, we will explore where the SCU falls along the Armao spectrum during each pre-defined era of its existence and what factors can account for this. Here, let us endeavour to define the key stages in the development of the organised crime presence, namely traditional versus newcomer, a distinction which can be incorporated within our definition.

1.5. Classifying traditional and modern forms of organised crime

This thesis is interested not only in understanding how 'newcomer' groups such as the SCU emerge, evolve and organise, but also in studying the effect that their status as newcomers has on their relative success or failure as organisations. As yet, the scholarly literature on organised crime has failed to address newcomer status in relation to successful clan operations. The wave of newcomers which has emerged appears to represent something of a departure from the traditional criminal syndicates, particularly in terms of organisation, structure, and culture. Vital questions are raised by these distinctions and that is why a study in this area will facilitate a more effective and pragmatic analysis of the debate.

In order to carry out this analysis successfully, it is crucial that we are able to distinguish between traditional and modern *mafia*-style organisations. Wright (2006) does so, elucidating that the *traditional* examples of *mafia*-style organisations 'have developed over many years, often from secret societies or warrior groups whose earlier goals were as much social and political as criminal' (p. 100). Characterised by their preference for the provision of illegal forms of protection, in the tradition of Gambetta's work (1993), these groups are identified by the crucial role played by conventions, customs, and initiation rites. It is interesting to note that the traditional groups appear, as in rural Sicily, to have pre-existed the formation and expansion of modern illegal or semi-legal markets, most notably those involved in the trade in drugs, human trafficking, and arms trade (Paoli, 2002), and it is largely in connection with these markets that we witness the emergence of the more innovative organisations, or 'newcomers'. Duggan considers the 'degeneration' thesis, stating that

After the Second World War, the mafia was said to have degenerated into gangsterism, and much of the blame was put on the Americans. More recently, the supergrass, Tommaso Buscetta, spoke of the mafia's decline from a noble organisation that protected the weak back in the 1950s, to an association of ruthless common criminals in the 1980s (1989, p. 47)

The effect that this shift from traditional to modern may have had on the organisational structure of crime syndicates is evident as we appear to witness a departure from the social and political norms and shared values which may have once lain at the heart of the traditional organisations. As such, the commitment to the concepts of honour and kinship has often been abandoned. In their place, we see the emergence of a seemingly more profit-focused, unscrupulous and market-force driven *modus operandi*. These new groups, the so-called 'newcomers', tend to be characterised by a looser structure, more informal and adaptable to their environment and the opportunities or constraints which may arise (Block, 1989; Morselli, 2005; Varese, 2006). Abadinsky (2006) also distinguishes between traditional and non-traditional groups in organised crime, identifying the traditional as the Italian clans, non-ideologically based but rigidly organised with a hierarchy, defined ranks and norms which are adhered to. Cressey, whose bureaucratic approach was the embodiment of the original hierarchical model (Morselli, 2005), defined a hierarchy as a formal, rational entity which was based on the internal division of labour of specific roles (1969). Abadinsky contributes to the traditional-modern debate, citing the example of African-American organised crime groups which emerged in the USA following the Vietnam War, when contacts across Asia were exploited in order to traffic heroin, directly

bypassing the traditional, Italian-American groups (2006). The author refers to a diverse range of these non-traditional, ‘newcomer’ groups, including Mexican drug traffickers, the Gangster Disciples, Frank Lucas in New York, the Nigerians, the Bloods and the Crips, as well as the growth of the phenomenon of Russian and Asian groups across the USA (Abadinsky, 2006).

The table below (Table 1) outlines the three waves of organised crime we have identified; first comes the traditional, ‘first wave’, starting with the Sicilian Cosa Nostra at the genesis of organised crime; following this comes the ‘second wave’, or ‘newcomers’, which emerge in the period immediately following the Second World War, a period of expansion and modernisation; lastly comes the ‘third wave’, or the most recent ‘newcomers’, which emerged following the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. It is also crucial to make clear that, for this thesis, ‘newcomer’ refers to ‘new’ in temporal terms; we are not concerned with external or migratory arrivals as ‘new’, but rather ‘new’ in the chronological sense, but still native or endogenous. It is not our intention here within the thesis to explore the reasons for the emergence of these groups during these particular eras. What we are interested in, however, is an assessment of *how* they are organised, and *why* they are organised in this way, because this can help us to understand what it is about these organisations that distinguish them from one another and factors which account for success and failure. Only when we understand what the crucial working mechanisms are can we truly understand how these mechanisms can be blocked, and the way in which this can be examined is via a process of analysing their *workings*, or organisation.

Table 1: Three different waves of organised crime

| Traditional: 1800s-1945; the ‘first wave’ | Post-war: 1945-1991; the ‘second wave’ | Post-Soviet: 1991-2000; the ‘third wave’ |
|--|--|---|
| Italian: Cosa Nostra, ’ndrangheta, Camorra | Italian: <i>pugliese</i> | Russian |
| North American: Cosa Nostra | Colombian cartels | Eastern European: Albanian, Balkans |
| Chinese Triads, Japanese Yakuza | UK London gangs, Irish gangs and Jamaican; French, Corsicans | |

It is the birth and rapid rise of these *modern* organisations that lies at the heart of this project

and which here we shall refer to as the second-wave, or simply newcomers, namely the organisation which emerged in Italy between the late 1970s and the early 1980s. There is an enduring engagement with the first wave, both in the scholarly and the popular literature (Cressey, 1969; Ianni, 1972; Arlacchi, 1986; Hess, 1988; Abadinsky, 1990), and the third-wave has garnered considerable interest within the scholarly debate (Bibes, 2001, Varese, 2001; 2009; 2011, Arsovska, 2006). The second wave, however, remains somewhat neglected.

The thesis is primarily concerned with developing an understanding of these newcomer organisations and of the way in which they differ from their precursors in terms of structure, characteristics and activities and, if a distinction emerges, to account for it. Only then may we ascertain if the organisational structures which *have* developed have a genuine role to play in ensuring organisational success or resulting in organisational failure, or whether other structure or agency variables play a vital part in this process. It is also imperative that we assess if there is a difference in the organisational structure of these criminal organisations; is it just a question of becoming more organised to be more efficient in a market context as was the case for the Sicilian Mafia in the post-war period? These considerations will be among the key issues and concepts at the centre of the thesis.

Whilst the distinction of these three ‘waves’ of criminal groups aids our understanding of the history of the phenomenon of organised crime, for this study we will differentiate simply between traditional and non-traditional (i.e. newcomer) as defined by Lyman and Potter (2004) in Table 2. For Lyman and Potter, the differences are related to time periods, viewing pre-war as traditional and post-war as being non-traditional and, furthermore, inextricably linked to the drug trade.

Table 2. Traditional and non-traditional organised crime groups

| Traditional: 1800's-1945 | Non-traditional: 1945-2000 |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| Cosa Nostra, 'Ndrangheta, Camorra | Chinese: Triads Japanese: Yakuza Italian: Apulian Eastern European: Albanian, Balkan, Russian |
| [North American] Cosa Nostra | Colombian cartels |
| | UK: London gangs, Irish, Jamaicans France: Corsicans |

Source: Lyman and Potter (2004, pp. 9-44).

Lyman and Potter consider *traditional* to include the earliest Italian groups of the *Mezzogiorno* (Sicilian, Campanian, and Calabrian) and the Italian-Americans who in Chicago and New York reigned supreme for decades until the succession of other groups, such as African-Americans and Asians. As early as 1931, it was argued that these traditional groups emerged in a 'climate in which organised crime performs services for which there is public demand and satisfies certain persistent and outlawed human appetites' (Lipmann, W., 1931, pp. 1-4; 65-69). Alcohol during the Prohibition era in the USA is a good example of this. These groups can be largely grouped as adhering to Cressey's hierarchical-bureaucratic model (1969).

We may therefore surmise that *non-traditional* includes the Chinese, Japanese, Russian, Albanian, Colombian, and Apulian, as we witness the coming-of-age of post Italian/Italian-American criminal groups, and we can see groups based upon ethnic minorities that have emerged in the wake of the decline of the first-wave/Italian-American syndicates (Kelly, R., Chin, K., and Schatzberg, R. (eds.), 1994, p. 7). A certain level of concern and confusion was induced by the exaggerated images of Chinese triads, Jamaican posses, Japanese Yakuza (*ibid.*), Colombian cartels, Russian *mafia*, *pugliesi cosche* [Apulian clans], and Albanian gangs, due to a lack of understanding and cohesive definition in reference to these more modern organisations. What these new groups reveal is

A different criminal topography but not a different set of imperatives. As criminal organizations, their aim is familiar: profits and power through any means. What is also clear...is that criminal organizations are protean; they are tied to circumstances large and small (Kelly, R., Chin, K., and Schatzberg, R. (eds.), 1994, p. 8).

As such, the thesis focuses on one of these newcomer organisations, acknowledging that these organisations' objectives are the same as those of the traditional models, but with the aim of identifying new patterns of behaviour and accounting for these.

1.6. Existing literature in the field

There is a long-standing debate which focuses on how best to understand and analyse the *models* of organisational structures that these criminal syndicates adopt. But why is there a need to devise and formulate such models? Albanese writes:

A model is an effort to make a picture of a piece of reality in order to understand it better (p. 77, eds. Kelly, Chin & Schatzberg, 1994).

Interpretive models in organised crime studies have tended to be categorised into three types: those focusing on rigid hierarchical structures, those which stress the role of looser, network-based configurations, and those centred on an economic or market interpretation. One must be wary of influence or bias, however, as Albanese states:

The outcome of efforts to model organized crime invariably reflects the perspective of the investigator (*ibid.*, p. 78).

Accordingly, economists may prioritise economic factors, those working for the government or political scientists often focus on hierarchical, government-like entities, and social scientists see it as more of a socio-cultural phenomenon (Albanese, eds. Kelly, Chin & Schatzberg, 1994). Nonetheless, these three broad strata provide us with a useful point of departure in terms of an assessment of the debate on the explanations for the emergence of these organisations, and may also help us to understand the way in which these organisations *work*. Once this distinction has

been established, we may attempt to account for relative successes and failures of criminal syndicates *vis-à-vis* organisational structure or other structure or agency variables.

1.7. Interpretive models of organised crime (Albanese, 1994)

In order to best analyse the primary data gathered for this thesis, Albanese's interpretive models of organised crime have been selected as a useful analytical framework. Albanese's approach was chosen because it offers a concise, coherent and easily-applicable theoretical approach through which we may begin to analyse our rich empirical material. Although Albanese was writing more than twenty years ago, the comprehensive and far-reaching models which he devised and synthesised are still relevant today and the scholarly literature has yet to deviate far from his interpretations of the phenomenon. As such, these models act as a useful guide by which we can assess whether newcomers 'fit' into one or more of the typologies and, if so, whether structure and agency factors contribute to these configurations.

Albanese (1994) poses the question 'What is a model of organized crime?' (p. 7) in his own study on perspectives on organised crime theory and research. The author states that distinct interpretive models relating to the phenomenon have emerged from all quarters, including government investigators, researchers, and scholars utilising data from informants, surveillance, court records, interviews and historical accounts (*ibid.*). The author concedes that models are limited, but he also cites their utility in aiding our understanding of often complex subject matters. The author classifies the models of organised crime into three sections: hierarchical, local ethnic or cultural and economic.

1.7.a. The hierarchy model

Also known as the bureaucratic, national conspiracy or corporate model, Albanese claims that:

This model of organised crime characterizes it as a government-like structure, where organized illegal activities are conducted with the approval of superiors, 'policy' is set by higher-ups, and illicit activities are 'protected' through the influence of the hierarchy (1994, p. 79).

From US senate hearings of the 1950s to contemporary investigations of the Sicilian Mafia, the hierarchical model has been utilised to analyse and explore crime organisations which are

characterised by groups of people arranged in order of rank or grade and whose activities are organised accordingly. Albanese states that the structural basis for criminal activity in this type of organisation is based upon a family unit 'with graded ranks of authority from boss down to soldiers' (1994, p. 80). Within this type of organisation the 'bosses oversee the activities of family members...and a "commission" of bosses handles inter-family relations and disputes' (*ibid.*).

Citing examples such as the Sicilian Cosa Nostra organisation and its North American offshoot, Albanese states that the model has been criticised for its imprecision, with facts relating to the organisations failing to be historically confirmed and, according to some, rendering the model 'useless' (Albanese, 1994, p. 80). However, Albanese argues that the hierarchical model '...fits best in its description of how the group functions in accord with respect for position...[but] is weakest' in describing whether there exists a true connection among organized crime groups in different cities (1994, p. 82). This arguably outdated and overly simplified model is, therefore, useful to the analysis of certain types of criminal organisations during certain periods of time but it is far from exhaustive. As a result of this dissatisfaction, additional models have emerged.

1.7.b. The local, ethnic model

Identifying weaknesses in the hierarchy model, social scientists became involved in the scholarly debate on the phenomenon for the first time in the 1970s. As such, researchers found that members of organised crime syndicates do not necessarily belong to a single organisation but are connected by a series of loose connections and ties which develop as a means by which to increase profit. Refuting the accepted notion of organised crime as some form of 'private government' (Albanese, 1994, p. 83), the author argues that studies show cultural and ethnic ties as the crucial links between criminals and that groups are local in nature, as opposed to connected via a national crime syndicate (*ibid.*). Albanese describes and explains the structure that forms the context for criminal activity, emphasising the importance of cultural and ethnic ties which bind the group together (1994, p. 84). Within this type of organisation, individuals largely control their own activities and take on partners according to their own volition, and, according to Albanese, there is scant evidence to show that they are connected to a national crime syndicate, but rather they are locally organised.

Albanese acknowledges that this model fits best when attempting to analyse *how* illicit relationships are structured, rather than studies focussing on the nature or extent of criminal

activity (1994, p. 84). Whilst this model certainly contributes to the debate on the phenomenon of organised crime, just as with the previous case, criticisms began to emerge. Whilst the local, ethnic interpretation aids our understanding of the socio-cultural facet of the debate, how does it relate to organisations that do feature strict internal hierarchies and act in a similar way to formal/legal businesses? So, whilst the model is once again useful to our grasp of certain cases and limited sections of the phenomenon, a more comprehensive and inclusive model was required which could potentially encompass all forms of organised crime.

1.7.c. The business enterprise model

The third and final model emerged in the late 1970s when the economics of organised crime ‘drew interest among researchers and policymakers’ (Albanese, 1994, p. 84) for the first time, focussing on economic relations as drivers of organised crime business. Dissatisfied with both the hierarchy and the local ethnic models, Albanese states that:

Investigators found that relationships between individuals (hierarchical, ethnic, racial, or friendship) were the genesis of organized crime activity (as opposed to individual, less organized forms of criminal behaviour) (*ibid.*).

As such, investigators sought to identify factors which caused the emergence of these illicit relationships in the hope that this would facilitate a broader understanding of the true causes of the phenomenon. Albanese argues that:

Organized crime groups form, and thrive in the same way that legitimate businesses do: they respond to the needs and demands of suppliers, customers, regulators, and competitors... [The only difference being] that organized criminals deal in illegal products, where legitimate businesses generally do not (1994, p. 85).

Again Albanese describes the structure of this sort of organisation, incidental to criminal opportunities, stating that both organised crime and legal business involve similar activities at different ends of the ‘spectrum of legitimacy’ (1994, p. 86). The author argues that, for this type of criminal organisation, operations are not ethnically exclusive, nor are they particularly violent, and are rarely centralised due to the nature of the markets and activities involved (*ibid.*). As such, this model ‘clearly places these business-related concerns as more significant than hierarchical obligations or ethnic links in the genesis and continuation of organized crime’ (*ibid.*). Whilst this approach is certainly broader and more inclusive than the previous two, it

can only truly allow for an analysis of one fairly limited facet of the phenomenon. What of organisational structure, cultural and social drivers and structure or agency factors? It is simply too general and leads to a focus on all organised crime groups; a collection of actors which is simply too broad and diverse to be analysed as ‘one’.

Whilst it is clear to see that every model has its limitations, the approaches presented by Albanese represent a useful tool through which we can attempt to classify criminal groups. Moreover, the categorisations offer us a practical guide through which we can seek to identify what sort of organisation we are dealing with when it comes to our chosen topic. Do additional variables mean that, for newcomers, these models are now defunct or are they still helpful when it comes to the analysis of contemporary organisations?

1.7.d. The three models in combination

Albanese concedes that ‘there is evidence to support each of the three models...in certain respects’ (1994, p. 87). However, the author also identifies three ways in which these models merge, citing Cosa Nostra groups, for example, as (loosely) hierarchical, ethnically bound and maintained by market forces (*ibid.*). Secondly, Albanese refers to ethnically bound groups that are not hierarchical but are driven by economic factors. Finally, the author cites groups that are not hierarchically *or* ethnically bound but which do engage in activities corresponding to the available market (*ibid.*).

Albanese argues that, whilst the hierarchical and local ethnic models focus on *how* groups are organised, the enterprise model investigates how any given group’s *activities* are organised. As such, an overlap of the models is not problematic and nor should it be conflictual. The author states that:

Once one recognizes, as the organised crime literature clearly indicates, (1) that some organised crime is hierarchical in nature, and much is not; (2) that some is locally based and ethnically bound in nature, and much is not; and (3) that all organized crime activity is entrepreneurial in nature, then the differences among the models become less significant (Albanese, 1994, p. 88).

On the basis of Albanese’s work on the models of organised crime, let us consider that organisations may exist which represent, or ‘fit’, all three of the models. We accept Albanese’s theory that all organised crime syndicates are entrepreneurial in nature, whilst displaying factors

from the two remaining models. As such, for this thesis we accept the notion that market forces drive organised crime groups, and we will be applying the first and second models, respectively the hierarchical and local, ethnic models, in order to best understand the phenomenon in question. The analysis of our empirical data indicates that the hierarchical approach is most applicable to the earliest stages of the organisation we have chosen to focus on; the SCU. However, as a result of various structural and agency factors, there is a shift. Following this, the SCU evolves into an organisation which is better explained by a hybrid of the hierarchical *and* the local, ethnic model as a sort of hierarchical-network ‘that...develops throughout [an affiliate’s criminal] life involving numerous reciprocal relationships and obligations to the people to whom one is bonded. (Morrison, 2002, p. 3). Whilst not representing an entirely new typology in the field of terrorism studies¹², the concept of a hierarchical network remains largely unexplored in the literature on organised crime. This hybrid model, however, is certainly applicable in certain phases of SCU history and will be explained in greater detail as the thesis progresses. Finally, the business enterprise approach is relevant and applicable to the thesis in that, with its definition of all organised crime as entrepreneurial, it helps us to understand and analyse the organisation throughout the entire period in question.

What is of interest here is not defining an organisation’s structure *per se*, but rather establishing how and why these organisations emerge, and how and why they take on the structure that they do. Some emerge as hierarchies and remain so. Some hierarchies themselves emerge from local, ethnic-bound criminal syndicates and evolve in response to internal and external, or structural and agency, variables. Moreover, there are some organisations which set out goals, plans and objectives and succeed in achieving these. Conversely, there are examples of other organisations which aim to form one sort of organisation, but the final product is quite another. Furthermore, there are cases of organisations which are branded as a great success and others which are considered to have failed. How and why does this happen? How difficult is it for members of these criminal groups to achieve their initial mission or objectives? There has been a focus on the trend of ‘transplanted’ groups (see Varese, 2011, for further detail) or those which emerge organically in one area and migrate and settle in another. There are also examples of groups who simply borrow from and imitate other organisations, lacking in the capability or desire to formulate their own original brand. We may also observe criminal gangs who attempt to withstand potential attempts at transplantation of these migratory, exogenous groups, some more successfully than others. All of these distinct examples lead us on to the next crucial element of our theoretical framework; an analysis of both structural and agency factors in relation to the emergence, development and evolution of newcomer criminal organisations.

¹² See Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) and Morselli and Petit (2007).

1.8. Key theoretical considerations: my analytical approach

1.8.a. The structure and agency approach

In light of the analysis of the diverse theories on organised crime, here let us introduce the ontological approach which will help us to best analyse our primary data: structure and agency. Through the application of this model, the intention is to connect variables relating to the genesis, development, and success and failure of criminal organisations, be they internal or external relations and constraints, to structural or agency factors. As such, the structure and agency approach will underpin the entire theoretical framework, incorporating all of the other factors under the umbrella of, broadly speaking, contextual or individual factors. Once again a need for definitions and clarity is required, so here let us explore the structure and agency debate more closely.

Described as arguably ‘the most important theoretical issue within the human sciences’ (Carlnaes, 1992; Giddens, 1984; Archer, 1996, cited in McAnulla, S., Marsh, D., and Stoker, G., eds., 2002, p. 271), the structure and agency approach made an initial impact in the field of sociology, and latterly in the realm of political science. Hay’s research on the debate is regarded as ‘seminal’ (*ibid.*) so let us here incorporate his definitions in order to broaden our understanding of a complex and highly-debated issue. In his definition of the essence of the debate, Hay describes structure and agency simply as ‘context and conduct’ (2002, p. 89), in writing:

What we are concerned with here is the relationship between the political actors we identify...and the environment in which they find themselves; in short, with the extent to which political conduct shapes and is shaped by political context...Some authors... place their emphasis upon the capacity of decision-makers to shape the course of events. By contrast, other more structuralist authors...emphasise instead the limited autonomy of the state’s personnel and the extent to which they are constrained by form, function and the structure of the state itself (*ibid.*).

We can see that Hay outlines the structure and agency debate from a political science perspective, referring to identified political actors and the context which they occupy, and arguing that ‘we can differentiate relatively easily between two types of explanation: (i) those which appeal predominantly to what might be called *structural* factors on the one hand, and (ii) those which appeal principally to *agency* (or *agential*) factors on the other’ (Hay, 2002, p. 94).

Hay provides detail on the notion of structure, arguing that:

Structure basically means context and refers to the setting within which social, political and economic events occur and acquire meaning...In particular, they are referring to the ordered nature of social and political relations- to the fact that political institutions, practices, routines and conventions appear to exhibit some regularity or *structure* over time (2002, p. 940).

In addition, Hay outlines the notion of agency in greater detail when he writes:

Agency refers to action, in our case to political conduct. It can be defined, simply, as the ability or capacity of an actor to act consciously and, in doing so, to attempt to realise his or her intentions...In particular... [agency] implies a sense of free will, choice or autonomy- that the actor could have behaved differently and that this choice between potential courses of action was, or at least could have been, subject to the actor's conscious deliberation (2002, pp. 94-95).

As such, for the thesis we define structure and agency *as per* Hay's definition. Structural factors relate to external relations and constraints which affect action and influence outcome as a result of mechanisms of context, states, and institutions. Agential factors relate to individual actors taking action on the basis of free will and rational choice.

Now that we have established definitions of structure, agency, and some of the related key concepts surrounding the ontological debate, it is important that we examine previous applications of the theoretical approach in the field of organised crime research.

1.8.b. The structure and agency approach applied to organised crime

Although increasingly popular in political science research, the application of the structure and agency approach in the scholarly literature on organised crime literature is scarce. However, Allum (2006) is one of the first thinkers to apply the concepts of structure and agency to an organised crime syndicate, namely the Neapolitan Camorra.

Allum (2006) considers the merits of Giddens' structuration theory (1978) in relation to organised crime research arguing that the author 'constructed and analysed 'society' as the

interaction between the individual and the structure...a dualism in which both are interconnected: the structuration theory' (*ibid.*). Delving further into Giddens' approach, Allum writes:

Whereas many social theorists have studied the role of individuals in terms of groups and group dynamics without theorizing about their own individuality, Giddens tackled the very problem of the subject in the group and identified an analytical space for the individual, whom he referred to as 'the agent'. This enabled him to concentrate on different types of individual behaviour (motivations, actions, and consequences) and insist on the role of the 'agent', especially its transformative capacity, in the social process (2006, p. 12) .

Applying Giddens' structuration theory to the Neapolitan Camorra, Allum argues this gave a voice to criminals which was previously unheard, as '...it allowed space to be given to the individual members of the criminal organization being studied and theorize about their behaviour, their various motivations, the various moments of actions and the general transformation of their organization' (2006, p. 12).

For Giddens, structure is 'an invisible form of historical memory in-built in the agent which has no reality and is brought into being through the agent' (cited in Allum, 2006, p. 12). Allum incorporates this into her own definition as representative of the 'internal structure', which she describes as 'also invisible...the acquired and internalized elements of the psyche' (2006, p. 12). It is, claims Allum, these '...personal memory traces, historical experiences and education...as well as beliefs and desires...[that] can help us explain collective action [in organised crime]' (p. 12). Allum (2006) also incorporates the notion of 'external structure' (p. 12), referring to '...other agents, socio-economic conditions, institutions, the State, and other systems. Although these are only instantiated through the agent, it is important to note that they are the subjective and inter-subjective experiences of the 'external structure' as viewed by the agent' (pp. 12-13). For Allum's model (2006):

The agent instantiates both the 'internal' and 'external structure' (forming together the 'general structure' and produces a 'recurring criminal practice')...the interaction between the agent ('internal structure': the rules and resources of the psyche, personal memory, education, beliefs, desires, dilemmas, and traditions) and the 'external structure' (the rules and resources of subjective and inter-subjective experiences of other agents, socio-economic conditions, institutions, the State, etc.) produces action or what causes action, i.e. a change in beliefs or desires. This 'action' constitutes a type

of recurring practice which forms a criminal sub-system known as the Camorra. This criminal sub-system is thus made up of some basic and constant rules and resources that can vary, increasing and decreasing in influence according to different historical moments (p. 13).

This approach has the advantage of explaining change, but also addresses how organised crime is produced and reproduced, as well as the motivations of individual agents.

In terms of connecting the structure and agency debate to our theoretical approach to organised crime models, here we can already see emerging links. We accept Hay's broad definitions of structure and agency, or context and conduct, as in the classifications outlined earlier. The application of Giddens' structuration theory is central here, as we accept that it is not structure *versus* agency, but rather both have an effect on organisational emergence and evolution *in combination*. The approach adopted in the thesis to the relationship between the two is, therefore, more holistic as structure and agency are viewed as inextricably linked, relations or connections between the two are considered to be reciprocal and, ultimately, they represent a duality, as opposed to a dualism. Newcomers which emerge in already crowded spaces are certainly subject to the effects of both structural *and* agential factors. In the *pugliese* case, structural factors are represented by pre-existing rival or sponsorship organisations, embeddedness within the local context (a concept which will be explained later in the thesis) and state and police repression. Agential variables are present in the form of members' values and experiences (e.g. in the prison system), leaders' behaviour, inter-clan interaction and social ties.

In order to understand the theoretical model adopted here, it is crucial that we identify links between Albanese's models and the structure and agency approach. Albanese's work on the three classic models in combination clearly indicates that we need to take into account *both* socio-cultural factors *and* organisational and structural factors. This represents the most plausible way of analysing our data, taking the combination model and testing it in relation to structural and agency variables. The findings can then be used to ascertain what the link is between the two. As such, here we can see why the distinction between distinct models may be so important, be they hierarchies, networks, ethnically-bound, or economically driven. Furthermore, a consideration of the structural context, or environment, is imperative if we are to effectively analyse these newcomer organisations.

Before we may attempt to properly address our research questions and hypotheses, let us expand our own model. Now some additional theoretical approaches will be introduced in order to facilitate the effective analysis of our case study.

1.8.c. Success and failure in organised crime

This thesis is also concerned with addressing the notion of success and failure in relation to organised crime. Can one ever speak of a deadly, ruthless and violent criminal gang as successful? Conversely, can organisations at the core of a pervasive and ever-growing international criminal underworld be deemed a failure if they still exist today, in whatever form they may have adopted or which may have been imposed upon them? Moreover, to what extent do structure or agency factors affect the success or failure of any given organisation? Investigating possible indicators of success and failure in organised crime *vis-à-vis* the structure and agency debate can aid our analytical process.

The scholarly literature on success and failure in organised crime is scarce, but there are certain theoretical sources to aid our understanding of what the terms mean in relation to the phenomenon and this may, in turn, assist us in formulating our own definitions. Albanese (1983) refers to success within his definitions of the interpretive models of organised crime, stating that the business enterprise model ‘focuses on how economic considerations, rather than hierarchical or ethnic considerations, lie at the base of the formation and success of organized crime groups’ (p. 85). Here, when the author refers to success, it appears he is referring to continued and lasting activity following formation, largely in economic terms. Moreover, Gambetta (1988) also referred to success, in claiming that the [Sicilian] Mafia can be seen as a successful cluster, or coalition of clusters, triumphant in its method of defensively coping with lack of trust but also at turning this distrust into a profitable business (1988). It appears that Gambetta relates success to forming a cohesive cluster of separate gangs, capable not only of protecting themselves from risks associated with lack of trust, but also of exploiting this lack of trust for their own economic gain. Let us be clear that when, in this context, we refer to the absence of trust, this relates to citizens distrust of the state and its institutions.

Even in the 1930s, Moley and Thrasher ‘emphasised that certain political conditions were essential for successful organized crime’ (cited in Chamberlin, 1932, p. 668), acknowledging that success was possible as a result of some form of power vacuum or corruption, and relating success to the resultant product of said corruption, most likely financial gain and control of the territory. Writing much later of organised crime in Germany in 1995,

Von Lampe refers to success in relation to ‘the extensive use of violence’¹³, relating this violence with an increased ability to dominate local markets, clearly connecting economic gain and territorial control with the notion of success. Fiorentini & Peltzman (1997) carried out research on gangs as primitive states (Fijnaut & Paoli eds., 2006, p. 74-74) and refer widely to the notions of force and violence, writing that ‘rulers would always want to reduce the waste of resources associated with the use of force and protracted conflict if it could be done with minimal threat to their rule. One way to do that would be to convince their subjects of their rule’s legitimacy’ (Fiorentini, G., and Peltzman, S., 1997, p. 74). With reference to effectiveness and efficiency, the authors claim that it is crucial that rulers make their subjects believe they have a common interest and argue that ‘the long-run success of gangs and primitive states depends heavily on the articulation and internalisation by members, subjects and community of a workable ideology, a logically connected system of beliefs about the world’ (*ibid.*, p. 75). Here, yet again we see theorists relating success to economic gain and territorial control via the creation of a climate of fear and concluding that success equates to the maintenance of a system of values by which all members of any given organisation are bound.

The Fijnaut Group’s and WODC¹⁴ findings (1991) represent somewhat of a departure from the literature discussed thus far, as they consider the organisational structure as intrinsically connected to a group’s potential for ‘success’. Klerks (1999) confirms that this study further emphasised ‘the need to look at “criminal cooperatives” (the term they propose instead of ‘organisation’, ‘group’ or ‘structure’) in terms of fluid network relations with occasional ‘nodes’ representing the more successful and enterprising operators’. From this statement, we may ascertain that the Fijnaut Group did not only consider profit making as an indicator for success, but rather they postulate that success *via* economic profit can come as a result of an organisation not being organised as a rigid hierarchy but instead adopting a more fluid, *ad hoc* configuration, which we know indicates an organisation which is capable of change and adaptation.

Furthermore, the WODC findings indicate that ‘a substantial re-targeting of law enforcement intervention efforts toward more “short strike” missions intended to take out “facilitators” and clandestine service providers [was necessary], as these form essential elements in the networks that allow many others to successfully perform their criminal acts’ (cited in Klerks, 1999). Here we see the application of vocabulary widely associated with social network analysis to the realm of organised crime. There is also clear reference to the efficiency

¹³ <http://www.organized-crime.de/IALEtr1.htm#1>. Accessed 01/03/2011.

¹⁴ The Dutch Research and Documentation Centre for the Ministry of Security and Justice or *Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum*.

and durability of networks as criminal configurations which is so profound that a change was required in terms of law enforcement bodies' missions to combat the phenomenon. Spencer & Heberton cite the work of Alexander and Caiden (1985) as presenting 'considerable evidence that the development of "successful" organised crime structures requires both an active economy and the opportunities to reap the financial rewards of the more affluent societies'¹⁵ (p. 2), again connecting success with economic gain via control of desirable markets.

Woodiwiss (2001) produced a study on organised crime in Great Britain, in which he argued that 'many studies have shown that those with power, influence, and respectability in local, regional, national, or international society have tended to organize crime more successfully and securely than those without' (p. 3). Again, we can see that the notion of success is intrinsically linked to the concept of control, as Woodiwiss states that criminal activities themselves seem to be more successfully carried out by those groups with some form of power, domination, or monopoly of markets, so yet again we witness the concept of economic gain and command of territorial control as crucial to perceived success of criminal organisations. Finally, the Stratfor Intelligence Review (2008) wrote that the Sicilian Cosa Nostra organisation 'became wildly successful when it started trafficking and selling drugs to its American affiliates in the 1960s and 1970s. The resulting profits helped the Corleone family rise to power in Italy's criminal world'¹⁶. The article continues, stating that 'the successful organized crime families are powered by discipline and rewarded by the money that results from their control' and this reaffirms the concept of control and subsequent profits stemming from said domination. The clear theme which emerges from these theories lies in the crucial role of control and domination as vital drivers behind the increased potential for economic gain, considered to be the key indicator of success. Clearly, to achieve economic gain, an organisation must be carrying out lucrative criminal activities and some form of organisation is crucial in order to facilitate these activities.


Von Lampe argues that the level of embeddedness is an indicator of an organisation's capabilities and probable potential for success. In 2008, the author wrote an article in which he argued that there are a number of cases of organised crime gangs whose 'territorial control is not confined to the underworld but also extends to legal businesses.' (2008, p. 8) which the author refers to as the illegal-legal nexus. Von Lampe's approach is criticised for being simplistic and his interpretation of the Italian case of organised crime could be accused of being too reliant on classic stereotypes. Nonetheless, his theoretical work on the concept of

¹⁵ <http://www.britisoccrim.org/volume2/004.pdf>. Accessed 25/04/2011

¹⁶ Organized Crime in Italy, May 2, 2008

embeddedness provides us with a useful categorisation of distinct organisational models. Von Lampe presents his typology of different manifestations of criminal gangs in-line with this system of classification and the diagram below represents the presentation of the model (2008, p. 9)

Figure 1: Von Lampe criminal typology diagram (2008)



On the basis of the assumptions upon which Von Lampe based this classificatory system, we can see that the author identifies five types of organised crime, from a wholly unsupported network to a fully embedded alliance of upper and underworld business.

As will be seen in the course of this thesis, the constellation which is of primary interest in relation to Rogoli's SCU is type 2; a network embedded in a marginalized subculture. Von Lampe describes this form of organisation as follows:

The second constellation of organised crime refers to crime networks which are rooted in marginalized subcultures. In these cases criminal actors can rely on a social support structure which is larger than that provided by their immediate accomplices, but one more or less set apart from mainstream society and its institutions. While the seclusion is used to shield criminal activities from detection, criminal actors are familiar enough with the host culture to take some advantage of its infrastructure, including communication, business and finances....Smuggling, storage, and distribution of heroin are typically organised through networks of familial ties. (Pearson & Hobbs, 2001) (2008, p. 9).


Von Lampe defines a form of organisation which, for myriad reasons, does not achieve the qualitative leap between the illegal and sub/semi-legal spheres, thus limiting potential for earning and retaining status as a mere criminal gang. This form is contrasted with the more sophisticated syndicates which achieve a certain level of corruption of the legal sphere and enjoy the resulting elevated status. As we know, economic gain is considered to be an indicator of success so, if an organisation is limited in terms of what it is able to gain as it fails to penetrate more lucrative sectors of society, can it truly be regarded as successful? Furthermore, given that territorial control is another fundamental indicator of success, can a criminal syndicate which only achieves brief or limited domination and remains set apart from legal institutions be seen as anything but a failed attempt at a *mafia*-style organisation?

This thesis aims to address what factors dictate an organisation's success or failure, this theoretical approach will allow us to explore what success and failure actually means and whether or not it can be quantified. Furthermore, having established what factors indicate success and failure, we can examine how and why Rogoli's SCU evolved and developed, whether or not it can be considered a failure and, if so, what factors lead to this. If we establish that the organisation succeeded in terms of making money but failed to become truly embedded, or to control the territory, we will have to identify the factors behind this perceived failure.

In the absence of any true consensus of what success and failure actually mean in relation to the phenomenon of organised crime, we accept that economic gain, the ability to control the territory, and a degree of embeddedness indicate that an organisation is successful. Given Albanese's theory (1994) of all organised criminal groups as being market-based, it is clear that those groups which are best able to turn a considerable profit are those to be considered successful. However, what of failure? Does failure simply mean the inverse; that those who fail to earn serious money, control the territory and infiltrate the legal, semi-legal or sub-legal sectors of society in order to do so are to be considered to have failed? What of organisations that evolve, and meet the criteria for success during certain time periods but fail to do so in others? If an organisation sets out to adopt a certain structure or configuration on the basis of some form of rational choice but the end result is another, can this be considered a failure?

Below I have formulated a diagram which represents my approach concerning success and failure of organised crime gangs

Figure 2: Success and failure in organised crime diagram



As we can see from the diagram, the focus here lays with structure and agency *in direct connection* with the notions of success and or failure of criminal gangs. In the thesis we seek to establish if it is predominantly structural *or* agential variables that influence organisations' success and failure and this diagram can help us to understand the relevant connections. These concepts are underpinned by the level of embeddedness continuum, according to which we may establish to what extent organised crime groups have infiltrated local politics and society, or whether they remain disconnected and unsupported. The diagram lists the main factors considered to be indicators of success, related to economic gain, market domination, coping with lack of trust and the ability to eliminate rivals. Conversely, the diagram also lists those factors which are considered to be indicators of failure, namely poor profits, failure to control markets, suffering from lack of trust and domination by rivals.

As such, from the diagram we can see that we attribute both structural and agential influence to potential success or failure, to be further clarified as the thesis progresses, as well

as outlining a reciprocal relationship of influence between success and failure and an organisation's level of embeddedness.

We must investigate to what extent structure or agency factors affect success and failure of criminal organisations and, more specifically, what role is played by organisational configuration. So what of organisational structure? Looking back across our references to success, it is clear that network-based, or local, ethnic, groups, are considered to be the most successful (WODC; Fijnaut Group), able to mutate, adapt and regroup, thus evading capture. However, is it not the case that some of the most successful organisations have been hierarchically-based? Thus, it is vital to consider whether a network-based configuration is indicative of success, as is often argued. This leads us on to the next part of our theoretical framework which considers the thesis on the weaknesses of so-called 'dark networks'¹⁷.

1.8.d. Weakness in criminal networks: the scholarly debate

In contrast with a hierarchical structure, the more fluid, *ad hoc* network configuration is deemed to have proved to be more flexible and responsive, eliminating the strict rigidity which can render criminals vulnerable to detection and capture. However, this focus on the impermeability of networks, their great flexibility and shrewd response to external pressure has recently been put into question. We must also consider the extent to which emergent weaknesses in gangs are affected by structural and agency factors. Does a struggle emerge as a result of external constraints, or the wider context in which a given group operates, or do individual choices cause problems and increase susceptibility to potential weaknesses?

The majority of contemporary scholarly literature focussing on the network interpretation of organised crime (Morselli, 2006, Varese, 2006; 2011) praises the efficiency of criminal networks. The consensus within the scholarly debate on organised crime perpetuates the notion of the

[Emphasis on] the fluidity of organised crime, the importance of improvisation and the fact that especially the drug trade allows for relatively small operators to expand like a comet on the basis of a few successful drug imports and become criminal 'top dogs' almost overnight (Klerks, 2001, p. 56).

¹⁷ The term 'dark networks' was coined by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) in *Networks and Netwars*, with reference to the dark side of the network phenomenon represented by terrorist and criminal organisations.

The network paradigm has now become widely accepted as one of the principal interpretations of *mafia*-style organisations, alongside the hierarchical and business-enterprise or market models. However, recent studies in the field of scholarly research on terrorism (Tucker, 2008; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2010) show that the tide is beginning to turn as scholars have started to interpret the role of social networks in a different, more critical manner related to what Morselli (2007) refers to as the efficiency/security trade-off in criminal networks.

In his 2008 article, Tucker questions the conventional wisdom on the strength of criminal networks, based on his research on al-Qaeda. Already echoing the structure and agency debate, Tucker argues that

The most important issue for an organization or those fighting it is not what structure it has. The most important issue is how well an organization's structure is adapted to its environment, which includes what its enemies are doing, given what the organization wants to achieve and the resources available to it (2008, p. 2).

The structure and agency thesis resonates here as Tucker refers explicitly to an organisation's ability to adapt in relation to the context in which it finds itself. Outlining the relative merits of both the hierarchical and the network structure, Tucker presents his critique of the network model:

First, faster...decision making may not necessarily be better decision making. Faster decision making may mean in some cases that bad decisions are made faster. Furthermore, the original or central hierarchy loses some control over the components to which it has distributed authority. The loss of control means that there may also be an increase in the difficulty of implementing any decisions that the center arrives at (2008, pp. 4-5).

Tucker continues, stating the further disadvantages of the network structure include:

It has no formal control over its members, although peer pressure might operate. The trust it relies on might well be misplaced....In networks, there is also less accountability (2008, p. 5).

As such, here we see the author citing trust, or a lack thereof, as a crucial variable. Tucker argues that:

Networks...respond more quickly to their environments...It is also the case that as information from all...nodes travels through the network, the members in effect get to sample various ways of adapting to the environment, which increases the adaptability of the network over time. As nodes communicate, they get to see what works and what does not, which allows the nodes and ultimately the network to deal with mistakes...in a way that is more efficient and effective than the way that a hierarchy does. Decentralized organizations are also more resilient. If one node fails, the whole network does not fail. But the lack of centralized control over members of the network means that what the network does in toto (the sum of the actions of the individual nodes) is unpredictable (2008, p. 6).

Tucker claims 'that network organizations suffer from short-term risks, even as their adaptability lowers their long-term risk. [Ultimately]...networks make accountability more difficult, since authority is diffuse and control limited or non-existent.' (2008, p. 6) Ultimately, Tucker states that

One might argue that networks, as transitory and shifting coalitions, do not need long-term planning or that their strength is that this "planning" is distributed throughout the network. But in this case, the network can no more be said to plan than a market can be said to plan the distribution of the resources that flow through it. In any event, networks that aspire to be something more than transitory...will suffer from their lack of a strategic planning capability (2008, p. 13).

Tucker's theoretical critique of the network approach is insightful, and his analysis of the weaknesses of a network configuration in terrorism can also be applied to organised crime. This is because, although *mafia*-style organisations are non-ideological, many of the goals, activities and indeed the ethos of the two types of organisation are to a great extent comparable. As such we can see that Tucker appears to be referring predominantly to agency factors; individual failures, mistakes and weaknesses. However, do these weaknesses not emerge as a result of external pressures from pre-existing, often rival groups, indicating the importance of structural influence?

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones' study (2010) offers a similar theoretical critique of both

the failings of 'dark networks' (p. 8) as well as of the existing literature related to this type of organisation. Referring to the currency gained in academic circles of the notion that 'it takes a network to fight a network'; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones acknowledge that 'network-based threats pose serious challenges to state security' (2010, p. 8). However, the authors argue that

International relations scholars have been too quick to draw parallels to the world of the firm where networked organization has proven well adapted to the fast-moving global marketplace...consequently [overlooking] issues of community and trust, as well as problems of distance, coordination, and security, which may pose serious organizational difficulties for illicit networks (2010, p. 9).

Identifying problems of trust and community, clearly more personal, cultural and individual factors, the authors acknowledge the obstacles criminals may encounter. However, in referring to problems relating to security logistics, such as distance, they make it clear that structural or contextual factors play a vital role. Accordingly, what Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones have attempted to achieve in their study is to address the weakness in the literature on criminal networks through an analysis of a 'wider body of research' (2010, p. 9) in order to 'unearth potential sources of network debilitation in greater theoretical and historical depth' (*ibid.*).

Having acknowledged, addressed and analysed the potential advantages of the network model, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones go on to ask some critical questions about the existing literature, beginning with their contention that 'most clandestine networks...are not as agile and resilient as they are made out to be' (2010, p. 17). Arguing that 'potential weaknesses and constraints... [receive] far less attention' (*ibid.*) than the perceived advantages, the authors cite Mahler's (2009) claim that 'successful networks are relatively easy to spot; failed ones much less so. Failures are seldom revealed or evaluated, either with regard to the formation of networks or their ability to achieve stated goals' (Kahler, 2009; cited in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2010, p. 17), concluding that the capacity and strength of the network configuration may be overestimated.

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones draw upon a wider body of literature and material in order to identify what they perceive to be problems or critiques of the network configuration. The authors define these disadvantages as information limitations and communication failure, poor decision-making and excessive risk-taking, restrictions on scope and structural

adaptability, collective action problems due to coordination, security breaches, and finally what the authors describe as ‘learning disabilities’, or failures to learn (2010, pp. 19-31). Again highlighting factors which would be more closely linked to agency, the authors indicate that personal error leads to weakness. As such, is it the case that the weak networks thesis implies a greater influence of agential over structural factors? This will be explored as the thesis progresses.

The authors apply their theory to a case study, just as Tucker (2008) had, on al-Qaeda, investigating contemporary clandestine actors in the 21st century which they see as a ‘particularly good case in which to probe the presence of network weaknesses’ (2010, p. 34). They cite a loss of unity, cohesion and collective-action capacity, as well as networked vulnerabilities, poor security, lack of professionalism, lack of centralized sanctioning, weakness in coordination and strategic planning, feeble learning capacity and subsequent reduced accountability, as the reasons behind failed attacks and operations. So, whilst it seems that Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones are implicating agential factors in organisational weakness, we must consider to what extent these are, in turn, affected by structural factors. If indeed we accept Albanese’s combination model, according to which all gangs are driven by market forces, yet some are hierarchical, some network-based and some represent a combination of the two poles, is it not the case that both internal and external factors influence success or failure, in turn caused by structural *and* agency variables? We can attempt to formulate responses to these pertinent questions. Just as is the case with Tucker’s theoretical critique, we can see that Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones approach is applicable to organised crime gangs as well as terrorist networks.

1.8.e. Rivals, internal conflict and network breakdown

Along with an analysis of the apparent bias related to the success of the network configuration in the scholarly literature, it is also vital that we investigate other potential weaknesses of this type of organisational structure in greater depth. Moreover, in the thesis we are not simply going to examine whether single networks fail as a direct result of their structure, but the role played by rival networks in conflict, and conflict internally of the networks themselves. In a piece of research in organisational studies based upon an investigation into social networks and conflict in 20 organisational units, ‘results indicated that low-conflict organizations are characterized by higher numbers of intergroup strong ties, measured as frequent contacts, than are high-conflict organizations’ (Nelson, 1989, p.1). So, we can see that the theory suggests that strongly

connected groups consisting of close bonds and formal ties suffer less from internal conflict. Nelson states:

A prominent feature of competing groups is the tendency for their members to become more cohesive internally while developing negative stereotypes and other perceptual distortions of those outside their group (Blake, Shepherd, & Mouton, 1964; Coleman, 1957, Schein, 1970)...Increased cohesion leads to pressure to conform to group norms ...Polarization and disruptive conflict are often the result (p. 3).

From this analysis, we may ascertain that groups in competition with one another, be they network-based or not, may form a strong internal unity whilst animosity grows towards rivals beyond the group. As we can see, this is an illustration of both structure and agency factors influencing behaviour; not only do individual actions have an effect on an organisation's progress but, perhaps more importantly, interaction with the context or environment, in the form of rivals, is key to strength and potential success. In the case of *mafia*-style organisations, particularly when looking at a multiplicity of actors linked via a network configuration, we can therefore see that conflict may easily arise as battles for territory develop and internal breakdown may ensue. Nelson argues:

Field experience and anecdotal evidence from popular business press suggest five events that commonly occur when conflict has reached sufficient intensity to prejudice organizational performance: (1) Recent turnover attributable to internal politics or incompatibilities. (2) Apathy or fatalism about external threats attributable to excessive in-fighting. (3) Inability to reach consensus on how to implement needed strategic or operational changes. (4) Recent intervention by external entities attributable to internal inability to make or implement decisions (externally imposed management changes, investigations, arbitration, litigation, etc. (5) The presence of easily identifiable opposing internal factions (p. 10).

Whilst this section of the theoretical literature relates to organisational studies, we can see parallels with organised crime analysis if we are seeking to identify possible factors to account for failure. As such, an application of this theory is possible and indeed shall form part of our model. All of the events cited by Nelson may easily be applied to organised crime groups, particularly network-based ones, which could potentially fall victim to all of these

circumstances, resulting in potential 'failure' or organisational breakdown.

Nelson states that 'organizations with disruptive levels of conflict suffer a lack of strong between-group ties' (p. 14), so we can see that conflict can affect relations both internally of an organisation, as well as in relation to external, even if interconnected, organisations as 'strong ties are generally associated with an absence of disruptive conflict, and strong ties between groups are especially typical of low-conflict organizations' (p. 21). From this we can surmise that, if a criminal organisation is bound by strong ties, the potential for conflict may be reduced and may facilitate peaceful inter-group relations. Again here we can see parallels emerging with theories on organised crime studies, as a network configuration which lacks a strong hierarchy and consists largely of relatively weak bonds may fall victim to this potential weakness and itself suffer in terms of organisational progress and, as such, an application of this broader theory is possible in the thesis.

Returning to theoretical studies on terrorism, Ettlinger & Bosco (2004) question the network configuration and resulting conflict, asking 'how...members of a...terrorist network find connections and reinforce solidarity, even in the midst of internal conflict' (p. 10). The authors acknowledge that, in this sort of illegal organisation, conflict is probable, and cite other disadvantages such as distance and communication difficulties as possible factors for problematic relations. Examining terrorist networks, the authors explore how and why networks may change:

In the case of a diasporic network... [it is crucial that we examine] how and why a network changes. Expansion, for example, may occur either as a network grows, or alternatively, as a network connects with other networks within localities or across space to form a coalition ...Contractions, also within and/or across localities, occur as well, notably when coalitions dissolve in reaction to inter- network conflict or possible external threat (from governments, for example) to member network(s)(p. 14).

Citing possible factors behind internal or external conflict, as well as potential consequences of this emerging rivalry, the authors acknowledge that organisations may break down as a result of in-fighting or external pressure; is it the case for organised crime syndicates, too, that networks are not always resilient enough to withstand the burden of conflict or external threat? Moreover, we must consider to what extent structure and agency factors influence clan development. Is it

the case that conflict emerges as a result of purely structural factors, or does in-fighting indicate that agential factors also contribute? Further, if organisations are weakened by conflict which emerges predominantly as a result of agency factors, do subsequent weaknesses when faced with external constraint not also indicate the role of structure? What this research project can add to the field of organised crime literature is a critical analysis of a network-based organisation which seeks to challenge the consensus about the many advantages of the network configuration in terms of its impenetrability, flexibility, resilience and strength.

1.9. The application of the theoretical model to the Sacra Corona Unita


Now that the key theoretical approaches have been defined, it is important we clarify their application to our case study. Accordingly, the notion of structure in this thesis refers to the socio-criminal regional environment or context, as well as to the judicial and law enforcement response. The notion of agency refers to the criminals themselves, be they the *capi* [bosses] or the foot-soldiers, as well as their acquaintances, and the choices regarding internal organisational configuration. By examining the way in which these two elements interact, we can formulate an analysis of how and why the Sacra Corona Unita (SCU) was born, and the way in which it evolved.

Did structural changes instigate formation, were agential factors more fundamental, or was it both structure and agency *in combination*? As the criminal context changed in the form of pre-existing criminal organisations, both in terms of rivals and of ‘sponsors’ of the SCU, patterns of behaviour emerged and these had an effect on the burgeoning local organisation and altered the way in which it developed. However, members of the clan, as agents, also played an integral role in the process of the formation of the organisation and the economic activities it undertook in order to increase both profits and control of the territory.

Moreover, the thesis will investigate the role that structural or agential factors played in the evolution of organisational configuration and the subsequent effect this has on success or failure. As such, the thesis attempts an analysis of internal dynamics within the organisation which emerge and evolve under the influence of external or structural factors and the context in which it is operating, as well as the free-will or volition of the agents at the heart of the organisation. It is my belief that these are the theories that can most fruitfully assist me in elucidating my case studies and also those which explain the broader phenomenon of newcomers in organised crime.

Below I have formulated a diagram which represents my theoretical approach:.

Figure 3: Theoretical approach diagram



As we can see from the diagram, the principal concepts at the heart of my theoretical approach are structure, agency, organisational configuration and, finally, success and failure. If, within this thesis, we consider structure to refer to the socio-criminal context and agency to the criminals themselves, we can see from the diagram that the project considers both structural and agential factors to influence organisational configuration. More importantly, the two-way arrow by which the notions of structure and agency are connected to the role of organisational configuration indicates that we consider there to be a reciprocal relationship of influence and interaction, both of the context and the actors on the emerging organisational structure and *vice versa*. So, we can expect to see examples of both the context and the individuals affecting the configuration and the configuration influencing the external environment and the actors/agents emerging within the empirical section of thesis.

We can also see that embeddedness, rivals and state repression are provided as examples of structural influence over the SCU and, conversely, shared values and internal social interaction are cited as examples of agency-influenced variables. Again, as the empirical chapters explore the history of the SCU, we can expect to find tangible examples of these factors in play and go on to connect these to our theoretical framework. In terms of organisational configuration, hierarchies and networks are named as key to this thesis and the case study within the diagram. However, as illustrated earlier within the theoretical framework, an overlap exists and these models tend to merge. As such, these definitions are by no means

exhaustive. The empirical chapters, therefore, will explore how and why the SCU came into existence and evolved over time, investigating at what stage it could be defined as a hierarchy, a network or an amalgam of different models.

Finally, we find the success and failure continuum. Its position in the diagram is not indicative of its lesser role. Rather, it is placed last and in connection to all of the other variables, with each leading down to the continuum, precisely to represent how crucial it is in terms of this thesis; we consider all of the above cited factors, variable and concepts to ultimately impact upon an organisation's success or failure. As such, the context in which an organisation emerges, in the form of embeddedness in the local territory, in connection with pre-existing clans, or in relation to state repression, will affect an organisation's configuration and, eventually, its success or failure. However, along with these structural factors, the diagram demonstrates that the thesis considers SCU members, their internal interaction, shared values and social ties included, to have an effect on the organisational configuration, be it co-existing in combination with the environmental factors or during different time periods of SCU history. We can see, therefore, that these factors will, in turn, ultimately influence organisational success or failure. Before we may evaluate structure and agency factors and their influence on SCU development and ultimate success and failure in the following empirical chapters, we need to consider the way in which these theoretical considerations can be made tangible for our analysis.

1.10. The primary focus of the thesis

The analysis focuses on the SCU under its so-called father, founder and historical leader, Giuseppe Rogoli, as well as during the period that saw the emergence of two additional bosses, namely the De Tommasi and Vincenti clans' bosses, Giovanni and Franco respectively, and their surrounding networks. However, the analysis includes the pre-SCU years, examining the relationship between Rogoli and other criminal bosses present in the region, and the first fifteen years of SCU history. The origins of the organisation, in fact, can throw considerable light on the role of external crime organisations in the formation of the SCU and of Rogoli's own actions and decisions. The relationship between Raffaele Cutolo of the Nuova Camorra Organizzata (NCO), Umberto Bellocchio of the 'ndrangheta, and Giuseppe Rogoli as the founder of the SCU in itself revealed much in terms of the development of newcomer organised crime syndicates.

For the purposes of the thesis, the history, and indeed pre-history, of Rogoli's organisation was divided into three sub-periods. The time periods which I chose to divide and focus on, in that they are deemed to best reflect the most important stages of the organisation's development, are as follows:

- 1979-1985: From the arrival of the NCO and the 'ndrangheta to the official formation of the SCU and the emergence of the first splinter/rival groups;
- 1985-1991: The SCU's continued evolution in relation the foundation of counter-groups (Famiglia Salentina Libera, Remo Lecce Libera, Rosa dei Venti) and the first maxi-trial in Lecce;
- 1991-1999: From the first to the second maxi-trial, legislative change, the role of collaboration, the role of women and the near-complete destruction of Rogoli's organisation.

As such, the decision was taken to restrict the study to focus on the role played by the external *mafie* in the region, whether rivals or in a 'sponsorship' role, on Rogoli's emerging organisation, exploring structure and agency factors, and the application of Albanese's (1992) interpretive models in relation to organisational structure of the clans. I also decided to incorporate the interconnected theories on structure and agency, success and failure in organised crime and the failings of the 'dark networks' thesis in relation to the pre-SCU era, the birth of the organisation, its rapid growth and equally rapid decline.

1.11. Methodology: making the case for a case study

I have chosen to apply a case study approach to this thesis, believing it to be not only the most appropriate in relation to my research questions and hypotheses but the only truly viable method via which to study my chosen topic. Although criticised for being 'intuitive, primitive, and unmanageable' (Miles, 1979, p. 597, cited in Yin, 1981, p. 1), the method of using a case study is a vital tool for social science researchers. Indeed, as an approach the technique is easily applicable and inclusive, particularly because

The case study does not imply the use of a particular type of evidence. Case studies can be done by using either qualitative or quantitative evidence. The evidence may come from fieldwork, archival records, verbal reports, observations, or any combination of these... Nor does the case study imply the use of a particular data collection method (Yin, 1981, pp. 1-2).

Accordingly, I took the decision to carry out a case study in my analysis of the SCU predominantly because it appeared to be the only viable and workable option. Due to the dangerous, volatile and secretive nature of organised crime in general terms, interviews with SCU members were not an option for me. Moreover, irrespective of the personal risk factor, access problems would have been extremely problematic as the majority of the key figures of the SCU that I had decided to focus on were in prison, deceased or living under police protection following collaboration.

In relation to methodological issues faced by organised crime researchers, Paoli and Fijnaut argue that:

Access to data represents a powerful hurdle...The illegal nature of organised crime activities make data collection not only particularly difficult and occasionally risky but it also makes the researcher almost unavoidably dependent on the cooperation of the police and the judiciary...police and judicial bodies collect and file data on concrete organised crime cases for other purposes than those of scholarly analysis- thus neglecting or losing much of the information that would be the most interesting for researchers (2004, p. 8).

The authors highlight the complex nature of this field of research. As such, an appropriate choice of methodological approach is vital to increase the chances of producing meaningful research. Van Duyne (1997) writes:

Scientific research into organized crime is very much hampered by the unreliability of the sources: organizing criminals either keep silent or glorify themselves, while the police forces have their own perception of reality, not infrequently motivated by demands for more police power and personnel...[There is an] uncertainty and lack of standard research methods (p. 8).

Accordingly, given the complexity of the subject in hand, the choice of a method which allowed for a broad approach, useful for identifying crucial mechanisms and permitting a detailed and elaborate study was vital. Convincing and rich, the case study method focuses on written data, predominantly from judicial sources, but also allows for the inclusion of oral history via interviews.

Indeed, Lea (2005) writes that organised crime group members may be unwilling to identify themselves, and victims reluctant to discuss their lives with a stranger,¹⁸ and he cites Hobbs argument that:

Until gangsters, armed robbers, fraudsters and their ilk indicate their enthusiasm for questionnaires or large scale social surveys, ethnographic research, life histories, oral histories, biographies, autobiographies and journalistic accounts will be at a premium (1994, p. 442).

As ethnography, along with questionnaires, surveys, and participant observation, had therefore been necessarily eliminated, the application of the case study method, through the analysis of judicial data, was deemed to be the most appropriate and constructive for the thesis. What a single case study provides us with is a focus on the dynamics within an individual, specific setting (Yin, 1984). Yin (1984) offered four justifications for choosing the case study method:

- To explain complex causal links in real-life interventions
- To describe the real-life context in which the intervention has occurred
- To describe the intervention itself
- To explore those situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear set of outcomes.

These are useful in terms of being able to explain how and why we would go about using a case study to apply our theoretical framework. It is the real life element which makes them so convincing. Case studies typically combine various data collection methods, from archives to questionnaires, and the evidence is generally qualitative but quantitative is by no means excluded. However, with such an enormous volume of rich and interesting data, it is vital to ensure that our research does not become overly-complicated, and prudence is required here to

¹⁸ <http://www.bunker8.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/orgcrim/3810.htm>. Accessed 2/9/2011

synthesise the correct information in to a worthy piece of research. Nonetheless, case studies can offer us the opportunity to have a genuinely creative insight, and we can even create new theory on the basis of juxtaposition in the chosen cases (Cameron & Quinn, 1988). Furthermore, we can base our work on cases, constructs and hypotheses which are easily tested, thus making our research more conclusive. The intimate interaction with the evidence and the theory also provides us with a closeness that means the resultant theory and research is empirically valid (Eisenhardt, 1985).

Let us briefly remind ourselves of the rationale behind the thesis: in terms of the Italian situation, the SCU is the most contemporary case of serious organised crime. Therefore, if we are looking to examine the role of so-called newcomers, the SCU was an ideal example. Moreover, very little research has been carried out to-date on the SCU, but much rich material is available. As such, I believed that the analysis of this organisation would be able to add something innovative to the existing body of literature on organised crime, both in terms of the Italian case and the wider debate about modern criminal syndicates. Additionally, a certain level of pragmatism was considered as I have a thorough knowledge of the history, culture and language of Puglia, the zone in which the SCU originated, thus facilitating more effective research. Finally, it is our belief that the emergent links between the SCU and the theoretical framework provide us with an innovative and original research project as we analyse the organisation and the environment in which it exists. Now we must look to the methods employed within our research project, as this can best help us to understand the process by which we will arrive at answering our research questions and addressing our hypotheses.

1.11.a. Data collection

Organised crime is a complex subject matter on which to carry out scholarly research. There are elements of personal risk, and bureaucracy, and one is often met with a wall of silence, or *omertà*, which can be somewhat oppressive in terms of research. Nonetheless, should these problems be overcome and the obstacles approached appropriately, it makes for a fascinating subject matter.

In order to carry out meaningful qualitative research on the SCU, the target data were primary sources relating to the organisation and individual members, as well as some secondary sources in the form of the sparse existing literature and newspaper articles relating to the

organisation. Although I had been able to formulate some early conclusions *vis-à-vis* the available secondary sources, there was no doubt that a field-work project would also be necessary in order to gather data to facilitate the progression of the project as a whole. It was felt that the most effective way to employ the research design at the heart of this thesis was to spend time in the area gathering information and conducting some informal interviews, given that very little information is available on the case study topic outside of Italy.

I carried out some preliminary reading and initial analysis of the broader organised crime literature and the chosen case study of Rogoli's SCU before embarking on my field-work in Lecce, funded by the Italian government. The field-work project lasted 7 months, during which time data was gathered in Lecce and the surrounding towns. I was able to source much of the target data through a contact made with Dr. Cataldo Motta, the Chief Prosecutor for the Republic of Lecce (*or Procuratore della Repubblica di Lecce*) in the form of primary data from trials against the SCU between 1990-2006. The trial data consists of 14 different documents, ranging from brief overviews of cases to extensive judgments of more than 3,000 pages. The data includes the sentences themselves, as well as transcripts of wire-tapped telephone conversations, transcripts of cross-examinations of SCU members by prosecutors, and the cases relate to trials in the criminal, civil and supreme courts. Information is provided not only on the organisational configuration of the SCU, but also in relation to defendants' lives, the sentences they received, verdicts and cases of appeals. It is precisely because the data are so rich and diverse that an analysis of the trial documents alone as primary sources was considered appropriate in light of the project in hand.

The sentences and transcripts have been combined with existing literature and newspaper archive reports, along with some informal interviews, to increase the scope of the project and to try to ensure impartiality. I chose to interview Dr. Motta himself, as well as sociologist Dr. Mariano Longo, Don Raffaele Bruno, the regional co-ordinator for anti-*mafia* charity *Libera*, and Raffaele Gorgoni, the *pugliese* journalist and author, in order to avoid too much of a judicial bias of the data¹⁹. According to Morselli (2005), memoirs, diaries, and autobiographical texts by or on the subject of members of organised crime syndicates offer us a goldmine of information about the actors' lives and involvement in the criminal underworld. As such, I also chose to use interviews and autobiographical memoirs of some members of the organisation in order to increase the presence of a 'first-person' narrative to complement the judicial data.

¹⁹ Further detail on this can be found in the next section of the chapter

It was necessary to identify a specific actor/s in the organisation which was to be the subject of the case study and then examine the actor/s in terms of role and position within the organisation, including his or her primary functions (Burnam, 2006); the principal actor chosen for the thesis was Rogoli. As such, an extensive analysis of the data has been carried out, beginning with a summary of the information within the trial sentences in relation to the chosen case study and distinct time periods. The process has proven to be rather painstaking and lengthy, but results are visible relatively quickly in the form of patterns emerging and organisational configurations becoming apparent. Moreover, it helped to shape the final research project as available secondary data is somewhat misleading and the analysis of the primary data altered the thesis dramatically as new information came to light.

It is my belief that this diverse and eclectic range of sources can provide us with a rich and interesting product and a picture of the phenomenon which can help us to prove or disprove, and ultimately test, our emerging research questions and hypotheses. An overlap of these diverse sources can, furthermore, lend us a fuller, more wide-ranging lens through which we may view our case study, providing us with more validity and legitimacy. Newspaper articles provide us with media information (Morselli, 2005, p. 40), whilst the analysis of telephone calls transcribed within the legal documents allow us to formulate ideas surrounding the individuals involved and their roles within the organisational network. Through analysing the data starting from a chronological overview, we are able to analyse the evolution of the organisation from the days of its emergence to serious breakdown. Further, this provided us with the opportunity to assess the evolution of actors from entry level to their rise within the organisation and establishment of their role right up until their ultimate downfall. This examination of the transition throughout the history of the network can help our understanding in terms of the way in which the network functions.

1.11.b. Potential limitations and solutions

There are a vast number of potential obstacles which need to be addressed in relation to carrying out research on the topic of organised crime, a subject which many Italians, particularly those from the south, are simply unwilling to openly discuss. Even local bookshops in Puglia stock books on organised crime hidden out of sight on bottom shelves of stores. As highlighted earlier in the chapter, both the perpetrators and the victims of organised crime are often unwilling to discuss their personal lives. Moreover, the logistics surrounding the matter of access are crucial. With members in prison, deceased or living under police protection, access for interviews was

simply not possible. In spite of my working relationship with Don Raffaele Bruno, the chaplain of Lecce prison which houses hordes of SCU members, my gender was also raised as an obstacle; there was no way the prison management would have allowed a woman access to carry out interviews. As such, I had to approach my research in a thoughtful and methodical way, ensuring that I was able to take full advantage of the rich primary data.

This was the principal motivational factor behind my choice to contact Dr. Motta, the public face of the *pugliese* judicial anti-*mafia* movement, and a man who is committed to the battle against the organisation. I knew with Dr. Motta that I would be able to gather the target data in the form of primary sources. It is clear that Motta and his colleagues' prevailing interest is that of securing convictions. However, in order to attempt to avoid claims of judicial bias or a one-sided or prejudiced approach, I chose to complement my primary data with which Dr. Motta provided me with the aforementioned additional interviews and memoirs, as well as newspaper articles and other secondary sources. It is inevitable that some form of bias is present in the judicial data, given that the sources which come from the judiciary exist purely with the goal of achieving successful prosecutions. However, I believe that the inclusion of a broader variety of sources goes some way to providing a clearer picture, albeit from the perspective of my own interpretation as a researcher.

It is also important to reiterate that, even within the trial data, the voice from inside the organisation can be heard in the form of *verbatim* telephone interceptions, confiscated letters and cross-examinations of collaborators which were carried out in court. Whilst some of these sources still present the problem of judicial bias as the questions are posed by the judges themselves, they offer the solution to providing an internal representation of the clans. It is crucial that we remember that there is *no such thing* as wholly neutral research: can one ever be truly objective? What the thesis represents is *my* interpretation of events *vis-à-vis* *my* chosen theoretical model and *my* selected methodology. There will always, necessarily, be an element of my own perspective within the analysis of the organisation.

So often in PhD research claims are made in relation to jeopardised truth and credibility, but I strived to include a variety of sources in order to make my interpretation of the topic as inclusive and authentic as possible within the scope of my research. There is also the aforementioned matter of personal risk, and this is a question to which I have had to respond throughout my time working on organised crime. However, considering my choice of topic and case study, in the form of a now defunct area of *pugliese* criminality, I knew that I was at no

greater risk than a research student working in a more mainstream research field was. In fact, given that all of the trials I have worked on are closed, the data is technically available within the public domain. Moreover, almost all of the key individuals that feature in my research are either deceased, incarcerated or have collaborated, I considered my choice of topic to be a sound one without a great element of personal risk.

In terms of the ethical issues surrounding my research, I was careful to ensure that full consent had been awarded by Dr. Motta and, given that the trials were over, I knew this would not cause any serious problems in terms of the progression of my thesis. Furthermore, there was no need for anonymity or concealment of names, often a sensitive issue in organised crime research, as a result of the fact that the court cases themselves were closed. Nevertheless, the documents were treated with due care and attention, considering the sensitivity of the material. It is vital to remember that all affiliates on trial are held to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. I endeavoured to approach the subject matter with the patience, respect, and understanding that it deserved, often difficult when faced with the reality of the actions of the individuals in question. However, Falcone's words on the human side of the phenomenon cited within the introduction to the thesis remained vital as I believed that a true, dispassionate and unprejudiced approach to the topic would avoid my judgement being affected and facilitate the production of a sound and balanced piece of original research.

1.12. Conclusion

Within this chapter we have outlined the theoretical facet of the research which is to become the backbone of the thesis. From an overview of the definitions of our key terms, we are able to assess what exactly is meant by the title of the thesis, as well as by the terminologies related to the subject matter in question; organised crime. The literature review broadens our understanding of existing literature in the field, as well as helping to highlight how and why this thesis represents an original contribution to the literature. In connection with the literature, we have been able to assess the principal models applied to organised crime research to date, and to what extent, if at all, these theories remain relevant, particularly in relation to our choice of topic of newcomers in organised crime, employing the example of Puglia and the SCU.

Along with the assessment of the pre-existing models, we have considered their relative advantages and disadvantages in an attempt to ascertain if it is necessary to formulate a new

model of our own by which we can analyse our own case study. As this is clearly the case, we have devised a model which appears to be useful in relation to our topic, and the application of these approaches that will take place in our empirical research chapters intends to provide the reader with a sound theoretical framework which can be applied to a neglected organisation, both in terms of the law enforcement bodies and in the field of research, resulting in a project that represents something original and innovative. Our choice of case study, a more in-depth rationale and methodology have been outlined, guiding the reader through the research design and related processes which intend to facilitate the production of a thesis which can contribute an original and creative set of ideas to a field of research which, as is so often the case, is characterised by gaps and vacuums which only further attention and dedication to a topic can address. As our empirical chapters which follow will illustrate, the topic in question is a fascinating one, worthy of greater consideration and debate if one considers the scholarly engagement with the organisation, and one which can be truly revelatory in terms of organised crime research, a field that is so often over-simplified and misunderstood.

Chapter 2. 1979-1985: From *Apulia felix* to the *nascita* of the Sacra Corona Unita and beyond

2.1. Puglia in the pre-organised crime era

A map of Italy, indicating the region of Puglia, and another indicating the sub-region of Salento.




Figure 4: Map of Italy



Figure 5: Map of Puglia (Source: google.co.uk)

Before we may successfully analyse the emergence of the SCU as an organisation, we must look to the period immediately before the alleged date of foundation in 1983. Judge Motta states that

There was a certain moment at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s when the [other criminal organisations] all became interested in the *pugliese* territory because there was an opportunity after the *camorristi* stopped their contraband on their own land, having had their motorboats confiscated. So, the Neapolitans decided to move to the Adriatic Coast in Puglia because contraband went pretty well there and the Sicilians had created a base in Fasano, near Brindisi, as a result of those who had been sent there on the *soggiorni obbligati* [forced resettlement] programme who were drug traffickers so that was how they set up the first out-post for illegal drugs in Puglia... The *'ndranghetisti* from Calabria [were also] already involved in kidnapping for ransom in Puglia, working alongside criminals from northern Puglia, Andria and

Cerignola...Cutolo had this project to create a sort of affiliation with the NCO [Nuova Camorra Organizzata] which was to be called the Nuova Camorra *pugliese*, just as if it were a part of the NCO linked to Puglia with influence over Puglia (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006).

This indicates that there were two waves of external infiltration which contributed to the arrival of the SCU in Puglia; the first via the Camorra and the second via the 'ndrangheta. In order to produce a thorough analytical narrative of the organisation, it is logical here that we begin with the earliest example: the infamous Neapolitan gangster Raffaele Cutolo.

'Born in 1941 into a peasant family from Ottaviano'²⁰, (Allum, 2006, p. 118) Cutolo's criminal career began when he was arrested and imprisoned for killing a man in a petty fight in his home town in autumn, 1963. In Poggioreale prison in Naples, Cutolo met Don Vittorino Nappi, an old *guappo* (or *camorrista*), who 'became his mentor and model' (Marrazzo, 1981, cited in Allum, 2006, p. 119). Cutolo '...began befriending young inmates unfamiliar with jail, giving them a sense of identity and worth, so much so that when they were released they would send Cutolo 'flowers' (*i.e.* money)' (Behan, 1996, p. 52). Nappi presented the Camorra as 'a revolution against injustice' (Cutolo, cited in Allum, 2006, pg. 119) and this organisation appealed to the 'young and intelligent rebel' (Allum, 2006, p. 119). We see the influence and patronage of one criminal being transmitted to another younger, less experienced and ultimately subservient actor, a process which takes place throughout the history of organised crime. Cutolo 'started to see himself as a kind of new Robin Hood fighting for social inequality and defending the weak' (*ibid*). In order to be able to carry out what he saw as his mission, he needed to assemble his own organisation. Cutolo officially founded the Nuova Camorra Organizzata (NCO) from his prison cell in 1971, which quickly expanded beyond the prison walls and into local society (*Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia*, 1993, p. 35). Allum states:

Traditionally the Camorra, in marked contrast to the Mafia, does not have a vertical and hierarchical structure. It consists of a series of clans and gangs that form, split and reform at will — usually as a result of bloody clashes...Cutolo was responsible for introducing two novelties; first a sense of identity, and second organisation...A mass organisation, then, that Cutolo was able to unite around his charismatic personality: centralised and complex, but with an 'open structure' in which there was a place for the thousand of violent and disbanded youths in Naples and in Campania...a part of the

²⁰ A small town 20km from Naples.

success of the NCO has been attributed to its organisational strength- that is, the capacity of Cutolo to overcome the family structure of clans and gangs (1996, pp. 238-239).

Cutolo set about creating an innovative organisation, attempting to impose unity over the clans and adopting a more centralised core, built around the leader himself as a charismatic figurehead, but retaining localised factions. Evidently Cutolo was aware of how crucial innovation and evolution could be to ensuring success, and he was willing to move away from tradition in order to create the sort of organisation he hoped to lead. Having quickly recognised how valuable an expanded network could be both internally and externally of the prison system, Cutolo aimed to increase the scope for profit and control. Emerging conflict in Campania, along with increased threat of invasion by the Sicilian Mafia (Behan, 1996, pp. 51-52) acted as further incentives for Cutolo to seek to shift the geographical focus of his criminal organisation. As such, the boss worked to establish links with other criminal organisations across the *Mezzogiorno* [or South]. The departure from the organisational configuration that the Campania region was accustomed to indicates that Cutolo was indeed an ambitious leader, as well as a man who recognised when emerging seeds of trouble had already been sown. Cutolo doubtless knew that, whilst maintaining a local stronghold, more money, power and prestige were available *should* this mission to extend prove successful. But his entrance into the realm of organised crime was a complex one. As a precursor to the formation of his own organisation, it was not the Camorra which Cutolo chose to join, but the *calabrese* [Calabrian] 'ndrangheta. It was this affiliation which informed many of his own choices and actions as the founder and *capo* of the NCO. The secondary literature tells us that

The relationship between [the 'ndrangheta and] Cutolo's NCO was very intense. According to Pino Scriva, infamous 'ndrangheta *pentito* [collaborator]...Cutolo himself has his own origins in the 'ndrangheta, his career having begun with his baptism [into the organisation] and then continued with his promotion decreed by a *calabrese sinedrio* [a Sanhedrin or council]. More over, it seems as if the Camorra [at least that run by Cutolo] represented a sort of descendent of the *calabrese* 'ndrangheta which boasted of far more solid organisational traditions. According to Pasquale D'Amico, "it was during 1974 in Sant'Eframo mental institution that Cutolo thought of founding a new Camorra which he organised on the *calabrese* 'ndrangheta model, assimilating its systems and rituals." Cutolo made a wise move when he chose to transfer 'ndrangheta rituals, oaths and ranks to the new organisation and, in fact, the rituals themselves reappeared in

Campania ...following a long period of suppression...The Cutolo-De Stefano axis helped to characterise the shape of organised crime across the entirety of Southern Italy, influencing the most relevant criminal events, such as murders, drug trafficking and kidnapping (Ciconte, 1992, p. 317).

A document published by the Chamber of Deputies echoes this, stating that Cutolo himself was officially affiliated as a *capo bastone* [underboss] of the 'ndrangheta via the rite of *battesimo di sangue* [baptism of blood]. (*Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*, p. 53) Although he was regarded as the *capo* and founder of the NCO, the *calabrese* organisation was still considered to be the overarching authority of all of the organisations, or *madre più completa* [mother above all others]. (*ibid.*). This tells us that it was a combination of the support and patronage of not only the Camorra but also, and potentially more importantly, the 'ndrangheta which led Cutolo to organise his own distinct and innovative syndicate. However, the role of the traditional organisations was not limited to simply encouraging Cutolo to found his own organisation. Massari (1998) writes that 'during the process of constitution of the NCO, Cutolo relied heavily upon the cultural patrimony of the *calabrese* matrix and the traditional oaths of the *Camorra Borbonica*, providing a single identity for his own family and offering affiliates a strong sense of belonging' (p. 21). This indicates that Cutolo borrowed from two distinct organisations when he set about organising his own, responding to structural factors in the form of pre-existing, rival organisations. Cutolo's decision was doubtless made in order to increase and strengthen the supporting foundations of his burgeoning clan. Moreover, in doing so, his own reputation and notoriety were bolstered by marketing himself as a serious criminal with a considerable history and patronage.

Armed with his own master plan and mission to dominate the criminal landscape of Campania, Cutolo set about recruiting for his organisation. Allum (2006) writes:

Prison was...full of young delinquents who had different skills and resources but no particular *raison d'être*. By providing them and their families with protection, money, legal aid, and social assistance...Cutolo could create, both inside and outside prison, a pool of grateful and loyal followers...transform[ing] them at the same time into men with honour and purpose (p. 119).

Cutolo's principal offering was that of guaranteeing protection and assistance, including

financial help for the families of all affiliates, in exchange for the prisoners' loyalty. Across the region, the NCO quickly developed with the aim, at least in part, of contrasting the hegemony of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra in the market of illegal tobacco trafficking (Sciarrone, 1998, p. 201), whilst branching out into many other criminal activities. This, in combination with the offer of support to the young prisoners facing lengthy sentences, ensured that Cutolo was able to recruit loyal members with relative ease, including those beyond the prison walls. His power base quickly expanded until, 'at the height of his reign in 1981, Cutolo was at the head of a hierarchical and strictly locally-based organisation...providing 'a living for at least 200,000 people in the Neapolitan area alone' (Allum, 2006, p. 118).

Whilst the Camorra had long since abandoned traditional affiliation rights as far back as the groundbreaking Cuocolo trial (1911-1912), it was Cutolo who decided to resurrect these antique ceremonial practices when he founded the NCO. However, given the contacts he had made within the prison system, he chose to fuse the historical *Camorrista* traditions with those with which he had become more familiar; the '*ndranghetista* customs (Gorgoni, 1994, p. 240). Behan (1996) states that 'the Camorra is an urban mass phenomenon' (p. 29) and it is evident that neither the NCO nor the traditional Camorra *fit* the earliest examples of Italian *mafia*-style organisations. Let us recall the distinct types of organisation outline within Armao's (2003) continuum; whether or not organisations truly represent *mafie*, or are simply forms of organised crime, is a subjective matter, the relevance of which shall become apparent as the thesis progresses. When 'compared with the Mafia, the Camorra has more of a 'horizontal' than a 'vertical' structure, so individual gangs act by and large independently of one another' (Behan, 1996, p. 184). This decision indicates that Cutolo hoped to retain the pre-existing hierarchical roles whilst conceding some form of relative, local autonomy.

It is not only the organisational structure of the NCO which differs from its predecessors. Behan (1996) writes 'a young man generally becomes a member of a Camorra gang without any kind of ceremony; Cutolo's NCO appears to be an exception - an unrepresentative throwback to the rituals of the last century' (p. 115). This illustrates that Cutolo was determined to rely on tradition and reputation which he gained via the emulation of the traditional Camorra. Nevertheless, Cutolo actually carved his own criminal path. Paliotti (1993) writes:

Unlike the old *camorristi* of the 1800's, Cutolo liked written documents. '*Professore*' is perhaps not an accurate description: he seems to overlook the fact that these

documents can end up in the hands of the police or magistrates. Prestige has its price (p. 226).

This disregard for the tradition of *omertá* contradicts the value-laden history of Italian organised crime and its participants. Duggan states that the term *omertá* is ‘...apparently derived from the [Sicilian] dialect word ‘*omu*’ (man)’ (1989, p. 55) and it describes a disinclination to cooperate with or speak to the authorities, along with broader trends of secrecy and concealment, which was ‘fearsomely obeyed’ (*ibid.*, p. 40). At least until the days of Tommaso Buscetta and his *pentiti* counterparts, members of these organisations held *omertá* to be a rule to be obeyed above all others, and Cutolo would eventually pay the price for this behaviour. Just how devastating these mistakes were will become clear as the thesis progresses. However, at this stage we can already ascertain that Cutolo's NCO organisation was innovative in terms of its organisational structure, rites and rituals and behavioural trends, whilst borrowing from and relying on tradition to inform his decisions and practices. This factor is paramount to our comparison between the NCO and SCU which will come later in the thesis as we try to establish the nature of the relationship between the two organisations.

2.2. Cutolo and his men descend upon Puglia

In his role of *capo* and *fondatore* [head and founder] of the NCO, as well as 'ndrangheta affiliate, Cutolo already had contacts in Calabria and across Campania. The boss was in competition with Cosa Nostra members for control of his own region. There was, however, one area of the *Mezzogiorno* which remained untouched, and Cutolo was a very ambitious man. In a move which mirrored his own organisation's path years earlier in Campania, Cutolo set about finding new working spaces in which to operate and set his sights on *la terra pugliese*. During 1979-1980, Cutolo set to work beyond the borders of Campania, and NCO infiltration was consented, intensified and propagated (Sciarrone, 1998, p. 52). Massari (1998) writes:

According to a report published by the *Comando generale dei Carabinieri*, the area of Foggia was under the control of Giosuè Rizzi and Giuseppe Iannelli, one of the most important representatives of the 'ndrangheta in Puglia...linked to Paolo di Stefano's 'ndrina, Cerignola was under the control of Cosimo Cappellari- who was very close to the *cutoliani*, the province of Taranto was dominated by the Modeo brothers and the

area of Brindisi was occupied by Giuseppe Rogoli, originally from Mesagne and closely tied to Bellocco's *calabrese cosca* [clan]. All these groups aspired to be autonomous organisations which moved parallel to that of Cutolo whilst being under his protection (p. 11).

This indicates that it was not only Cutolo who was active in Puglia from the end of the 1970s, but that there was a host of individuals, groups and organisations active in the region at the time. Moreover, this is the first time we witness the appearance of key protagonist Giuseppe Rogoli's name.

We can see that there were various attempts at infiltration of the local criminal underworld on the part of external clans. These events are of interest in that they set the *mise en scène* of the *pugliese* criminal scene, which we could define as pluralistic, competitive and overcrowded. Rivals vied for an opportunity to monopolise the illegal markets and take control of the territory in order to ultimately expand their own power bases and increase their economic gain. The transfer of Neapolitan prisoners into Puglia on the basis of '*soggiorni obbligati*'²¹, or forced resettlements, programme was a crucial event. *Campani* [Campanian] judges made the decision to transfer many members of Cutolo's NCO to prisons in Puglia as a result of heightening tensions between members of '*Il Professore*'s gang and representatives of Michele Zaza's rival clan (Occhiogrosso, 1993, p. 125). *Pugliesi* prisons quickly found that there was a 'massive presence of Neapolitan and Calabrese detainees, affiliated to the Camorra and the 'ndrangheta [respectively]' (Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, *Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni criminali similari*, Doc. XXIII, N. 7, p. 52, 8/6/1992). With no local single, unifying power structure in place, Cutolo wielded considerable power and influence over individual actors, no doubt aided by his previous affiliation with the 'ndrangheta. However, whilst Cutolo was able to exert some level of power and influence, the multiplicity of actors ensured that no single behavioural code was adhered to. There remained opposing and, at times, rival attempts to dominate the criminal landscape. This resulted in the emergence of a sort of criminal market, a free-for-all; a disorganised coalition of relatively autonomous gangsters, seeking acceptance and credence via a higher authority, but failing to constitute a single, homogenous organisation.

²¹ A legal obligation to live in a certain area introduced in Italy as a preventative measure under Fascism but today applied to members of organised crime syndicates. Further detail is provided in Chapter 4.

Cutolo had operatives spread throughout the region, and ‘...small pockets run by key, local criminals had been active for some time...even if working on the basis of ties with Cutolo and some ’ndrangheta bosses...[but all of which] were operating autonomously on their own territories (Massari, 1998, p. 11). This process of expansion of the NCO began in the late 1970s. According to *pentito* [collaborator] Pasquale D’Amico (cited in Occhiogrosso, 1993, p. 126), a meeting at Hotel Florio in Lucera on 5th January, 1979, represents a crucial moment in the history of *pugliese* organised crime. This ‘ceremonial lunch, present at which we find fugitive Cutolo²², his ‘staff’, and *pugliesi* criminal representatives’ (Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, *Commissione Parlamentare d’Inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni criminali similari*, Doc. XXIII, N. 7, p. 52, 8/6/1992) symbolises the first occasion in which official representatives of both the Neapolitan and local criminal formations met to discuss plans for future operations. Adherence to Cutolo’s gang appeared favourable to members of the local criminal underworld (Motta, interview with the author, 30/01/2006) largely for reasons of self-preservation, just had been the case earlier with the NCO in Campania. Further, the NCO link offered them the potential opportunity to broaden the scope of their own criminal careers. Forty of the men present at the meeting were officially sworn into the NCO (Motta, 2002, p. 22). This event represents the official starting-block for the creation of true organised crime in Puglia; an exogenous model built upon attempts at infiltration on the part of external bosses, and taking place many years before the ‘indigenous’ organisation came into being. It was not, however, simply an attempt on the part of local criminal groups to form various home-grown models of criminal syndicates, but the ‘existence of [external] components which saw Puglia as appetising in terms of organised crime’ (Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, *Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*, p. 51).

Later in 1979 another event took place which allegedly helped to solidify and strengthen burgeoning ties between the *camorristi* and the *pugliesi*; the ‘Summit of the Ninety’. Held in Galatina, near Lecce, some of the most important lieutenants of the NCO, representatives of the ’ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra affiliates were present, discussing the future of organised crime in the region (*Comando generale dell’arma dei carabinieri, II reparto*, 1990, p. 10). It was during this meeting that the central rules and rituals of the newly founded Nuova Grande Camorra Pugliese (NGCP) organisation were outlined. Representatives of the ’ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra (including Salvatore Zizzo, famous in Italy for his inclusion on the Italian Most Wanted list between 2001 and his arrest in 2009) sat alongside Cutolo and his men. Having already taken the decision to formalise the NCO’s organisational presence in Puglia, these pre-existing groups were organised according to the structure of the NCO and, *ab initio*,

²² Cutolo had absconded from a mental institution.

Cutolo ensured that the locals were subordinate, at least in economic terms. The most explicit example of this subordination, under which newly-recruited members were subservient to members within the upper echelons of the organisation, lies with the demand for 40-50% of all profits earned through criminal activity (*Comando generale dell'arma dei carabinieri, Il reparto*, 1990, p. 10). Moreover, Cutolo outlined a criminal matrix, nominating *capi-zona* behind bars (*a cielo coperto*), or those within the prison system who were best positioned in terms of increasing recruitment and instigating conversion. *Capi-zona* were also positioned on the outside (*a cielo scoperto*); affiliates who were fugitives who would be responsible for single localities (*ibid*).

According to a Chamber of Deputies report (1992), the ultimate result of these meetings was the emergence of the organisation which developed into the Nuova Grande Camorra Pugliese (NGCP), with Giuseppe Iannelli and Alessandro Fusco as leaders. Affiliates met with the 'objective...of constructing, based on the *cutoliano* model, a "*camorra pugliese*", even if subordinate to the original organisation' (Sciarrone, 1998, p. 169). Officially founded in 1981, all NGCP affiliates, or soon-to-be affiliates, were:

[To be] United into one organisation which was meant to come parallel, but autonomous, to the NCO. Following further meetings in prisons across the territory, Cutolo allowed Iannelli to consider his organisation as working in association with the NCO, and therefore protected by it, but constrained to provide Cutolo with 40% of organisational profits. This organisation became known as the Nuova Camorra Pugliese (NCP). (Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, *Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni criminali similari*, Doc. XXIII, N. 7, p. 52, 8/6/1992).

Therefore, Cutolo's affiliates were soon able to position themselves at the top of the existing prison-based hierarchies and power structures. We see the leaders' and affiliates' shared goal of transforming the NGCP and, latterly, the NCP into another localised hierarchy, which would co-exist alongside the NCO, but remain independent from it, and enforcing subordination on the local members of the criminal underworld.

Recruitment into the NGCP and NCP took place predominantly in the prisons. Evidently, whoever was condemned to pass the majority of their lives in prison recognised that

it had become useful to accept adherence to, or membership of, the Camorra and go on to occupy a prominent position within the organisational structure which was formed within the prison system. This channel of Camorra infiltration and influence took place within the prison system where bullying and violence were omnipresent and the insertion, growth and evolution of a Camorra-style organisation took shape in a terrain more fertile than ever (Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, *Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni criminali similari*, Doc. XXIII, N. 7, p. 53, 8/6/1992). These gangs came to represent a place of refuge for those within the structural organisation of the prison environment (*ibid.*). Having been transferred into prisons across Puglia, NCO members were quickly able to subjugate numerous members of the local criminal underworld, successfully demanding their support, and these demands were seconded by members of the NGCP and NCP (Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, *Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*, p. 53). Cutolo's siphoning of the profits illustrates his opportunistic behaviour, filling the vacuum where he saw potential to increase his power, dominion and profits.

Cutolo's mission recalls Gambetta's thesis of private protection (1993), in that the extra-legal institution that the NCO represented offered support for inmates in the absence of protection from the state, or at least staff within the prisons. As is frequently the case with schemes of illegal private protection, the offer has a tendency to be more of an obligation. This in-prison protection scheme offered Cutolo and his affiliates the power that they craved. It served to create networks which enabled expansion, leading to an increase in profit-making business. Both the secondary literature and examples from primary data sources tell us that it is clear that TLE (*tabacchi lavorati all'estero*, or contraband cigarettes) and drug trafficking (Sciarrone, 1998, p. 160) were the principal activities carried out by Cutolo and his affiliates. *Camorristi* groups in Puglia controlled 75-80% of the illegal TLE market in the middle of the 1970s (*Tribunale di Palermo*, 1986, p. 92, cited in Sciarrone, 1998). It is apparent that, in Puglia at least, this was the area in which they were most successful in exerting their control and increasing their profits. This again reflects Cutolo's opportunistic criminal character as he quickly set to work, having seen an increased number of his affiliates move to *pugliesi* prisons, creating a climate of fear; a tyranny within which hierarchical roles instilled by him and his men were strictly adhered to. The locals, however, were soon to take action.

2.3. The emergence of Giuseppe ‘Pino’ Rogoli and the declining role of Cutolo

The judicial material offers further information about members of this newly founded organisation (the NGCP/NCP) and this is where we witness the first appearance of Giuseppe Rogoli, the historical founder of the SCU, as an important figure. A document published by the Chamber of Deputies lists the key players of the local criminal underworld, among whom we find Giuseppe Ianelli, Giosue Rizzi, Giuseppe Rogoli himself, Cosimo Cappellari and Antonio and Riccardo Modeo, and these names appear throughout early SCU history (*Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*, p. 53). These figures were all closely allied to the NCO, whilst linked via the rite of *battesimo di sangue* [baptism of blood]. At this time, Cutolo himself had been affiliated as *capo bastone* of the 'ndrangheta - still considered to be the overarching authority of all of the organisations (*Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*, p. 53). This indicates the continued presence of a centralised power-core which was organised hierarchically, filtering down some level of control to the sub-regional, semi-autonomous factions. Rogoli's presence here indicates that he was considered to be a significant member of the local criminal underworld. Even at this early stage we can see evidence for Rogoli's criminal capabilities, as he succeeds in becoming one of the chosen few to take a power position in this new organisation. Cutolo's continued control over Puglia was clearly dependent upon the conservation of these links and we must examine here if this was the case and, if not, what caused Cutolo's role to diminish. Ultimately, many other factors, events, and causes, both structural and agential, contribute to Rogoli's own mission coming to fruition, and the demise of Cutolo forms a small but integral part of this complex process.

Cutolo's continued attempts at expansion demonstrate innovation, as illustrated by his introduction of a new organisational structure, and flexibility in terms of the hierarchy at the core of the consortium. This doubtless aided organisational development, enabling it to withstand some level of structural change and judicial pressure. We know that the NCO and the NGCP/NCP both borrowed from the traditional Camorra, with some form of internal hierarchy and featuring a strict chain of command, but still remained flexible enough to be open to evolution and mutation. Cutolo's presence within the realm of *pugliese* organised crime was at least partially reliant on the traditions and rituals of other criminal organisations, namely the Camorra itself and the 'ndrangheta. Indeed, the judicial data supports this:

The identification with the aggressor (the *cutoliani*) determined the *pugliese* desire to imitate and move closer to the behavioural patterns and rituals of the Camorra (CdA2, p. 27).

We need only examine the similarity between the ranking systems of both the NCO and the *calabrese* organisations to see the clear process of mimicry, both including the terms *capizona*, *sgarristi*, *santisti* and *picciotti* (Paliotti, 2002; Paoli, 2003). This demonstrates some degree of flexibility and openness to change and evolution, hitherto absent among those which represent *traditional* Italian organised crime. Further, these behavioural patterns reflect an acknowledgement of the desirability in combining the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ in an attempt to form a successful organisation.

As time progressed, Cutolo’s NCO was trapped in ever bloodier warfare with Zaza’s faction of the *Nuova Famiglia* (NF) (Gorgoni, 1994, p. 240), a rival alliance, founded to contrast the NCO, which operated from 1977 to 1984 (Allum, 2006, p. 126). Cutolo began to lose his vice-like grip, both at home and in Puglia, as violent and ferocious counter-attacks on the part of the NF took place (Sciarrone, 1998, p. 177). Partially responsible for Cutolo’s diminishing control of the territory was his incarceration, as affiliates of rival *cosche* [clans] began to refuse to acknowledge his authority or to pay the *pizzo* (or bribe/extortion charge) in areas Cutolo considered to be within his domain (Paliotti, 2002, p. 229). In December 1978, representatives of the 7 rival *campane* [Campanian] families met and formed a pact in which they confirmed their support for one another, as well as their continued rivalry with Cutolo and the NCO (Paliotti, 2002, pp. 239-230). This new alliance threatened to destroy what Cutolo had created, and the need to ‘keep his own house in order’ superseded that of his mission in Puglia. Eventually, both the NCO and the NF succumbed to the state counter-offensive which had led to widespread arrests and conviction. This highlights the difficulty of maintaining order and territorial control from the constraints of a prison cell. Further, it illustrates that newcomers emerging in crowded spaces do, indeed, struggle, particularly in terms of rivalry with pre-existing gangs. Finally, it indicates that the more loosely-based, hierarchical-network structure Cutolo had envisioned and created was rather unstable and liable to breaking up. It was in the maelstrom of these clashes that local criminals seized the opportunity to attempt to fill the void left by Cutolo, as he desperately fought to regain and retain his stronghold.

Both local and external criminal gangs clearly saw an opportunity to make money and gain control from the power vacuum that began to emerge as Cutolo’s struggles continued.

Judge Motta states:

According to his plan, Cutolo affiliated *pugliesi* detainees to the organisation, but in the *pugliesi* prisons there was a really terrible atmosphere because the *campani* prisoners were assaulting the locals. So, the *pugliesi* prisoners realised, and not just those inside but those on the outside, too, that there was this occupation and criminal activity taking place and that they would be bossed around by both the Neapolitan *camorristi* and the Sicilians. They decided to get organised; up until that moment there had never been an organisation of local delinquents. Everyone had always done their own thing. That is what really happened. So, they decided to make things even, to set up a group, and to try to combat these attempted invasions, and that is how the SCU was born (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006).

We can also examine the secondary literature in relation to Cutolo's decline. In fact, Gorgoni's findings support Judge Motta's view as the journalist argues:

In fact, in spite of the hierarchical ranks and areas of responsibility which were stabilised, the push of the *pugliesi* criminals to liberate themselves of the NCO, to the vertices of which is owed a relevant part of their criminal proceeds, is very strong. The operation of detachment is also facilitated by the crisis running through the NCO, losing ground to the more organised Zaza and Alfieri clans. In 1980 the earthquake in Irpinia and the race among the *camorriste* organisations to win the contracts for reconstruction consented a detachment which we can define as 'consensual'. This in fact took place in a totally bloodless way (1995, pp. 241-242).

The actual date of birth of the SCU is a highly contentious matter which is relevant to this stage in our analysis. There is undoubtedly a period of co-existence which must be taken into account when we examine the relationship between the NGCP/NCP and the SCU. Let us consider that in 1981 the Nuova Grande Camorra Pugliese had already been founded. This was shortly followed by the Nuova Camorra Pugliese. According to some sources, Rogoli had already founded the SCU by 25th December, 1981. Conversely, the statute of the SCU which was discovered in Rogoli's cell cites the date of foundation as May, 1983.

Both the primary data and secondary literature are problematic in terms of establishing

the date of birth of the SCU. Judge Motta states that the official date of birth is May, 1983 (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006). One might presume that this would be the definitive response, considering Motta's expertise and role in the region. However, Massari writes that the organisation was [doubtless] already operative in the first few years of the 1980s (1998, p. 19) and it seems likely that this was the case. Longo is similarly vague, stating that the SCU was founded in 1981 (1998, p. 88) but then continuing to cite *pentito* [collaborator] Morello who claimed that the SCU was founded in 1983. Sciarrone (1998) states that the SCU was founded in 1981 (p. 172). The author then goes on to claim that a sort of 'refoundation' took place in 1983, marking the beginning of the era of autonomy, and stating that this three year period represented the passage from ideation to the material emergence of the organisation (Sciarrone, 1998, p. 172). Gorgoni's account is most similar to that of Sciarrone in that he states that the SCU was founded by Rogoli alone in 1981 but re-founded in 1983 with the support of Umberto Bellocco and the 'ndrangheta (1995, pp. 241-242). This represents the second wave of infiltration which was outlined earlier in the chapter. It seems that the earliest, embryonic form of the SCU represented a far smaller, strictly prison-based organisation. Whilst having many links beyond the prison walls, the organisation represented a more local phenomenon. Judge Motta stated:

The SCU was born with the intention of controlling...the whole of Puglia but only shortly after it had been founded the project had already shifted to just the southern part of the region, that being Lecce, Brindisi and Taranto, the old Ofanto [river] territory (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006).

It seems that it was *only* following 'ndranghetisti support in the form of Bellocco that Rogoli was able to officially found his organisation and begin his project of expansion.

This disparity makes analysis difficult as there are so many contradictory accounts about the nature of the SCU in this embryonic phase. However, what is clear is that the process of formation was not a simple passage. Rather, it was one characterised by difficulties, pitfalls and complications until the *calabresi* took the reins and aided the local, small-time criminals to expand beyond their relatively small areas of influence, whilst imposing upon them their own traditions and rituals. What is vital to assess at this stage is the role of the second-wave of external criminals in the foundation of an 'indigenous' organisation. It is, therefore, the aforementioned relationship between Rogoli and 'ndranghetista Umberto Bellocco which must be analysed if we are to understand the final steps in the process of detachment from the

Camorra and move towards the *calabresi* in terms of SCU history.

2.4. The *pugliese-calabrese* matrix is consolidated: Bellocco and Rogoli's relationship strengthens

It is clear that it was not only the presence of the Camorra in Puglia that instigated the locals to seek change and attempt to prevent the domination of external figures on their own territory. Both the primary and secondary literature illustrate that representative members of the 'ndrangheta also played a crucial role in the transformation from *Apulia felix* into a region comparable to its neighbours, albeit with greater involvement *in collaboration* with the locals.

Umberto Bellocco was born in the municipality of Rosarno, Calabria, on 17th December, 1937. He is the *capo* and *fondatore* [head and founder] of the eponymous Bellocco clan based in his birthplace, one of the organisation's most infamous and powerful *cosche* [clans]. Arrested in Casablate, near Lecce, in 1983 for a failed kidnap attempt (*Libera*, 2006. p. 107), Bellocco developed a relationship with Rogoli following his own arrest and incarceration in Puglia. Mayor of Bari Michele Emiliano said:

Sentence number 3 23/5/1991 [Sen. CdA 1] from Lecce Court of Assizes makes clear the link between Giuseppe Rogoli and Umberto Bellocco...who was transferred to share a cell with [the *pugliese* boss]...According to numerous collaborators, it was Bellocco himself who awarded Rogoli with the flower [or gift] which represented permission to found and name his own family in the area (*Rassegna di documenti processuali concernenti le mafie pugliesi*, http://www.csm.it/quaderni/quad_99a.html. Accessed 02/07/2009).

During this period, Rogoli was affiliated to Bellocco's *cosca* [clan], initially as a *santista* [holy one] of his clan but progressing to the more important *diritto al medaglione* [rightful medal-holder]. (*Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*, p. 53) Rogoli, now officially linked to Bellocco's 'ndrine as responsible for the zone of Brindisi, began to learn the craft of *mafiosità* from Bellocco himself and set about carving his own criminal path, just as Cutolo had done before him. The *calabrese* taught him about the affiliation rites and rituals of the 'ndrangheta, and these rules eventually became the foundation of Rogoli's own

organisation. This support of the 'ndrangheta ultimately provided Rogoli with the protection, support and leverage which were required to found his own organisation, which he did with Bellocco's blessing. It is clear from Bellocco's choice to collaborate with Rogoli that the *pugliese* was a highly-esteemed member of the criminal fraternity who recognised an opportunity for growth, expansion and increased autonomy through the burgeoning relationship with the *calabrese*. These qualities indicate that Rogoli was both respected in the prison system and intelligent enough to exploit his reputation for his own and his early affiliates' gain.

The collaboration between some key players of the *pugliese* underworld and Cutolo's gang appears to have had no negative effect on the progress of Bellocco's *calabresi cosche* in recruiting local members and branching out across the region. (*Libera*, 2004, p. 107) It was the ever-growing links with the bosses from Calabria which initially encouraged the *pugliesi* locals to seek more autonomy, no longer wanting to be bound by NCO control (*ibid*). Let us recall that:

The Salento criminals [were] animated by a clear local interest and aware of the expectation that they eventually submit to the *camorristi*. (including the heavy bribes of profits between 40-50%) (Sen. CdA2, pp. 21-22)

These members hoped to reap more of the financial rewards than had previously been possible under Cutolo. It was Rogoli to take the reins and instigate this bold move, again demonstrating his shrewd character. Insisting on greater autonomy and thereby securing greater profits, Rogoli was setting the path for change in motion. Simultaneous to other crucial external or structural changes, such as the *pugliese* economic growth and technological progress, there was a transformation taking place within local criminal organisations (*Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*, p. 51). We can see that, just as the legal sphere of Puglia was evolving and modernising, so too were the illegal or dark systems.

Our primary data tells us that it was indeed Bellocco to encourage and assist Rogoli in the foundation of his own organisation. Don Raffaele Bruno stated:

Indeed, it was the support of the 'ndrangheta, they authorised Rogoli to operate in organisational terms, and there were examples of ceremonial rituals in the area of Lizzanello Marine. (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006)

However, the aforementioned contradictions over the official date of birth persist. We understand some of the reasons behind this disparity and confusion, but there is very little information about the processes that took place. Whilst we know that there was already a considerable *calabrese* presence in Puglia, both within the prison system and beyond (*Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*), here we must seek to identify the nature of the emerging dual relationship between Pino Rogoli and his *calabrese* counterpart, now we have outlined Cutolo's departure. Rogoli may have already been operative in some capacity as a *capo* of an emerging organised crime syndicate. It was, however, to be the assistance of Bellocco that proved so crucial as to ultimately instigate the official foundation of the SCU as the triumvirate power structure shifted, marked by Cutolo's demise in the region. This appears to have taken place on the advent of their close proximity in Lecce prison. From as early as 1981-1982, we witness Rogoli expressing his frustrations about the stifling reign of the NCO over his own territory. He and Bellocco then set about coordinating their expertise and resources to set up a counter-organisation.

With Rogoli at the helm, and with the blessing of Bellocco and his other *padrino* Carmine Alvaro, one of the earliest missions of the emerging SCU was to take control of town squares across Salento in order to sell drugs (*Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*, p. 54). Following the consolidation of the Rogoli-Bellocco relationship, the *calabrese* boss set about organising kidnappings across Salento (*ibid.*). This move polarised many members of the *pugliese* underworld and smaller groups attempted to form their own autonomous gangs. These were quickly quashed by Rogoli's emerging stronghold. In 1981, when Rogoli found himself in cell number 12 in Bari prison, he is alleged to have officially founded the new consortium with the blessing of Bellocco as *padrino*, the date symbolically attributed to 25th December, and officially named the Sacra Corona Unita (*Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*, p. 54). By 1982-1983, the co-founders of the organisation, namely Iannelli, Rizzi and Cappellari, bestowed upon themselves the title of 'invisible leaders at the vertices', fully acknowledging the original philosophy behind the organisation, according to which the locals would have control of their own territory and support would be maintained by a close team of 'silent partners'. As such, Rogoli was allowed to maintain control having been 'chosen' by Bellocco, reiterating Rogoli's reputation and status as a criminal within the prison system. This is the first time, according to a primary data source, that we witness the official formation of a single family which consists of organic, local components from across the region, all officially recognised by the *capi-bastone* of the 'ndrangheta (*Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni criminali similari*, Doc. XXIII,

N. 7, p. 55, 8/6/1992). Indeed, SCU *pentito* [collaborator] Annacondia claimed that ‘Umberto Bellocco was the father of the SCU, great *’ndranghetista*, one of the *capi decimi* [ten leaders] of the *’ndrangheta*, who provided the rules for the SCU’ (*ibid.*).

The emergent organisation represented, broadly speaking, an attempt to ‘self-organise’ on the part of the *pugliese* underworld, initiated by the need to defend their territory from the perceived threat of subordination on the part of the Camorra and other external *mafia*-style organisations. Rogoli himself claimed:

At the time...the whole world knew what [Cutolo and his men] were up to, everyone was talking about it, I don’t know, they had power...everyone knew when...they ended up in jail...they wanted to take advantage, and that didn’t sound any good to us. So, a group of us - not just me, a group - decided to construct this SCU in opposition to this prison-based superpower which they had created. (Rogoli speaking in 1992, cited in Massari, 1998, p. 17)

Rogoli’s career was making considerable progress as he continued to exploit his reputation and status. Accordingly, Bellocco’s presence allowed for a move away from the vice-like grip of the NCO in the region. Moreover, his support provided the SCU with its official set of rules, rites and regulations, placing the burgeoning organisation under the *’ndrangheta*’s protective wing, and imposing the *’ndranghetisti* as the organisation’s *compari diritti*, or rightful godfathers. The role of the *’ndrangheta* was to be, according to Bellocco and Rogoli, discreet, reserved and altogether different to the reckless methods of Cutolo and his men. Cutolo’s departure permitted the Bellocco-Rogoli relationship to thrive.

Rogoli’s relationship with Bellocco certainly proved to be more enduring than that with Cutolo. Nonetheless, his behaviour as founder and leader of the SCU can reveal much more to us in terms of the evolution of the organisation and its status as a newcomer in the world of organised crime. As the thesis progresses, we can further examine if Rogoli remains subordinate to Bellocco, how long Bellocco’s influence endures, how Rogoli goes on to organise his gang, and how Rogoli behaves as affiliate of one organisation and boss of another. Only when these questions have been addressed may we conclude our analysis on organisational evolution. Here we are referring strictly to the earliest form of the SCU, which may potentially reveal something different compared to the later stages of organisational development. Further, this analysis is

crucial to our understanding of organisational evolution post-NCO. Observing whether established rules and regulations were adhered to and, if so, by whom, should ultimately allow us to address the questions contained within our hypotheses and outlined in the previous chapter. However, before we may come to understand these key events in early SCU history, we must first understand the make-up of the organisation, its name, and its organisational structure.

2.5. The SCU deconstructed

Following many years living in Germany, shortly after returning to Italy in 1982, Giuseppe Rogoli carried out an armed robbery which resulted in the death of a tobacconist bystander from Giovinazzo (*Libera*, 2006, p. 107), near Bari. This crime resulted in a life-imprisonment term for the soon-to-be boss. Given the violent nature of the offence committed by Rogoli, a position of power and authority was quickly bestowed upon him within the prison system and he commanded a considerable amount of respect (Motta, interview with the author, 30/01/2006). Rogoli took full advantage of this climate of fear, allowing him to take control of the escalating organisation initially as an affiliate of Cutolo. It was his decision ultimately to reject the *napoletano* and move towards Bellocco, an astute move signifying the beginning of the end of any official *camorrista* presence in Puglia and forging the way for a special relationship between the local criminality and members of the 'ndrangheta. This departure also seems to represent a shift in the organisational structure of the pre-SCU organisation, as there ceased to be two poles battling for control. Rather, what we now see emerging is a small group or network of criminals, still hierarchically structured. At this time, Rogoli remains subordinate to Bellocco, and Rogoli's affiliates subordinate to him, featuring a clear and direct chain of command. Judge Motta states that 'the SCU was born as a pyramid, with a pyramidal structure' (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006). *Pentito* Cagnazzo stated:

It has to be said that the SCU was born to Pino Rogoli...via Umberto Bellocco, Beppe Pesce, [a] big player in the 'ndrangheta, because the SCU is basically a '*ndrina* detached in Puglia...it's no more than the 'ndrangheta branched out in Puglia, with the same rules, the same affiliations (1999, cited in Caselli, 2005, p. 490).

The special relationship between Bellocco and Rogoli represents the vital external assistance which bolstered Rogoli's attempts to expand. This allowed his power to increase, broadening his scope and reign across a wider area of southern Puglia. For the period in question, Rogoli,

alongside Bellocco, can be regarded as the true leader of the emerging SCU; in control, with the power to make decisions about both the structure of the organisation and also activities undertaken.

The support offered by 'ndrangheta members was not, however, purely symbolic. Rogoli's SCU borrowed many traditions and rituals from the traditional Italian organised crime syndicates. The organisational structure of the SCU at this stage in its history is no exception. It was the links with Bellocco that paved the way for the formation of an organisation which would borrow heavily from the organisational structure of the *calabrese* gangs. The 'ndrangheta-style origins are entirely evident in the SCU (Gorgoni, 1994, p. 240). Even from the name of the organisation, the influence of the 'ndrangheta, as well as the adoption of their rituals and ceremonies, is evident. The choice of the name was clearly symbolic: a 'sacra corona' is a rosary bead necklace, and the 'unita' was added by Rogoli and his affiliates in order to imply unity within the organisation (Don Raffaele Bruno, interview with the author, 30/01/2006). The image of rosary beads also appears to be symbolic of the character and organisational structure of the SCU, as it represents an organisation which consists of many strong parts, all of which are loosely but solidly linked. Moreover, the resonance of terms native to Reggio Calabria is clear, as the examples of Santa Catena and Santa Corona illustrate, both of which form part of specific *riti di formazione* [learning ceremonies] within the 'ndrangheta (Gorgoni, 1994, p. 240). Rogoli was making wise choices, symbolically including imagery relevant to the *calabresi* whilst beginning to mould his own organisation according to his own wishes. *Pentito* Morello claims that:

The hierarchical division of the organisation is based upon specific *gradi*, or ranks, from low to high: *picciotto*, *camorrista*, *sgarrista*, *santista e vangelo*...Affiliation with the organisation, whose primary goal was to supply financial assistance to detainees and their families, was finalised with a specific ceremony and with the swearing of an oath: baptism allowed one to acquire the rank of *camorrista*, which was then followed by internal progression to *sgarrista*, *santista*, *evangelista*, *mezzo quartino*, and *quartino*. The vertices featured the ranks of *crimine*, which allowed for progression to allow members to enter into contact with high-ranking members of the *camorra*, *della mafia e della 'ndrangheta*.(Romolo Morello in 1989, Sen. CdA 1).

The primary data, whilst scarce, does illustrate the existence of a pronounced internal hierarchy at this stage of the SCU history. Only upon further investigation will we be able to observe how

strictly these roles were actually adhered to and, if not, what this means in terms of the configuration of the clan. Morello's words further illustrate that Rogoli and his affiliates depended upon and were greatly influenced by the traditional *mafia*-style organisations, as the following diagram demonstrates:

Table 3: Ranks of SCU and 'ndrangheta families

| | |
|---|--|
| <p style="text-align: center;">SOCIETÀ SEGRETA</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Crimine distaccato o Diritto al medaglione con catena</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Crimine o Diritto al medaglione</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Tre quartino</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Evangelista</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SOCIETÀ MAGGIORE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Santista</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Sgarrista o Dispari</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SOCIETÀ MINORE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Camorrista</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Picciotto</p> | <p style="text-align: center;">SOCIETÀ MAGGIORE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">associazione o società</p> <p style="text-align: center;">trequartino o quintino</p> <p style="text-align: center;">vangelista</p> <p style="text-align: center;">santista</p> <p style="text-align: center;">camorrista di sgarro</p> <p style="text-align: center;">camorrista</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SOCIETÀ MINORE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">picciotto sgarrista</p> <p style="text-align: center;">picciotto liscio</p> |
| <p>The ranks of a SCU family, Sen. CdA 1, p. 76; Massari, 1998, p. 195</p> | <p>The ranks of a 'ndrangheta family, Paoli, 2003, p. 47.</p> |

The similarity between these two ranking schemes is patent. Colussi (cited in Sciarrone, 1998) states that, 'in order not to succumb to this external threat of invasion, members of the *pugliese* underworld had, necessarily, to adopt and imitate the organisational methods of the very adversaries who threatened them' (p. 105). We can see that the SCU was organised, at least in theory, as a classic hierarchy; vertically structured with 8 levels, or *gradi*, within which the

pyramidal structure was subdivided into three separate *strata*. Indeed, Judge Motta said:

The SCU *was* born...with a pyramidal structure...but this all changed over time...There was even talk of knights in the territory but these are folkloristic aspects of the organisation ... It is true, though, that there was this pyramidal structure, and that is not just on the basis of our investigations but a letter we confiscated told us this. Rogoli sent a letter to Dodaro, who himself was named as responsible for the province of Lecce, in which Rogoli named the other two who were responsible for Taranto and Brindisi and Rogoli expressed his thoughts to Dodaro, saying “Look, I decided that each of you will have control of the three provinces, [but] you will refer back to me, and in each of your own areas every person under you will refer back to each of you”. So this was the pyramidal structure (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006).

Whilst the SCU under Rogoli decided to adopt a hybrid of NCO-’ndrangheta rankings and rituals, borrowing from both traditions, Colussi may have identified an interesting factor. If the SCU was to have any hope of succeeding as an organisation, it was necessary for affiliates to create something which was, if not close to, at least comparable with the organisations by which it felt threatened. Rogoli clearly recognised this and acted accordingly, once again demonstrating his careful and thoughtful approach to foundation and leadership of the organisation.

When we consider the vicinity of the organisational structure to that of the ’ndrangheta, however, we must ask ourselves if additional influential factors played a part in Rogoli’s decision to structure the organisation in the way that he did. Perhaps in emulating the configuration of the very organisation by which the SCU was ‘sponsored’, a statement of appreciation, respect and gratitude was made. It seems that this, along with Collusi’s aforementioned thesis of necessity, is what led Rogoli to choose this path for his emerging organisation. This is echoed by Sciarrone (1998), who writes:

It is important to bear in mind that in Puglia the genesis of autonomous criminal organisations is not exclusively based upon simple processes of imitation: the most important groups acquire a definitive physiognomy not only because they adopt operative procedures and organisational structures of the traditional forms of *mafia*, but above all because they obtain recognition by the very same groups (p. 171).

It seems that the SCU was able to bridge the gap between tradition and innovation and that this is a crucial part of the evolutionary process which the Rogoli *cosca* and the wider organisation underwent. From the outside, the association presented itself as having an identity which had been profoundly inspired by the traditional *mafia*-style models - including rituals, symbols, ceremonies, hierarchies, and rules, all inspired by traditional *mafia* culture. However, the actual behavioural dynamics, as we shall see, indicate that it had acquired the more modern characteristics observed in contemporary *mafia*-style consortia; with affiliates often displaying traits which could be defined as utilitarian, individualistic, aimed even at fierce competition with the goals of getting rich and increasing power and status (Massari, 1998, pp. 172-173). Further evidence for this will be provided as the chapter progresses.

There was no initial animosity between Bellocco and Cutolo as the Camorra and the 'ndrangheta originally worked together in Puglia, with members affiliated simultaneously into *cosche* of both organisation. However, with Rogoli and Bellocco's strengthening relationship, they made a joint decision to contrast Cutolo, as illustrated in the EURISPES ²³ Report which states

[Bellocco and Alvaro's] control of the hierarchy allowed the *calabresi* to count on a certain number of allies and potential partners in a territory characterised by a strong attempt at infiltration on the part of the Camorra. In this way it was possible, on the one hand, to enlarge their own influence over the territory and, on the other, to contrast the expansionist strategy of the NCO (1994, p. 51, cited in Longo, 1997, p. 90).

The *calabresi* also wanted to make money and Puglia, with its 600km coastline, presented an opportunity, particularly following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakdown of the Eastern bloc, in terms of the illegal trafficking of drugs, arms and illegally produced tobacco (TLE) (Motta, interview with the author, 30/01/2006). Whilst Cutolo and the NCO had made money predominantly through drug trafficking and TLE, the secondary literature tells us that Bellocco and Rogoli relied heavily, at least in the earliest period, upon kidnapping for ransom (Massari, 1998, p. 22; Sciarrone, 1998, p. 160).

²³ The independent Italian research institute.

The role of external crime organisations in the formation of the SCU demonstrates the important role played by structural factors in this early phase of its history. The SCU's formal configuration as a hierarchy, its adoption of specific rites and rituals, its main illegal activities were all largely determined by external pressure, as opposed to autonomous choices. Agency plays a part, as the SCU represents an attempt on the part of the *pugliesi* to create an organisation based on the more traditional *mafioso* model, a process via which the founding members sought to reinforce their own organisation and thereby free themselves from the shackles of the other consortia (Colussi, 2004, p. 106). Rogoli's role in this process cannot be denied. Nevertheless, even this example of forward-thinking on the part of Rogoli and his close associates can be seen as reactive behaviour largely determined by the wider context in which they have to operate and, more specifically, by the constraints set by the presence of more powerful external organisations. It is only once the SCU comes into existence that Rogoli and his associates begin to operate with a certain degree of autonomy and emerge as influential agents in their own right. Now that we have considered the organisational configuration of the SCU, it is necessary to investigate who made up the organisation, how these affiliates were recruited and early patterns of interaction among members.

2.6. Recruitment and constitution: Rogoli and his inner circle

The matter of recruitment into the SCU followed a standard path, with affiliates being gathered both in and out of prison, some on the basis of blood ties, whilst others were approached due to their skills. *Pentito* Maurizio Cagnazzo said:

My affiliation took place in a cell in Lecce prison, number 5. I had, however, already been *pledged* on the outside, but first they need to see what type of guy you are. So in prison I was affiliated from an official point of view (Cagnazzo, 1999. Cited in *Dalla mafia allo stato*, 2005, p. 490).

This statement made by Cagnazzo offers insight into the recruitment processes of the organisation. In stating that official affiliation took place in prison, but following selection whilst not incarcerated, Cagnazzo helps us to understand how far-reaching the SCU quickly became. Further, this indicates that there were various modes of entry into the organisation. Rogoli himself was recruited and affiliated into the external organisations whilst prisoner in Puglia, through his links with 'ndrangheta clan members. He had, however, previously been

linked to Cutolo's NCO. Wider recruitment into the SCU took place predominantly within the prison system but, as time passed and the organisation grew, many more members were recruited from beyond the prison walls. These affiliates were vital to the success of the organisation, as these voices and actors 'on the outside', or '*a cielo scoperto*', enabled the *capi* to exercise their power from their prison cells and remained points of contact across the penitentiary boundaries.

Rogoli was targeted specifically by 'ndrangheta boss Bellocco before he went on to form the SCU, and it appears that he recruited members in the same way. Relationships were made in prison, either directly or indirectly, and potential members were invited to join the various *cosche* depending on allegiances or place of origin. Obligated to undergo a series of tests and initiation rituals, members were eventually admitted and awarded a certain grade, indicating their *level* and position within the organisation and allowing for promotion on the basis of recommendation. Beyond the prison walls, potential members were selected on the basis of family ties, friendships or other kinship bonds, representing more of a local, ethnic-bound organisation. Being a member of the organisation offered certain benefits, namely protection and favours, and the act of *not* joining surely carried its own risks.

At this stage it is crucial that we examine how much power and responsibility Rogoli wielded within, and in relation to, his inner circle and chosen cohorts during this time period. Whilst the matter of recruitment processes has already been explored, let us examine the ways in which newly-recruited members interact in relation to Rogoli as *capo* and internally as affiliates and 'comrades', if such a notion truly exists. An understanding of how much control and autonomy was delegated to the assigned *capi-zona* will allow us to assess whether the power came from above, was filtered down at every individual stratum of the organisation, or transformed from a strong power core to a more *ad hoc*, fluid power structure over time. Here it is worth noting that the application of the term *capozona*, or area manager, within the SCU indicates a slightly different meaning to that normally found to be associated with organised crime. Whereas in the other main criminal organisations, *capozona* is a common term with little indication of power position or status, for the SCU at this time it was the *capizona* who truly controlled the organisation, were awarded with relative autonomous responsibility and were trusted colleagues of Rogoli himself. It is also vital that we explore exactly who these members within the inner circle were. Given that the maxi-trials were held considerably later than the time period in question, available data on specific members within this organisational structure is limited. Longo (1997) states that *pentito* Morello named himself as a founding member of the

SCU in 1983, alongside Rogoli, Antonio ‘Tonino’ Dodaro, Giuseppe Giannelli and Claudio Mondadori (Morello, cited in Longo, 1997, p. 89, taken from *Primo grado rito ordinario Corte Assise*, 23/05/1991 [or Sen. CdA 1], p. 87). The author also states that the first affiliate of the SCU was Antonio Antonica, who was awarded responsibility for recruitment of new members and the nomination of lieutenants who would operate in specific towns. Furthermore, Longo states that Rogoli was initially responsible for Lecce, Brindisi and Taranto, whilst Giosuè Rizzi, Cosimo Cappellari and Giuseppe Giannelli had control over Foggia and Bari (Longo, 1997, p. 90).

Massari (1998) goes into greater detail of specific members, at both the pre-SCU stage and the embryonic phase of the Rogoli SCU clan. The author, in reference to the end of the 1970s, states that Foggia was in the hands of Rizzi and Iannelli, the town of Cerignola under the watchful eye of Cappellari, Taranto in the control of the Modeo brothers, and finally Rogoli was responsible for Brindisi and surrounding areas (p. 11). Massari cites Giuseppe Giannelli as the affiliate responsible for helping to unify members within the aforementioned NGCP/NCP structure (p. 12). Continuing, the author lists some of the *capi riconosciuti* [or recognised leaders] of the SCU on foundation in 1983 as Oronzo Romano, Giosuè Rizzi, Giuseppe Rogoli, Savino Parisi, Antonio Dodaro, Giovanni Donatiello, Vincenzo Stranieri, and the three Modeo brothers (p. 19).

Journalist and author Gorgoni (1995) attempts to detail the emerging organisation, citing the same names as Longo and Massari, but outlining the following areas of responsibility: Rogoli at the vertices of the hierarchy, followed by Rizzi and Giannelli in Foggia and Cappellari in Cerignola. According to Gorgoni, Rogoli placed himself in charge of Lecce, Brindisi and Taranto, whilst delegating the rest of Puglia to Rizzi, Cappellari and Iannelli (pp. 245-246). Other names cited by Gorgoni also include the Modeo brothers, although he cites that there are two (Riccardo and Gianfranco), whereas Massari (1998) cites three and Longo fails to mention them at all at this stage. Whilst the same names appear again and again, there is no definitive 'membership list' of the early SCU available within the primary or secondary data, in spite of the fact that it made up part of the statute discovered in 1984.

The 1991 maxi-trial sentence states that a document confiscated from Rogoli's cell included the following names among the affiliates:

Mazzei Maurizio, Rogoli Giuseppe, Erpete Enrico, Gagliardi Saverio, Porcelli Fernando, Contaldo Maurizio, De Matteis Pantaleo, Erpete Claudio, Fanghella Giovanni e Antonio, Mancino Agostino, Morello Romolo, Pagano Giuseppe, Perrone Daniele, Stranieri Vincenzo, and Cirfeta Cosimo (Sen. CdA 1, p. 103).

However, given that the wider organisation is considered to have approximately 1,900 affiliates²⁴, it is likely that this list just includes the small circle of founding members, considered at this time to be Rogoli's inner circle. Whilst still linked to Cutolo, we know Rogoli met with the Neapolitan leader himself, as well as representatives from Cosa Nostra and the 'ndrangheta. We also know that Rogoli chose subsequently to align himself more closely with Bellocco, thus distancing himself and his own affiliates from Cutolo. The data shows that Rogoli was responsible for Lecce, Brindisi and Taranto, or southern Puglia, and we know that members were recruited primarily from within the prison system but also beyond. We know that Rogoli, with the support of Bellocco, delegated certain areas of responsibility to certain, trusted members of the *pugliese* underworld who were recent affiliates of the burgeoning SCU but, beyond these limited facts, little more information is available. Far more names emerge as time passes and the organisation evolves but, at this stage, we must simply examine what little available data there is and attempt to extract useful information from these limited sources.

Different accounts and interpretations may be partially responsible for an inconsistent historical account of the pre- and early SCU. A lack of useful data can arguably be attributed to the state's failure to respond efficiently to the arrival of organised crime in Puglia. When the maxi-trials began in the early 1990s and Law 416*bis* was finally applied (to be explored in greater detail in Chapter Four of the thesis), it seems that these early stages had become somewhat irrelevant, with the trial transcripts simply stating that the SCU was founded for *x* reason by Rogoli and *x* prisoners with the aim of *x* goals and objectives and little else. We never see a full and consistent diagram or an exhaustive list citing all members, roles and responsibilities at this stage of SCU history. This makes analysis of this time period difficult so we must work with what little we have in order to attempt to address the hypotheses and research questions at this stage of our analysis.

Whilst specific data on the nature of the organisational structure is, at times, frustratingly limited, the figure of Rogoli appears throughout. So, here we can attempt to use

²⁴According to the *Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura* (or the Council of the Judiciary), http://www.csm.it/quaderni/quad_99a.htm. Accessed 16/10/2011

some of this information to help us to understand the structure of the emerging SCU with Rogoli as a point of departure. Ultimately, this will allow us to come to some preliminary conclusions concerning the configuration of the organisation. The pre- or early SCU seems to represent a simple hierarchy with Rogoli at the top of the power pyramid. Conversely, there is evidence emerging which suggests a more complex, network-based organisation with Rogoli at the core and other members situated in gradually more external peripheral positions. In terms of the actual make-up of the clan, given that the SCU borrowed from the rules and regulations of both the NCO and the 'ndrangheta, it is no surprise that Rogoli's organisation features a similar structure: clusters of coordinated but individual *cosche* (Longo, 1997, pp. 136-139), which clearly represent a network, or local, ethnic model, as opposed to a traditional hierarchy. Whilst in the early stages of the history of the SCU, Rogoli appeared to have a genuine role of power and decision-making over the entire organisation, it seems to be the case that he gradually lost control and the *cosche*, or at least smaller clusters, became more autonomous and, ultimately, this undermined Rogoli's power and role as leader.

The territorial control structure of the SCU appears to have been such that Rogoli had always lain at the centre, as a unifying, overarching figure. However, that power core was surrounded by quasi-autonomous entities at the local level, such as bosses nominated by Rogoli for the areas of Lecce, Brindisi and Taranto (*Tribunale di Lecce, Sentenza contro G. De Tommasi + 104*, p. 120, cited in Longo, 1997, pp. 137-138). These sub-regional bosses organised their own activities autonomously whilst maintaining an associative bond or tie with the centre in the form of Rogoli's consent to their enterprises in exchange for a pre-approved amount of associated earnings (*ibid*). So, whilst hierarchical bonds and relations co-existed with the presence of parallel *cosche* (*Tribunale di Brindisi, Sentenza contro C. Bruno + 28*, p. 188, cited in Longo, 1997, p. 138) this form of local, territorial autonomy was always accepted as part of the structure, even if certain central rules needed to be obeyed. Nonetheless, it was clearly necessary for Rogoli to be able to delegate given that he was incarcerated throughout the entire period of time relevant to this section of the thesis.

What this combination of hierarchical authority and localised autonomy appears to have allowed him to do initially is control the territory centrally. This is indispensable in terms of wielding tangible power, with the delegation to apparently trusted *capizona* who exchanged information and worked together on certain projects. This ultimately reinforced Rogoli's power and control through the creation of a loosely linked yet unified confederation. (*Tribunale di Brindisi, Sentenza contro D'Amico +9*, p. 147, cited in Longo, 1997). Given that one of our

chosen indicators of success is territorial control, here we witness Rogoli aiming at expanding his organisation and his power domain. Rogoli was able to count on his most trusted men to carry out day-to-day responsibilities, only intervening when events within their own territorial areas had the potential to compromise the organisation as a whole (Longo, 1997). Rogoli and his closest affiliates exploited this structure in order to maintain order and control. Further, a broader, more fluid, *ad hoc* organisational structure allowed for flexibility, rapid growth and transformation and helped affiliates to evade capture. This is coupled with the absence of judicial pressure, providing the SCU with space and time to develop and evolve.

It can thus be argued that, despite structural constraints, Rogoli demonstrated himself as able to impress his own stamp upon the organisation he headed. In particular, as an agent he was able to carve out a fairly innovative configuration, balancing the hierarchical model adopted in imitation of, and response to, powerful rival crime syndicates with a more flexible structure which better addressed the local and regional context. This took place in spite of the difficult environment in which Rogoli found himself, particularly in terms of incarceration, state pressure, and the pre-existence of a loose configuration of autonomous gangs. However, as we shall see as the thesis progresses, Rogoli was to fail the test of a strong leader exercising moral authority and inspired by a code of honour, thus exposing himself to the risk of in-fighting and insubordination.

2.7. The primary activities, aims and drivers of Rogoli's SCU

For this section of the thesis we intend to outline the principal activities and aims of the Rogoli clan and surrounding network between 1979 and 1985, or the pre- and early SCU era, and the principal drivers behind their criminal activity. Understanding what both individual affiliates and *cosche* as a whole are doing can aid our understanding of the wider organisation and allow us to further test our hypotheses and theoretical framework. According to Judge Motta, the principal economic activities of the Rogoli clan and the wider SCU were drugs, TLE, running illegal gambling dens, extortion, arms trade, and kidnapping (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006). These are evidently the sort of activities one would expect from an organised crime syndicate, although given the high percentage of SCU members who were incarcerated, the necessity for representation beyond the prison walls is obvious. The first maxi-trial data reiterates the crucial role played by drugs, as illustrated by numerous intercepted telephone conversations. During one such conversation, an affiliate said:

The boys are all getting a cut, 300,000 *lire* a gram, comrade, just right...that Tonino Sinistro took 200 grams off us and gave 92 back, he said he didn't need it...You need to chase up the money because we gave him 200 grams of the stuff! (Sen. CdA 1, p. 134).

Here we can see that, even at this early, stage, SCU affiliates are dealing with large quantities of drugs. Although the name of the drug is not explicitly mentioned, the vocabulary used leaves no doubt in terms of the subject matter of the conversation. Along with providing evidence of drug dealing, this conversation, one of many, demonstrates a clear absence of vigilance or *omertà* as the affiliates make virtually no attempt to disguise the nature of the topic in question. Further examples of this careless behaviour emerge as the period progresses.

As we can see from Motta's account, the main activities carried out by Rogoli and his affiliates at this stage in time, drug dealing included, indicate a relatively low level of criminal activity. This shows a lower level of sophistication in terms of activities being undertaken, demonstrating a lack of organisation and subsequent limitation of scope for money making and territorial control, and recalling Von Lampe's thesis on embeddedness (2008). Von Lampe states 'the second constellation of organised crime...[as] crime networks which are rooted in marginalized subcultures [in which] criminal actors can rely on a social support structure...but one more or less set apart from mainstream society and its institutions' (pp. 8-10). The type of crime carried out does not fall within the more embedded categories, but rather it remains in the realm of marginalised criminal subculture. Indeed, the data tells us that the *calabresi* Bellocchio and Alvaro set Rogoli an early mission to take control of town squares across Salento in order to sell drugs, still not expanding beyond the *pugliese* illegal sphere (*Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*, p. 54). This relatively low-level criminal activity tells us that there was an absence of organisational skills, as there is little evidence to suggest that large-scale, semi-legal activities are being undertaken. Moreover, there appears to be little or no attempt to infiltrate local politics, a key indicator of *mafiosità* [mafia-style behaviour]. As such, we can surmise that, at this early stage, we are dealing with an emergent organisation which would be best defined as organised crime, rather than *di stampo mafioso* [mafia-type organisations].

It remains to investigate the key motivations behind this choice of economic criminal activity, and seek to explain whether external factors, or indeed other variables, altered the way in which the clan functioned during the time period in question. Following the arrival of the *cutoliani*, Rogoli and his associates saw an opportunity to imitate some elements of Cutolo's

gang, allowing for the adoption of certain rules and regulations inside the prison which they were able to utilise to their advantage. In an attempt to create a climate of fear and a system of organised regulations, Rogoli's gang set to work. Early on, the organisation attempted to recruit members and organise illicit business transactions, particularly in the realm of narcotics, still remaining embedded in the marginalised criminal underworld. Rogoli, like Cutolo before him, quickly promised detainees protection in return for their loyalty and sought to prevent the emergence of rival factions through his own conflict resolution methods. So, whilst we know that SCU activities remained relatively low-level, their gradually expanding network still posed an undeniable threat to *pugliese* society.

The primary data indicates that many events in the history of the SCU have been based upon opportunism, Rogoli's role as leader arguably included. This indicates that economic factors represent the key driver behind the emergent organisation. That is not to say, however, that Rogoli was not making considerable progress as a boss, in spite of numerous obstacles. It is the role played by this opportunism, however, which sets them apart from traditional *mafia*-style clans in terms of activities and aims. Sciarrone argues that 'from the very beginning, the SCU seems to be characterised more as an enterprise syndicate than as a power syndicate: its principal objective is to accumulate wealth and, accordingly, the management of illegal trade' (Sciarrone, 1998, p. 172). This indicates that the *mafia* culture was not paramount to Rogoli's SCU, but rather market forces were in play as principal drivers. What this represents is a further example of an organisation primarily driven by economic influences but organised somewhere on the spectrum between a hierarchy and a network. Sciarrone further supports this argument, employing the words of *pentito* Cosimo Cirfeda, who claimed:

The philosophy of the SCU, as conceived by Rogoli and those affiliates closest to him, was based purely upon the concept of the economic activity of the society for which progression in the hierarchy did not take place on the basis of evaluation of the value of the man or on the passing of tests, no matter how bloody. Rather evaluation was carried out by Rogoli based upon the capacity of any individual to be useful to the organisation or to increase proceeds for him and his men (Cited in Piacente, 1997, p. 16; cited in Sciarrone, 1998, p. 172).

This illustrates the central role of market forces, supply and demand, economic gain and territorial control. Cirfeda's statement implies that nothing was more important than the business enterprise role: the organisational structure was secondary. In fact, Albanese (1992)

himself stated that the structure of an organised crime group is not necessarily important and here this notion rings true. We can see that early SCU affiliates were not only looking to ensure self-preservation within the prison system. They also sought to protect their territory of which they were so proud. However, the emerging signs of their utilitarian, self-serving ideals (Massari, 1998, p. 173) prevent them from being classified, at least at this stage by the state, as true *mafiosi* according to the traditional model of *comportamento mafioso* [or mafia-style behaviour].

Bellocco's arrival on *pugliese* soil, as opposed to Cutolo's, truly gave Rogoli the will and the power to continue with the mission the locals had become so committed to, that of preventing colonisation and branching out alone, natives together. It was this shared goal of protecting their territory that enabled Rogoli to gather further support, and this provides further evidence of the locals connection with their own land, a key driver behind SCU activity and cohesion. Massari argues that:

The SCU, according to the original plan, was to constitute an association strictly [sub] regional in character and capable of representing, at an internal level, all components of local criminality. This, in reality, never came to fruition (1998, p. 19).

We can see that Rogoli, just as Cutolo before him, was indeed an opportunistic boss, exploiting chance, convenience and this form of shared values. The key role played by sub-regional identity in the attempt to form a unified organisation is clear. Indeed, Don Raffaele Bruno told the author that, during this period in Puglia, localised identity was so crucial that even the smallest towns were deeply divided, and people had to fight to be considered to be part of their own wider community (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006). This sense of sub-regional identity filtered down to the criminal underworld, and Bruno stated that 'locals felt that criminals sensed this marginalisation, and offered more in terms of a sense of belonging than the state did' (*ibid.*). As a leader, Rogoli took advantage of this, preying on fears, and adeptly utilising available resources to tap into a fertile market. However, what this opportunism and *ad hoc* behaviour also represents is a lack of true goals, and an absence of significant shared history by which traditional *mafia*-style organisations and regions are underpinned.

Whilst it is true that there was a power vacuum to be filled, there was certainly no established criminal culture *di stampo mafioso* present at this stage in the region. Massari states

that, much later, ‘during the 1994 trial in Bari, many of the defendants were in agreement in their denial of having not actually wanted to participate in a *mafia*-style association and they would only admit that they were almost forced to unite into some sort of consortium if only to oppose the Cutolo’s tyranny within the prisons’ (1998, p. 24). This statement made by members doubtless reflects their desire to avoid prosecution. However, it is, if taken on face value, revelatory about the nature of the SCU at this stage. In the absence of a true and lasting shared criminal history, tradition and culture, it appears that the frustration felt by detainees was simply not enough to ensure that Rogoli's power was wholly accepted and the climate this results in is a complex one in which the founder may struggle to operate efficiently.

2.8. Rogoli and his affiliates make mistakes: the first seeds of struggle emerge

Although early growth was rapid, defects at the core of the organisation soon began to emerge which indicated a lack of internal cohesion and put the SCU at risk of struggle or even failure. In a notebook confiscated from the home of SCU affiliate Leo Orlando, the following passage was discovered:

Beautiful *omertà* which has taught me, honourable descent which guarantees me, like a flower I blossomed and like a table I was set. No more and no less than five may enter in the society, no villains, no cops...Since the dawn of 1860 when Napoleon declared war on Sicily, Calabria and the whole Neapolitan state where our faithful companions shed blood, this blood was gathered in a fine and elegant white handkerchief and was put in a fine and elegant golden basin where it formed a ball, round and undulating, as strong as iron, as cold as ice and as humble as silk: this is *omertà* (Sen. CdA 3, pp. 1325-1326).

Whilst this is the way in which a SCU affiliate’s journal described the origins of *omertà*, Rogoli and his comrades quickly demonstrated that the code of silence was not as revered as this passage seems to suggest. In his study on the Sicilian Mafia, Duggan (1989) argued:

The deep-rootedness of *omertà* was shown by the number of proverbs and stories that commended it: “Good is he who sees and is silent”; “He is truly a man who reveals nothing, even under the blows of a dagger”(p. 55).

This rich history of the code of silence, and drama surrounding it, pervades the Italian criminal landscape and Puglia was, on paper at least, no exception. The discovery of the notebook indicates that SCU members indeed aspired to the secrecy codes employed years earlier in Sicily and across the *Mezzogiorno*. However, *pugliese* reality was vastly different from that of its counterparts. In fact, shortly after Rogoli founded the SCU, two crucial events took place which put the boss's behaviour and leadership in question, and threatened the status of *omertà* within the organisation.

It was in April, 1984 that officers working on behalf of Judge Maritati confiscated the so-called '*Statuto della SCU*', or the SCU statute (Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, *Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni criminali similari*, Doc. XXIII, N. 7, p. 55, 8/6/1992). Judge Motta told the author:

The SCU left [us written evidence]... They had it with them in prison...and we, as the public prosecutor and judicial authorities, well they had made our job a lot easier. These criminals weren't used to keeping quiet, to not writing, so there was no [sense of] *omertà*...culturally speaking those from Salento weren't used to shutting up and so they wrote, they spoke on the telephone, they did it all and this was really useful for us when we needed to find proof [of their criminal activity] (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006).

Whilst, in Sicily, '*omertà* posed an enormous problem for the authorities' (Duggan, 1989, p. 55), in Puglia this was not the case. The document named Rogoli as the official founder of the organisation. Written and signed by the founder earlier in May, 1983, with the assistance of his closest comrades, the document proved crucial for investigators (Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, *Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni criminali similari*, Doc. XXIII, N. 7, p. 54, 8/6/1992). The statute, consisting of various articles, contained rules, organisational charts and membership lists, outlining individuals' roles and functions (Motta, interview with the author, 30/01/2006; Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, *Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni criminali similari*, Doc. XXIII, N. 7, p. 55, 8/6/1992). There was also information related to joining ceremonies, initiation tests, instructions to commit specific crimes and lists of punishments for members who had committed certain crimes, or *sgarri* (Motta, interview with the author, 30/01/2006; Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, *Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni criminali similari*,

Doc. XXIII, N. 7, p. 55, 8/6/1992). Just as Cutolo before him, Rogoli appears to have wholly disregarded the fundamental rule of *omertà*. In retaining written documents, as opposed to burning them which would have been standard practice, Rogoli is demonstrating his weakness as a boss, a position which could be put at risk should such errors continue. *Omertà* represents a cornerstone of *mafia* culture, and one vital to the traditional *mafia*-style organisations. Its absence is indicative of a organisational ethos which is, at this stage at least, far removed from that of its counterparts.

Shortly after the discovery of the statute, Rogoli made a shocking admission of guilt in Bari Court to Prosecutor Alberto Maritati on 14/05/1984; not only did he admit that the organisation existed, he also confessed that he was its founder. According to the data from the 1992 trial, having realised that the statute had been discovered:

Rogoli admitted that he was the founder of the SCU, making particular references to its genesis, development, and objective, and also diminishing the anti-social element of the organisation, along with its criminal nature (Sen. CdA2, p. 24).

Massari writes that Rogoli's actions contravened the sacred rule of secrecy, as he declared that the organisation was born simply to 'regulate and decide on various issues which arose between detainees' (1984, in conversation with Maritati, cited in Massari, 1998, p. 16) or as an association which 'helped detainees and provided widows with financial assistance' (Piraino. G., 1992). Indeed, according to a bill published by the Chamber of Deputies, whilst under interrogation Rogoli told Maritati:

Here in our sacred jails many terrible things happen and, as the eldest, the wisest, it's true that I regularly give advice. Often...when I have intervened it was simply to avoid real massacres taking place. As far as the SCU is concerned, it wasn't created to commit crimes, but just to regulate and decide on various issues which arose between detainees. For example, if someone said that Dr. Maritati had made an accusation, before punishing him, I would call them to find out what had really happened. Then, if it did turn out to be something insignificant, I would tell them not to touch him. Up until now I have always tried to be a peace maker. (*Camera dei Deputati N. 1240, XII Legislatura- Disegni di Legge e Relazioni-Documenti*, 1994, p. 2²⁵).

²⁵ http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg12/lavori/stampati/pdf/46352.pdf. Accessed 02/09/2011

What Rogoli's actions indicate is evidence of the leader attempting to deliberately underestimate and diminish the functions and role of the organisation, most likely in an attempt to avoid charges under the law of mafia association, or 416bis²⁶. In fact, according to the *Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura* (or the Council of the Judiciary) 'proof of the *mafiosità* of the organisation, gathered by Judge Maritati in Bari, was initially deemed inadequate to support the application of 416bis'.²⁷ As such, early response on the part of the state indicates that Rogoli's impression of impunity was, in fact, correct. The refusal of the state to acknowledge the *mafiosità* of the organisation was a grave mistake and Massari stated that, as a result of this decision, a high price was paid (1998, p. 23). Indeed, in the period between the organisations emergence and the acceptance of its *mafiosità*, the SCU was able to grow unfettered by external pressures on the part of the state (*ibid.*).

The reaction to Rogoli's admission was one of shock and anger on the part of his affiliates. According to the trial data, SCU members were angered by Rogoli's actions as they considered him to have collaborated with the investigators. This caused a violent reaction, with affiliates deciding that Rogoli was to be stabbed. However, for a variety of reasons, including a complex process of prison transfers, this attack never took place (Sen. CdA 1, p. 87). From the moment in which Rogoli's poorly-received admission of the existence of the SCU was made to Maritati, we see his reputation begin to suffer. *Pentito* Cagnazzo maintained:

There had been contrasts...during the trial... Pino Rogoli had made declarations which weren't taken very well by a lot of people...In the presence of the Bari judges he declared that effectively the SCU did exist, but that it wasn't...let's say...a *mafia*, but rather it was just an organisation for solidarity among the detainees...the *leccesi*²⁸ took this really badly. He [Cagnazzo] said "You should never have made these declarations because in reality you've admitted that an organisation exists" and he [Rogoli] said "But I only did it to throw them off the scent, to make them think the organisation was one thing when we all knew it was another"(Sen. CdA 3).

²⁶ The 416bis law makes mafia association a crime. Whilst previously members could only be charged with associated crimes, following the introduction of this law they could be prosecuted for membership of the organisation alone

²⁷ http://www.csm.it/quaderni/quad_99a/quad_99_4.pdf. Accessed 04/09/2010

²⁸ Let us recall that Rogoli hailed from Mesagne, near Brindisi.

If we consider this event in comparison with classic examples of the Sicilian Mafia, we can see the distinction between the SCU and its traditional contemporaries. Judge Giovanni Falcone claimed:

Unlike our justice system, the mafia understood the importance of [reformed *mafioso*] Leonardo Vitale's²⁹ revelations and at the moment it considered most opportune, executed the inexorable punishment for breaking the law of *omertà* (Falcone, G., cited in Stille, A., 1996, p. 92).

Falcone's statement is illustrative of the way in which the traditional *mafie* reacted to affiliates who broke *omertà*. The case of the SCU and Rogoli, however, represents something quite different. This event, and its aftermath, illustrates two important matters: firstly, that Rogoli broke crucial *mafia* rules; and, secondly, that affiliates' poor organisation meant that retribution for this act was not carried out. Here we can see emerging signs of agency factors accounting for mistakes and hindering organisational progress and activity.

The next two sections will examine the extent to which Rogoli's own disregard for Mafia rules and his opportunistic behaviour were replicated across the organisation, ultimately leading to in-fighting and short-termism.

2.9. Rogoli's project fails to come to fruition: offshoot organisations begin to emerge

Rogoli's power was already well-established, having built a strong name and reputation under the *aegis* of Bellocco and the 'ndrangheta. However, in 1984, only a year following the consolidation of all the actors which constituted the SCU, we see the emergence of the first rival organisation; the Famiglia Salentina Libera (FSL). Just a short time later, the Remo Lecce Libera (RLL) clan also emerges. Both of these organisations attempted to challenge the supremacy of the SCU. This represents a crucial turning point in terms of the evolution of Rogoli's SCU.

²⁹ Leonardo Vitale (1941-1984) was a Sicilian *pentito* whose statements were disregarded by the judges on the basis of mental illness. Just 6 months after his release from a mental institution, his statements having been accepted as fact by the court, Vitale was murdered by the Mafia, undoubtedly an act of retribution for his crime of breaking *omertà*.

Let us recall that the official date of birth of the SCU is 1983. Only a year later, the criminal investigations shifted focus into the prisons as law enforcement officials searched for crucial evidence to use for prosecution in the forthcoming trials. To the surprise of the investigators, along with evidence of the existence of the SCU, a rival organisation had also emerged. Judge Motta told the author:

The Famiglia Salentina Libera (FSL) was born in the same period, operating in and around Lecce...it was a truly *leccese* organisation, in terms of power, and territorial control which was limited to Lecce, whereas the SCU's was more vast. The statute of the FSL was...confiscated... from Pianosa Prison, an island north of Lecce where the members of that organisation had all been transferred...we found the statute, the 'incorporation certificate', which they had written! It was named '*Codice S*', 'S' for Salento, and the introduction, or the preface...began "We *salentini* criminals will never allow other families from other regions to come and take control of *our* region". So it was a true claim for territorial control (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006).

Indeed, Don Raffaele Bruno told the author 'Even they [the FSL] had their statute, it was incredible! It began, this constitution of theirs, with the phrase 'Salento for the *salentini*. We don't want strangers in our homes' (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006). Bruno stated that this indicates the prison-based climate of fear, on the part of the *pugliese* underworld, in respect of the potential colonisation of Cutolo's NCO (*ibid.*). Moreover, argues Bruno, this demonstrates the sub-regional focus of the group, in contrast to Rogoli's project which was to be the eventual winner (*ibid.*). Further, Article Seven of the FSL statute states:

The cause that the FSL family has embraced is the following: making sure that Salento remains in the hands of we *leccesi* and to never allow any families from other regions to take our territory from us. Only those who come in friendship will be welcomed in the pure spirit of hospitality (*Ministero dell'Interno, Rapporto sul fenomeni della criminalità organizzata Anno 1994*, pp. 190-191. Cited in Massari, 1998, p. 15).

Massari argues that 'the magistrates used documentation to ascertain that this organisation was founded in an attempt to block any further infiltration on the part of the *cutoliani* [those loyal to Cutolo], and any other extraneous organisations' (1998, p. 15), Rogoli's undoubtedly included. This reminds us of how crucial sub-regional identity and territory was in Puglia at that time.

Whilst the evidence illustrated that the FSL was specifically aimed at limiting NCO domination, it is clear that it also represents a rejection of Rogoli and his previous links with the NCO and, subsequently, the 'ndrangheta. Furthermore, they consider Rogoli himself to be 'extraneous' because he was from Brindisi, and not Lecce. The founding members of the FSL were concerned with retaining control of the territory of Salento, which does not include the city of Brindisi situated further north. In discussion with the prosecutor during the 1997 maxi-trial, SCU *pentito* Cirfeta said:

The FSL was Salvatore Rizzo's organisation, and Ingrosso was in on it, too. Practically as soon as Rogoli founded the SCU, Rizzo was annoyed...and this was something we had in common with him...The message was "Lecce for the *leccesi*, no? Why do we always have to be under the *brindisini*?" And so we founded the FSL along with Pino Trecento (a member of the 'old guard') along with loads of others...And the two organisations were rivals...they didn't share, even if, in terms of supremacy, the SCU was always at the top...Both in and out of prison they had had more opportunity to make themselves known, and so they won over the other organisation. In Lecce they had their own drug rings, and we had no dealings with them at all, and they also had their own *bische*³⁰, all normal things that we had, it's just that everyone was in charge of running their own shit. As soon as we met on the outside, we were first to attack, we thought it was gonna be them...especially because [SCU affiliate] Tonino Dodaro had pretty much already made it clear who was gonna be a bother, and to get them out of the way immediately...The first thing they did...was to kill Pino Ingrosso...he was the one who was after Mario Notaro, and that was pretty much enough to destroy the FSL with the elimination of Italo Pinto, and so on. (Sen. CdA 3, Verb. 09.10.95, p. 62-96).

This supports the notion that Rogoli was a specific target of the FSL, as concern is once again expressed about domination, not only of the *cutoliani* but also the *brindisini*. Moreover, this represents the first appearance of Antonio Dodaro, and his role will become crucial in terms of SCU development later during the 1980s. According to a study carried out by *Libera*, the SCU and the FSL eventually fused in 1985 (*Libera*, 2004, p. 117), and this is alleged to signal the birth of the *nuova* [new] SCU, as will be seen in our next chapter. Indeed, Judge Motta told the author that 'the FSL didn't last long because the SCU was far stronger so some members left, some were killed, because there were violent clashes, and the others merged back into the SCU' (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006).

³⁰ Illegal gambling houses.

The first Bari trial against the SCU came to a close on 14th November, 1985, with the judges requesting the application of 416*bis* for all defendants. However, the trial sentence denied ‘the presence of forms of criminal behaviour which could be defined as *mafiose*, and so the lesser charge of 416 was applied, or simple criminal association’ (Longo, 1997, p. 81). As such, we can see the vital role played by definitions, even from a judicial perspective, as the debate over the branding of the SCU as *mafiosa* or not persists. Rogoli and Dodaro, respectively the founder and one of the key bosses of the organisation, were among those defendants charged with 416. In 1985, the court in Lecce absolved FSL members on trial of 416*bis*, and the same process took place in Bari the following year. According to the data from the 1991 trial:

Bari trial documents, released on 18/06/1985, recognised the existence of a criminal organisation in Puglia...created in reaction to the attempt at colonisation of *pugliese* territory on the part of the NCO and to defend Salento from external interference...but excluded that said organisation had behaved according to the criteria laid out in law 416*bis*, instead maintaining that it represented a simple criminal association (Sen. CdA 1).

What we must consider here are the implications of these events. The SCU bosses and affiliates alike surely felt a sense of both arrogance and relief following the Bari trial. The re-absorption seems to indicate that Rogoli was still more authoritative, in spite of early attempts at rivalry. Nonetheless, even at this early stage, Rogoli was not controlling the entire region. Rather, rival clans always existed, thus even with the support and sponsorship of Bellocco, Rogoli simply did not wield enough authority to prevent the formation of counter organisations, no matter how short-lived.

2.10. Conclusion

In this chapter we have outlined the history of organised crime in the region of Puglia prior to the emergence of an endogenous criminal syndicate. From the arrival of the earliest *soggiornisti* [prisoners forced to resettle] on *pugliese* soil, to the advent of Raffaele Cutolo’s NCO and NGCP/NCP, we have considered the role played by external actors in SCU emergence and early development as a sort of backlash against attempted invasion. Umberto Bellocco’s arrival and Cutolo’s subsequent departure have been investigated, as the triumvirate power relationship between the *campano*, *calabrese* and local boss, Giuseppe Rogoli, was examined. The

constitution, organisational structure and economic activities of the SCU were also investigated. The early SCU years have been scrutinised, until the days of the emergence of the first offshoot or rival clan, as seeds of struggle began to emerge. We must now consider what an analysis of this time period of *pugliese* and SCU history can tell us in relation to our research questions and hypotheses, our theoretical framework and the broader topic of newcomers in organised crime.

Let us recall that the thesis focuses on the role of structure and agency factors in the emergence, development and ultimate success or failure of criminal organisations. During the earliest section of the period covered within this chapter (1979-1985), we can see that environmental or structural factors are certainly relevant; organisations from other regions and pre-existing loose configurations of criminals play a role in shaping how the SCU emerged and the way in which it evolved. The necessity to begin the analysis of the region four years prior to the birth of the SCU arose precisely because structural factors were *so* vital to the emergence of the *pugliese* organisation and had to be examined.

The birth of the SCU itself doubtless came as a result of structural factors predominantly in the form of the presence of exogenous criminal organisations on *pugliese* soil. These directly instigated the formation of a local organisation, and served to shape the earliest form of the SCU. Cutolo was the first to take the reins, and the *camorrista* influence over the organisation remained for some time. It was, however, the arrival of Bellocchio and his *calabresi* affiliates to change the face of the *pugliese* underworld forever. Rogoli combined influences from both organisations in forming his own gang, as illustrated by the similarity between their organisational configurations and the SCU's adherence to 'ndrangheta tradition. This step taken by Rogoli put the parameters in place for a newcomer organisation which was underpinned by the traditions of its own rivals. The absence of any serious state intervention in the earliest part of the period accounts, at least to some extent, for the ability of Rogoli and his affiliates to flourish and evolve.

It is clear, however, that agency factors also begin to emerge as influential and a shift occurred as the role of the agent became increasingly vital. We see the SCU arriving as a newcomer in a crowded context, both nationally and locally. Our first research question considers the role played by rival/sponsoring organisations in terms of the adopted organisational configuration of newcomers. Even at this early stage, we can see that our first hypothesis rings true; newcomers demonstrate some level of autonomy in terms of structural development, but the predominant influence over adopted configuration lies with external

criminal organisations. There is certainly a process of imitation of the external organisations as Rogoli puts a hierarchy into place in an attempt to rival these other syndicates and in order to transmit the message of organisational unity to potential adversaries. This demonstrates Rogoli's endeavours to create an organisation comparable to its rivals and worthy of respect, presenting a united front and attempting to respond to structural factors. At this stage in SCU history, there is no doubt that Rogoli as an agent can be attributed with much of the early organisational success; in a crowded space, he shone as a potential leader, and he took some crucial, early steps towards carving his own criminal path. Rogoli challenged himself and his affiliates by imposing an 'alien' hierarchical configuration on a pre-existing loosely-connected market of largely autonomous criminals. It was soon apparent, however, that the model was not an appropriate fit, demonstrating a degree of learning capacity on the part of the founder as he allowed for some form of localised autonomy in the shape of trusted *capi-zona*. As such, the emerging hierarchical network was able to expand, creating a delicate balance between centralised power and autonomous, sub-regional self-rule. Hence the SCU's organisational configuration showed itself to be relatively flexible in response to agential factors. This initial, insightful behaviour of Rogoli, in combination with the almost complete absence of judicial intervention, allowed for initial success and growth of the SCU and shaped its earliest configuration. Moreover, this is an early demonstration of the potential for fluctuation of adopted organisational configurations; as soon as the organisation is founded, changes are immediately being made in terms of structure, as adaptation to local conditions is deemed necessary.

Let us consider the diagrams (Figure 2 and Figure 3) in Chapter One that outline our theoretical approach. The first diagram presents the notion of structure and agency factors influencing organisational success and failure. Certain elements of the diagram already emerge as relevant in this section of the thesis. We can see that both structure and agency factors affect early SCU progress, as economic gain and market domination are increasing, both representing indicators of success. Nevertheless, at this stage in time, the SCU, *as per* Von Lampe's (2008) definition, remains a network embedded in a marginalised subculture. In keeping with the second diagram, there are already signs that both structure and agency, along with organisational configuration, may play a role in dictating a newcomer organisations potential to progress, although it is still too early in SCU history to speak of success or failure.

Towards the end of this period, however, Rogoli's admission in court, as evidence of his refusal to follow the rule of *omertà*, caused early organisational breakdown. Whether Rogoli's behaviour represents an attempt on the part of the founder to demonstrate unity and pride, or an

attempt to avoid being charged with 416*bis*, the result was ill-will among his affiliates and this had a direct effect on the respect Rogoli was awarded as boss. Sub-regional loyalties also increased, as the emergence of the FSL illustrates, even though it was quickly reabsorbed into the SCU. This is attributable to the desire of Rogoli and his affiliates alike to present a united front so as to gain respect and allow for illegal operations to continue, thus increasing scope for economic gain and territorial control. If we recall once more our first diagram, relating to success and failure, we see that Rogoli's early actions represent some of our failure indicators. The appearance of offshoot clans demonstrates that he suffered from a lack of trust and an ability to command respect. What these clans re-absorption tell us, however, is that at this stage he was capable of eliminating rivals, one of our success indicators. Further, we witness emerging disadvantages of the network model, *as per* our third and final research question and hypothesis. It is clearly still too early to draw any definitive conclusions about success and failure, but evidence of seeds of struggle can help us to understand how and why configuration counts, and this will be explored as the thesis progresses.

Up until the arrival of serious state intervention, structural factors declined in importance following Cutolo's departure and there was an initial underestimation of the phenomenon, particularly in prosecution and legislative terms. As a result, agency factors dominated the later part of the period in question. Rogoli and his affiliates were free to operate unfettered by the shackles of serious judicial intervention, but they repeatedly failed or refused to follow the traditional rules of the organisation Rogoli had put in place as part of his plan to dominate the region. Moreover, Bellocco's relatively 'hands-off' approach ensured that there was little external interference for Rogoli to concern himself with. As such, even at this early stage, we witness confirmation of emerging weaknesses of network-based organisations, as some agents refuse to follow rules, and inter-clan communication proves complicated. The following period in SCU history will see the full display of individual behaviour and of the transformative capacity of the agents in relation to both the social context and the organisational structure of the SCU. The agents' behaviour, as we shall see, exacerbates the weaknesses inherent in network-based organisations which in turn impact negatively upon the development of the SCU.

Chapter 3. 1985-1991: From the early years of the Sacra Corona Unita to the first maxi-trial in Lecce

3.1. Further factionalism ensues as Rogoli's foot soldiers falter

With the Bari trial already underway, Rogoli was clearly struggling to maintain order in his organisation, as the emergence of the FSL is testament. As we know, Rogoli's confirmation of the organisation's existence to Maritati 'caused violent polemic among affiliates, as he didn't even think to consult the members of the hierarchy before making the admission' (Massari, 1998, p. 27). It was the northern faction of the SCU that was particularly displeased and went on to form the FSL, a further expression of the fierce sub-regional allegiances which existed. The existence of these offshoot clans, or efforts to detach, hindered Rogoli's initial goal of founding a single, unified, fully autonomous *pugliese* organisation. Moreover, at this stage rivalry began to emerge between Rogoli and his affiliates '*a cielo scoperto*', or outside the prison system. The boss risked permanently damaging the future of the organisation.

In 1985, Rogoli had two key figures acting on his behalf on the outside: Antonio Dodaro from Lecce and Antonio Antonica from the *capo*'s hometown of Mesagne, near Brindisi. According to tradition, these right-hand men had authority over their own neighbourhoods and, whilst Dodaro was officially assigned as responsible for Lecce, Antonica was Rogoli's representative in his own home-ground. As the chapter progresses, we will see that both of these men are eventually killed as a result of their own behaviour and actions as their conduct was ultimately deemed to be inappropriate by other affiliates. It was, however, the relationship between Rogoli and Antonica to be the first to break down. Massari (1998) writes:

He was Rogoli's first ever affiliate, a long-time friend and fellow *mesagnese* criminal. Given the *capo*'s state of detention, Antonica was nominated as responsible for all illegal activity in Brindisi and the surrounding areas. Parallel to the expansion of their territory to surrounding provinces, Rogoli awarded Antonica with the power to nominate some *capi-zona* himself in order to "better control the situation" (p. 28).

Mayor of Bari Michele Emiliano referred to Antonica as Rogoli's right-hand man (*Rassegna di documenti processuali concernenti le mafie pugliesi*, Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura³¹) and the 'largest player of the organisation still free following the Bari maxi-trial' (*ibid.* p. 8). We can see just how crucial a role Antonica played in the organisation at this early stage.

During this period, some peripheral affiliates of the SCU entered into the field of drug dealing. *Pentito* Capodieci states:

Antonica was ruining everything that Rogoli had built over many years, constructing buildings whilst we were there starving to death, forcing us to get into drugs, our boys too, because, having no money, they were all throwing themselves into the drug market, and some of them were even injecting (*Memoriale del collaboratore di giustizia* Cosimo Capodieci; cited in Massari, 1998, p. 29).

This indicates that it was not only Rogoli who was having problems with maintaining his authority, but also his key lieutenants who were *a cielo scoperto*, or on the outside. Contradicting the instructions of both the founder and his representatives demonstrates that affiliates showed defiance in the face of the rules and hierarchy in place at the heart of the organisation.

The affiliates themselves, at least according to Capodieci, apportion the blame for these failings to Antonica. SCU members stated that he was responsible for destroying that which Rogoli had constructed through poor management of affiliates. Antonica also fails to make his foot soldiers follow orders. This happens because he repeatedly refuses to recognise that which was required and expected of him as *capo-zona*, both on the part of Rogoli as well as that of the other affiliates. This growing in-fighting and conflict is another early sign of organisational struggle, as individual greed appears to supersede organisational loyalty or unity. The emergence of semi-independent leaders fighting for power and control during this era is partially responsible for making Rogoli's mission impossible to complete, and widespread greed emerges as a crucial factor. Once again, this highlights the sub-regional, fluid and loosely-connected structure that the SCU had become, as well as some of the potential disadvantages of this type of organisational structure.

³¹ http://www.csm.it/quaderni/quad_99a/quad_99_4.pdf, Accessed 12/09/2010

It was not simply occasional *capi* who acted out of greed, whether for power or financial gain. As further members were released from prison, both during and after the Bari trial, the number of affiliates grew consistently and each affiliate took his own cut of the profits (Massari, 1998). The trials under way were very costly for the clans, as were the financial packages offered by the SCU to detainees and their families. It is clear that ‘Antonica felt the weight of managing this organisation and all responsibility fell on his shoulders. He was reluctant to divide the takings with affiliates who were a part of his own *‘famiglia’* (Massari, 1998, p. 29). This expression of financial greed, even among his own affiliates, is symptomatic of Antonica’s failure as a boss. The *capo* repeatedly demonstrated his inability to recognise his own responsibilities to those around him. In terms of the deteriorating relationship between Rogoli and Antonica, *pentito* Capodieci recalls an incident whereby Antonica said:

“You, Rogoli... You’re in jail but here I’m the one risking jail, as well as my boys, and you know I’m already sharing with you. I obviously can’t share with all the rest; and if you find yourself with all of this power today, and you’ve come this far, you’ve got me to thank for it” (*Memoriale del collaboratore di giustizia Cosimo Capodieci*; cited in Massari, 1998, p. 29).

This expression of frustration on the part of Antonica reiterates his increasing greed in connection with redistributing funds, contradicting a key ethos at the very heart of the organisation. Further, Antonica attributes himself with Rogoli’s success, again vocalising his frustration at the founder’s enduring position at the vertices. This illustrates his lack of respect for Rogoli by undermining what he has achieved, thus rejecting the roles within the hierarchy by his failure to respect authority. Indeed:

The very same Antonica, betraying the spirit of the organisation and adopting... a strategy of head-on opposition with his old *socio*, constructed a clan directly opposing Rogoli. The contrasts that followed paved the way for a long and bloody war, characterised by murders and attacks on affiliates on both sides. For example, two of Rogoli’s boys were brutally murdered by affiliates of Antonica in January, 1986; the two bodies were found burnt inside a car in the Brindisi countryside.... [Capodieci said] “Burning the bodies...Antonica wanted to send a message to Rogoli to tell him: I’m gonna burn your boys. If you think you’re gonna get away with it this time, you won’t again. You deal with your shit and I’ll deal with mine” (*Memoriale del collaboratore di giustizia Cosimo Capodieci*; cited in Massari, 1998, p. 39).

This represents another example of affiliates turning against Rogoli and forming offshoot or splinter clans. A clear demonstration of their lack of respect for the founding leader, the affiliates are demonstrating an ability, or at least an ambition, to regroup and reorganise. Furthermore, what Capodieci's assessment on Antonica's role tells us is that the structure continued to evolve and further depart from Rogoli's planned classic hierarchy. The emerging configuration was characterised by an environment within which sub-regional *cosche* were supposed to peacefully co-exist with some relative autonomy, whilst continuing to refer to the *capo* Rogoli over the most important matters. What we see here is a member of the SCU himself, namely Capodieci, stating that the spirit of the organisation was one of unity and *pax mafiosa*, or stable and peaceful coexistence. Yet even the most important, authoritative affiliates proved to be simply incapable of maintaining this structure.

3.2. The second major offshoot clan emerges: the Remo Lecce Libera

As time progressed, earlier behavioural patterns appeared to have re-emerged. In fact, in 1986 Rogoli wrote a letter to Dodaro which was later confiscated by investigators. One line of the letter read:

Both comrade Umberto [Bellocco] and comrade Carmine [Alvaro] know about this [deal] already; actually I told them you were going to *cala* [Calabria] and they were going to sort things out but, now you've got surveillance, I don't think you can move...If by any chance you *do* want to go...let me know; that way I can give you the address and telephone number [of Bellocco] (Sen. CdA 1, p. 188).

The fact that affiliates retained this written evidence, only to be later confiscated, is evidence of a lack of caution. Furthermore, the content of the letter is proof of the enduring role of the *calabresi*, demonstrating that Rogoli remains 'head' of the SCU at this stage but still refers back to his sponsor Bellocco and his *calabresi* clan members.

Later the same year, however, the next crucial event in the history of the SCU took place in the form of the foundation of the Remo Lecce Libera (RLL) clan. The RLL is the second concrete example, following that of the FSL in 1984, that demonstrates Rogoli's one-time affiliates attempting to found their own organisation/s as rivals to his. The emergence of

the RLL can be attributed to several explanatory determinants. Firstly, Rogoli's admission during the Bari trial continued to resonate, on the subject of which *pentito* Cirfeta stated that:

[Even though he was one of the first people to join Rogoli's SCU] Erpete was among the members who contested Rogoli as a result of his behaviour during the Bari trial and who, because of this, attempted to create a family consisting of just *leccesi*, the RLL, to rival Rogoli's own organisation (Sen. CdA 3, p. 450).

Formed in 1984, the Famiglia Salentina Libera may have represented a group which was essentially formed *in spite* of Rogoli's presence, on the basis of affiliates' own sub-regional, shared values. The RLL, however, was founded *specifically as a result* of Rogoli and his affiliates' apparent poor behaviour, along with other factors which we will now explore. What this organisation represents is, therefore, one of the earliest examples of a splinter group conceived with the specific, acknowledged aim of challenging and countering Rogoli himself. This indicates that the *capo*'s actions during the Bari trial even affected the attitudes towards '*il vecchio*' of some of the founding, original members of the SCU. Furthermore, the emergent organisation illustrates that sub-regional allegiances continued to be present among the affiliates.

We must also consider additional influential factors behind the foundation of these splinter organisations. The primary data from the first Lecce maxi-trial provides further detail:

Following a series of violent battles between *leccesi* detainees, the decision was taken to create an autonomous organisation called Remo Lecce Libera- in memory of Morello's brother who was killed shortly before. This family, which in reality was never really constructed and nor did it truly operate, was also intended to include the members of another organisation which had been founded earlier [the FSL], by Salvatore Rizzo, Remo De Matteis, Giuseppe Ingrosso, Aldo Montenegro and Antonio Trinchera, with the goal of rivalling the SCU but it eventually dissolved and its members were reabsorbed into the original organisation (Sen. CdA 1, p. 87).

This presents another example of a splinter group that emerges but is quickly reabsorbed. What this indicates is that there was an enduring, widespread lack of cohesion among SCU members

at the time, along with little respect for authority. The key phrase in this passage is that which refers to the RLL as never truly operational; this will be explored in greater detail as the chapter progresses. Nevertheless, the matter of apparent re-absorption indicates that no damage caused by agency factors was too great to preclude reconciliation, very much at odds with *mafia* tradition in terms of betrayal and subsequent retribution. Sciarrone (1998) writes that the organisation was:

Formed in protest of murder of Remo Morello at the hands of the *camorristi* in the early 1980s because he opposed any form of external infiltration. With the constitution of this organisation, they demanded the independence rights of the *leccesi* from any other form of criminality which was not the 'ndrangheta (pp. 174-175).

This is interesting as a tangible example of reprisal in the face of actions intended to prevent external domination on the part of the *pugliese* criminal underworld. Furthermore, it once more highlights just how crucial the role of the 'ndrangheta remained at this stage. The founding members of the RLL sought advice and permission from the *calabresi*, bypassing Rogoli, and once again demonstrating the affiliates' rejection of his authority. How he reacted to this dismissal will be explored within the following sections of the chapter.

In order to examine the make-up and configuration of the new RLL splinter group, we must refer back to our primary data. During a cross examination of *pentito* Cirfeta, the P.M [or prosecutor] asked if 'the [Bari] trial had any lasting effect on the organisation...and on its name the SCU' (Sen. CdA 3, p. 115) to which Cirfeta responded:

It had little effect on the name of the SCU. However, it did have an effect on those who had helped to balance the organisation because the Bari trial lead to something very interesting taking place. What I mean is that all of them, including Giosué Rizzi from Foggia, were unhappy with the fact that Rogoli had accepted, and declared in front of the tribunal [and to Judge Maritati], that he was the founder of the SCU. This action resulted in a break up ...some factions went on to form RLL; those who wanted to form one clan did so, and then those who wanted to form a different one went ahead and did it...The RLL was, in practical terms, formed as a result of the *leccesi* seizing the opportunity, including Pantaleo De Matteis who was in a cell with us; Romolo Morello; Enrico and Claudio Erpete. Claudio Erpete transformed from one of Rogoli's most

faithful comrades into the one who wanted to really pounce on him, and *he* wanted to found the RLL organisation (*ibid.*).

We can draw many conclusions from this testimony, alongside the additional evidence cited above. Firstly, various agential factors instigated the foundation of another splinter group. A growing disdain for Rogoli, along with an enduring desire to avenge the death of Morello's brother, led, in combination, to the emergence of the RLL. Echoing the FSL founder Salvatore Rizzo's statement of 'Lecce for the *leccesi*' (outlined in Chapter Two), the principle of strong, sub-regional allegiances is once again discernible and the commitment to localism is stronger than ever. Furthermore, we are reminded that the NCO, many years earlier, severely punished members of local criminal gangs who attempted to prevent their monopoly over the territory. The same local criminal representatives bore a grudge against members of the NCO for these actions, a demonstration of which lies in the naming of the splinter group after victim Morello. This goes some way to helping us to understand the importance of the locals' self-preservation and, moreover, why sub-regional allegiances became as important as they did. Affiliates were killed when attempting to protect their own territories. The reference made to the former FSL members in the judicial data related to the RLL also tells us that there was some level of collusion between the splinter groups which endured throughout early SCU history, united by shared values and interests in the form of rejecting Rogoli and denouncing his poor behaviour. It also acts as evidence for a shift in agential influence; whereas the earliest period analysed in Chapter Two is marked by Rogoli as primary agent, now we see lower-level, rank and file foot soldiers taking action, and instigating organisational change. Any attempt to form a splinter group was to prove extremely difficult, particularly given that, at this stage, Rogoli still had the blessing and assistance of the 'ndrangheta. Again we see the prominence of affiliates' allegiances to their own territory over that to any form of central authority, and this in itself is revealing.

However, what both the 1991 trial sentences and Cirfeta's statement made during the 1997 trial touch upon is the failure of the RLL to have any lasting effect or enduring presence in the *pugliese* criminal underworld. The 1991 data tells us that, in reality, 'the only activity carried out by RLL consisted in the management of a *bisca* [illegal gambling den] entrusted to Pasquale De Vergori, the profits of which were destined to subsidise detainees and their families' (Sen. CdA 1, p. 88). In the 1997 trial Cirfeta reiterates that the RLL had no real operative function and he also supports the claim of the basis for the group's name lying with Remo Morello. The brother of affiliate Romolo Morello, Remo was killed...and they wanted to honour his name.

(Sen. CdA 3, p. 115) However, Cirfeta states that, whilst the phenomenon of the rival RLL was to be brief, there were those in prison who continued to say ‘Pino Rogoli *infame*’ (*ibid.*) or ‘shame on Pino Rogoli’. This is illustrative of the continued disrespect and disdain for Rogoli on the part of certain affiliates and of the fluctuation of his role at the centre of the organisation. Cirfeta claims that those people who attempted to contrast Rogoli were eventually made to pay, some even with their lives. The collaborator states that *all* RLL affiliates, having been allowed the opportunity to apologise, ultimately returned to Rogoli and his organisation and some level of closeness and peace returned (*ibid.*). The *pentito* also refers to the ‘old guard’, ‘including Pino Trecento, Constantini, and Mario Notaro, all of a certain age who had been around for a while and with whom there was no longer “feeling”, or good relations’ (*ibid.*). Cirfeta singles out Notaro as an actor who was practically independent and carried out all of his own deals without informing anyone or requesting permission. It is clear that, in making this statement, Cirfeta is indicating that it was both unacceptable and unusual for members to act alone, that is to say without the authorisation of those positioned higher up the hierarchy of the organisation.

Ultimately, in spite of this attempted rebellion against Rogoli, the prosecutor reported that:

The contrasts between these rival gangs were eventually resolved and the SCU prevailed over the other organisations and [at least during this period]. Antonio Dodaro remained faithful to his original *cosca* under Rogoli (Sen. CdA 3, p. 115).

What the emergence of the RLL represents, particularly when examining the statements of *pentito* Cirfeta, is that Rogoli himself does not possess the skills required to become a *grande capo*, or ‘boss of bosses’. The founder ignores *omertà*, angers his affiliates, and fails to create a sense of unity which is able to transcend that of sub-regional, localist loyalty. The primary data indicates, however, that both the FSL and the RLL eventually dissolved, with the majority of members reabsorbed into Rogoli’s SCU. This implies that Rogoli was more authoritative than he seemed, in spite of early attempts at rivalry. Conversely, it is possibly indicative of additional agency factors which affected the way in which the affiliates behaved. As the chapter progresses and we are able to examine the role of other crucial actors and events, we can attempt to assess what factors can explain this apparent paradox.

3.3. The SCU prevails, but it is not to last: The rise and fall of Antonio Dodaro

As the period in question progresses (late 1986-1988), the situation in Puglia remained characterised by territorial battles, often descending into bloody warfare. Let us recall that, during this period, the state was extremely weak and the SCU was able to operate without the fetters of institutional pressure. Large sums of money were clearly being made, handled and laundered at this stage. On 21/02/1986, an illegal card game was raided and 200,000,000 *lire*³² in cash was confiscated from the villa in Solicara, near Lecce (Sen. CdA 1, p. 152). Again we witness the prominence of the figure of Antonio Dodaro; his presence, from supremacy through to decline, ending in his death, truly personifies the characteristics at the core of the early SCU years. Dodaro is widely referred to as Rogoli's right-hand man and, as 'Giuseppe Rogoli and Antonio Dodaro were old friends; Rogoli [had] assigned him as responsible for the Lecce area. It was Rogoli himself who warned him that they needed to stabilise links with the *salentino* underworld' (Libera, 2004, p. 117). This shows Dodaro to be a boss whom Rogoli trusted, but who still had to be reminded of the importance of maintaining good relations across the *pugliese* territory by *il vecchio*³³ himself. Trust is crucial in terms of success in organised crime, and so this bond, albeit temporary, that existed between Rogoli and Dodaro ensured that the *pax mafiosa* was maintained and business was managed effectively. However, this was not to last.

The primary data from the first maxi-trial states that Dodaro himself intervened in RLL relations and stopped their sole *bisca* [illegal gambling den] from operating (Sen. CdA 1, p. 88). Dodaro had already refused to join the RLL, having assumed a prominent position after he effectively moved into Pino Rogoli's role on the outside. At this time, Dodaro's affiliates included Mario Tornese, Giovanni De Tommasi, Cosimo Cirfeta, Giorgio Mancarella, Piero De Magistris, Sandro Angelelli, and Antonio and Giovanni Fanghella (Sen. CdA 1, p. 88), some of whom will go on to play a crucial role in later SCU history. We know that Rogoli had entrusted Dodaro with great responsibility, doubtless as a result of their long friendship. Dodaro's refusal to join the RLL offshoot clan indicates that he had the power and authority to intervene in the very same splinter groups. It seemed, therefore, as if the central authority at the core of the SCU had been restored. Agents are making decisions which influence organisational progress more than any other variable.

³² *Lira* conversion rate in 1986 was £1 = 2402.321 *lire* and so 200,000,000 *lire* was worth £87,862.48
Source: www.fxtop.com. Accessed 15/06/2012.

³³ Rogoli's nicknames included '*il vecchio*', or old man, '*nonno*', grandfather, and even '*Dio*', or God.

Interestingly, the branding of Dodaro's own group as an '*ndhrina*' ([sic.] Sen. CdA 1, p. 88) illustrates the continued overarching presence of the 'ndrangheta, as well as his acceptance therein. Hence, whilst Rogoli and his SCU were regarded as autonomous, the presence of the 'ndrangheta never faltered. Data from the first maxi-trial (1990-1991) indicates that Rogoli 'always remained the head of the entire organisation even if he had delegated part of his powers to various *capizone*, such as Dodaro in Lecce, Donatiello in Brindisi and Stranieri in Taranto' (Sen. CdA 1, pp. 88-89). Furthermore, 'Dodaro consented the formation of 'groups' in the province...inducting De Tommasi, Cirfeta, the Padovano brothers and Giannelli to the rank of '*crimine*' (Sen. CdA 1, p. 89). This indicates that Rogoli's network was expanding and further examples of sub-regional hierarchical-networks were emerging. The primary data (Sen. CdA 3) also tells us that:


Dodaro had already beaten Pantaleo De Matteis to Lecce and the surrounding province...and he managed to organise a group of boys around him interested in organising a stable, common mission of illegal activity, all the while connected to Rogoli...Dodaro's group carried out orders, including those closest to him together with De Tommasi, Cagnazzo, Macchia, Guerrieri, Mancarella, De Magistris, Tornese and Cirfeta (p. 1329).

From this evidence we understand the position of power that Dodaro held, capable of allowing the formation of groups, just as Rogoli had with him. However, this reign was not to last and once again we see multiple agency factors behind affiliates' decision to distance themselves from him, ultimately resulting in his murder.

According to the first maxi-trial data, the upper echelons of Dodaro's clan were structured as follows.

Figure 6: Dodaro's *cosche* division

Dodaro's *cosche* (pre-De Tommasi-Tornese divide of 1990)



(Sen. CdA 1)

We see Dodaro at the apex of his own *cosche*, or even sub-section of the organisation, with his own entrusted men filling the ranks beneath him. The two *strata* which come directly beneath him represent the Lecce and Brindisi clans of De Tommasi and Morello respectively, although these were to prove short lived. Within this vertically-organised structure, however, the outlined roles are often not observed by affiliates of the SCU. Furthermore, Dodaro ultimately alienated his own men, just as Rogoli had done in the preceding period.

In 1987 a smaller trial that took place in Brindisi applied only light sentences to Rogoli and 17 of his affiliates, still refusing to find any of them guilty of crimes associated with 416bis. This sentence was, eventually, overturned in 1990, when the Lecce Court of Appeal confirmed that the SCU was a *mafia*-style association, a decision that will be explored in further detail later in the thesis. Rogoli was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment for his crimes associated with 416bis (Libera, 2004, p. 119-120). The 1991 trial data states:

At the second stage of this trial, the judges noted that the earlier sentence [at the Court of Brindisi] had been contradictory, incoherent and unjustified, when in comparison to

an accurate and meticulous investigation...representing a denial of a *mafia* or Camorra-style association (Sen. CdA 1, p. 105).

Further discussions during the first maxi-trial reveal additional information about the emerging battle between the SCU and the judiciary, representing the increased influence of structural pressure following a period of relative freedom from the shackles of state repression. According to the trial data:

The time that passed between the trials in Bari and Lecce allowed Rogoli to construct a criminal *sodalizio* to which he instilled customs, a conditioned mentality, an inherent climate of fear, at worst transforming into terror...so much so that public powers were incapable of preventing it from operating efficiently (Sen. CdA 1, p. 106).

The judges themselves recognised the failings of their contemporaries, and acknowledged the role this played in the rapid growth of the organisation. This is in keeping with our earlier findings on the role of structure versus agency, as we can see that an absence of structural pressure awarded Rogoli and his affiliates with the opportunity to expand. Agency-related weaknesses soon emerged, however, as illustrated above and as the chapter develops.

A series of significant murders took place in the Lecce area which illustrated the increased in-fighting and violence that was emerging in the locality. Italo Pinto, a defendant who had also been convicted for his past connections with the Red Brigades (Sen. CdA 1, p. 74) was murdered in February, 1987. If we refer back to the statement made by Cirfeta in the previous chapter, we recall that he claimed:

The first thing we did...was to kill Pino Ingrosso...he was the one who was after Mario Notaro, and that was pretty much enough to destroy the FSL along with the elimination of Italo Pinto, and so on (Sen. CdA 3, Verb. 09.10.95, pp. 62-96).

Ingrosso was being punished for failing to pay 10,000,000 *lire* due to be passed on to SCU detainees (Sen. CdA 1, p. 172). This provides some evidence of the sort of sums the SCU was dealing with at this stage in organisational history, as figures of 16,000,000 *lire*, 15,000,000 *lire*, and 16,500,000 *lire* are referred to in terms of detainees 'expenses' (Sen. CdA 1, p. 175). Along

with Ingrosso's, Notaro's and Pinto's deaths, we also witness the murders of Cosimo and Pietro Vaglio, two affiliated brothers killed in Nardò on 1st August, 1987. According to a statement made by their father, the Vaglio brothers were already fearing for their lives following Pinto's demise (Sen. CdA 1, p. 74). Renato Vaglio stated that, having approached Dodaro in an attempt to reach some form of agreement over local drug trade, both Pinto and his own sons were eliminated by Dodaro, 'a ferocious barbarian [and his] gang of criminals who were without scruples' (*ibid.*). Still at the centre of a recent judicial inquiry in Lecce (*Operazione Maciste*, 2009), the murder of Italo Pinto is regarded as significant in terms of SCU history of this period. An article in a local newspaper states:

It appears that Pinto [who was killed on 12th February 1987], an established SCU member, was killed as a result of an order sent by Antonio Dodaro on the basis of internal fighting about drug dealing in the local area. The murder itself was attributed to Fabrizio Bernardini, Giovanni De Tommasi, Massimo Mello and Mario Tornese. There are certain elements of this homicide which make it truly significant. "We are in the first phase, that of affirming territories" explains local prosecutor Motta "with the elimination of the old guard of the local criminality (Lecce Prima, La Sacra Corona Unita è ancora in vita, *Lecce Prima*, 09/09/2009³⁴).

What these murders represent is a growing climate of violence and subsequent fear in Puglia at this time. Whilst there is still relatively little structural interference in the form of state repression, we can see the ever increasing role played by the SCU affiliates in affecting organisational progress.

Telephone interceptions recorded during this period provide us with further detail on the crucial role of drug dealing at the heart of organisational activity, as well as a continued absence of *omertà* and poor decision-making. In conversation number 133 (12/10/1988), affiliate Cafiero said:

I got a bit of the stuff...from where I normally go...the same stuff but a lot cheaper...
I couldn't get the [white] stuff, though...it's too expensive, comrade (Sen. CdA 1, p. 134).

³⁴ Source: *La Sacra Corona Unita è ancora in vita*, 9/9/09. <http://www.lecceprima.it/articolo.asp?articolo=16291>. Accessed 1/3/2010

Evidence of financial gains is also provided during this period. Within a letter written by De Matteis to De Luca (7/7/1988), we see proof of large sums of money being passed around the organisation. In the letter, De Matteis criticises his comrade for only giving his wife 100,000 *lire* and refusing to pass the 14,000,000 *lire* on to another affiliate, as agreed (Sen. CdA 1, p. 413). As such, we understand that the organisation is still capable of making considerable profits. The following day, the aforementioned affiliate Cafiero has an additional conversation (number 179) with a man identified only as Carlo, referring repeatedly to items of clothing. Carlo says:

I'm in the field, I know what all the risks are...It's 100% cotton and the price is good!... Enzo got some jumpers, too...the one Enzo got was 100% cotton as well (Sen. CdA 1, p. 134).

We witness some attempt of the affiliates to disguise that they are discussing drugs. However, the trial data states that, in referring to jumpers in the plural but then to the 'one' that Enzo received, the true nature of the conversation is revealed and they are evidently *not* talking about buying items of clothing. Later in the same conversation, Cafiero also states that "[In Amsterdam] we got the best stuff, you know Carlo, the yellow" (*ibid.*). These are all clear indications of an absence of forethought, secrecy, and vigilance, as well as poorly chosen codes which were easily decipherable. Once again, we witness SCU affiliates aiding the judiciary and law enforcement officers in their soon to emerge operations.

As the one-time right-hand-man of Dodaro, aforementioned affiliate Alessandro Macchia's role was to become even more vital to organisational development and, consequently, revealing in terms of our research. His attempted murder took place on 18/10/1988, during a period which Judge Motta referred to as the *pugliesi* '*anni di piombo*', or lead years (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006). The event signifies yet another occasion in which SCU members fail to carry out orders effectively, but also demonstrates internal conflict which potentially led to punishment and, ultimately, death. According to trial data, former FSL members reunited the *leccesi* representatives of the organisation and held a meeting during which they decided to eliminate Macchia, who had been taking care of Dodaro's territory whilst he was incarcerated (Sen. CdA 1, p. 91). Macchia's murder would have been crucial to former FSL and RLL members as it was supposed to have allowed for expansion of illegal activity, including kidnapping, extortion and drug dealing (*ibid.*). Moreover, the event was to mark a new beginning for Salvatore Rizzo, one of the founders of the FSL. Rizzo had made the decision to construct an 'autonomous family in an attempt to contrast the De Tommasi group's reign over

Lecce' (Sen. CdA 3, p. 256). Romolo Morello claimed that, during a meeting held at Urso's house in the summer of 1988, they took the decision to create a 'serious organisation and that the elimination of Macchia was crucial as he was the figure who was proving to be the obstacle to the realisation of this plan' (*ibid.*).

Due to carry out the murder were Morello himself, along with Leone, Mazzei, and Sileno, but the plan allegedly failed because 'the evening in which the four were posted outside his house waiting for his return Macchia did not go back to the house because he had been involved in a car accident as a result of a bomb attack' (Sen. CdA 1, p. 256). The judges, however, discovered that the real reasons behind the failed attack were somewhat different. Initial investigations proved that the attempt could not have happened as the affiliates had initially described, as attested by the incarceration of certain affiliates. Further, the first maxi-trial data maintains:

The attempt failed not because Macchia did not return home, but rather because they could not find the house where they were supposed to lie in wait for him. Leone attributes the failure to information passed on by Rizzo himself in terms of the location of the house, which Leone states he did not see as accidental, saying "The day after Morello went back to Rizzo accusing him of having given the wrong instructions. Rizzo said that he had done so as he was in a difficult position of semi-liberty... He confirmed that they had decided to try to eliminate Macchia who, at the time, "maintained the domain of the city of Lecce" carrying out all variations of criminal activity on behalf of Dodaro who was incarcerated. The murder of Macchia was [to be] instrumental in terms of the project of activation of new illegal activity in Lecce...The attempt on Macchia's life failed as a result of the fact that Leone, Morello, Sileno and Mazzei, who were due to carry out the murder, could not find his house as the directions given by Rizzo were vague. This failure led to a bitter war breaking out between Rizzo and Morello, whose relations deteriorated (Sen. CdA 3, p. 91).

What this episode reveals to us is multi-faceted in terms of our understanding of the organisation at this time. Principally, it provides us with further evidence of the persistent rivalry and sub-regional factions across Puglia at this time. Moreover, it represents the beginning of a decline in Dodaro's supremacy, as it was *his* right-hand man that the rivals were attempting to eliminate. Crucially, however, it provides us with yet another example of the lack of organisation and 'professionalism' of affiliates which results in grave errors being made, at

the ultimate cost of organisational cohesion and subsequent progress.

As time passes, Dodaro's decline becomes more apparent as further examples emerge of affiliates ignoring his orders and disobeying internal rules. In spite of the one-time level of respect and authority which Dodaro, within his role as Rogoli's second-in-command, enjoyed, evidence from the second maxi-trial indicates that:

Over the following years, the province of Lecce witnessed a departure of affiliates of Dodaro's wing of the SCU who did not accept Rogoli's influence and role over their *cosca* and their own territory. This in part can be attributed to the fact that Rogoli was native to Brindisi and not Lecce (Sen. CdA 3).

This shows not only that the affiliates had begun to lose further respect for Rogoli's position at the vertices of the organisation, but also that Dodaro's own closest comrades were seeking autonomy, just as others had in the past. Moreover, localist, sub-regional values are clearly still present, affecting organisational decision-making. Mariano (2002, p. 114) states that, in 1988, Dodaro betrayed members of his own clan, promising their heads to Salvatore Rizzo in order to attempt to reabsorb the by-then dissolved FSL's ex-affiliates and strengthen his own clan. From this we may ascertain the vital importance of the elimination of SCU rivals and also the declining role of Dodaro at the upper levels of the Lecce branch of the organisation.

The judicial material confirms the decline of Dodaro's control over the territory. The data indicates that, already by the summer of 1988, 'Dodaro's reign [had] started to be *under discussion* on the part of the very same people who had been closest to him' (Sen. CdA 1, p. 89), such as Macchia, Tornese, Cagnazzo, Guerriri and De Tommasi. Statements made during the maxi-trials provide information which can help us to understand Dodaro's decline as a leader who had been deserted by almost all of his men up until his murder. According to Leone:

Before Dodaro was killed, he had already been abandoned by all of his men for his poor conduct, [he had killed] drug suppliers in order to not pay them what they were owed and obliging dealers to buy goods from him, in spite of the fact that his prices were not the lowest available on the market at that time. Moreover, Dodaro had often failed to divide his earnings from those drug deals with the other associates (Sen. CdA

1, p. 91).

This emphasises the role of market forces underpinning the organisation, *as per* Albanese's (1994) model. Moreover, it illustrates the factor of greed which jeopardised the organisational model that the bosses were working towards, demonstrating the role of strong agential influences in negatively effecting SCU progress and development in the absence of state interference.

Further evidence of Dodaro's decline and a growing lack of respect for him are provided in statements made by Maurizio Cagnazzo, another prominent SCU *pentito* whom Judge Motta described as 'the most serious collaborator the SCU had ever had.' (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006) Cagnazzo states:

As soon as I got out in 1988, I met De Tommasi again...He was still *under* Dodaro, even if Dodaro had been shouting his mouth off about him. He was going around saying that De Tommasi was finished, just like all the rest of them around him. So, one night, me and De Tommasi were alone and talking and we decided we had to get rid of Dodaro, but we'd have to keep the decision under wraps, because first of all we wanted to see what all the other groups had to say on the matter (Cagnazzo, cited in Caselli, 1999, p. 491).

In an intercepted telephone conversation (13/11/1988), De Tommasi told Cirfeta to "let him [Dodaro] know that it's all over between us, then we'll talk, [but] I don't even want to do that" (Sen. CdA 3, p. 358). The rival Tornese group, another of Dodaro's subordinate *cosche* [clans], had also decided that Dodaro needed to be eliminated, as *pentito* Spagnolo explained to the judges following the murder. Spagnolo claimed:

I knew it was going to happen a few days before...but I found out from the newspapers...They were talking about doing it the day before at Mario Tornese's house...he was angry about some personal business, he told me when he was ranting that they were gonna kill him (Sen. CdA 3, *verbale* from 06/04/1995).

The decision to eliminate Dodaro had been made on the basis of his poor behaviour and desire

to dominate the territory, but the murder itself was to be yet another contentious point, and an event which helps to shed further light on the internal workings of the floundering organisation.

The De Tommasi-Cagnazzo faction of the organisation first took the decision to carry out the murder. However, there was widespread confusion in relation to culpability, even among affiliates of the respective rival clans. According to Macchia, the responsible parties for the murder of Dodaro were ‘...Caracciolo, Tornese, and Fanghella after they had got permission from Rogoli. They decided to carry out the murder because he had not paid for a shipment of drugs supplied to him by Tornese and Carraciolo, and for other [personal] reasons related to Fanghella’ (Sen. CdA 3, p. 798). That the affiliates sought Rogoli’s permission indicates that, even if there were those who disobeyed Rogoli and were angry about his poor behaviour, he was still respected enough to be consulted in relation to high-level decision making processes. Moreover, the fact that Rogoli awarded consent for Dodaro’s murder illustrates that he was willing to sacrifice one of his closest affiliates in order to gain more widespread support and loyalty. This provides further evidence of interactive agential influence, as both Rogoli and the rank and file members from across the various power strata of the SCU performed actions which had a direct effect on the organisation.

The murder itself took place on 17/12/1988 when Dodaro was brutally killed along with his wife and father-in-law. The trial data states that the murder was ‘particularly ferocious’ (Sen. CdA 1, p. 184). Although Cagnazzo stated that his faction, including De Tommasi, had officially decided to kill Dodaro, it was actually members of the rival Tornese clan who carried out the murder. According to the 1997 maxi-trial data, the *capo* was regarded as totally isolated following a steady deterioration of relations between Dodaro and even his closest affiliates (Sen. CdA 3, p. 358). Even the decision to eliminate him caused further friction between the rival De Tommasi and Tornese clans. De Tommasi made a phone call to Cosimo Cirfeta in 1988 in which he stated that they were going to cut off his head and that Dodaro was to be informed that, ‘between them, it was all over’ as they had ‘driven him out’ (*ibid.*). Cagnazzo told judges that the murder was due, in part, to Dodaro’s attempt to bridge the gap which had emerged between his own clan and that of Salvatore Rizzo, founder of the FSL, following their placement in a shared cell (Sen. CdA 3, p. 358). During this period, Dodaro had agreed to the elimination of De Tommasi as a sort of bargaining tool. De Tommasi informed Cirfeta, Cagnazzo and Macchia that he had heard of Dodaro’s betrayal and the decision was officially made to eliminate their rival. However, Cagnazzo states that he only heard of the murder on the television news and immediately assumed that his own group was responsible (*ibid.*).

The judicial investigations soon uncovered the true turn of events. Cagnazzo states that Sandro Frasola approached him in prison and informed him that Mario *Campana* (Tornese) and Nino *l'Americano* (Padovano) were responsible for the killing, which took place whilst Dodaro was snorting cocaine in the kitchen of his father-in-law's house where he was under house-arrest. According to Cagnazzo, Dodaro's wife heard shots and entered the room, throwing an ashtray at the attackers and was then herself killed, along with Dodaro's father-in-law, all who were shot at point-blank range. However, Tornese affiliate Macchia's version of events differ somewhat from that of Cagnazzo's, as he declared:

Sandro Caracciolo told me that he, Tornese, Padovano...and Pantaleo Scrimieri went to Dodaro's father-in-law's house and rang the bell, given that there were video-cameras at the home....So, he rings the bell, Dodaro sees him and opens the door, because things between the two were ok, I'm not sure, he trusted him...I'm not sure why he opened the door to this guy...I seriously thought it was the work of one of De Tommasi's boys, but then Cagnazzo told me what had actually happened (Sen. CdA 3, p.374).

The statements made by collaborator Gianfranco Spagnolo reveal more specific details about the crime. Tornese later sought refuge with Spagnolo at his home in Magliano, on the outskirts of Lecce, whilst a fugitive. It was during this period that boss Tornese informed Spagnolo of the chain of events leading up to Dodaro's death as he claimed:

They went over to his house and offered him a line of coke, and they shot him in the back of the head as he was snorting the stuff....They went over there with the excuse of talking about some personal business...And they shot him in the head... then, in the other room the wife and father-in-law hear shots, go in to intervene and they kill them, too (Sen. CdA 3, p. 376).

The common objective of eliminating Dodaro, the one-time 'absolute leader' (Sen. CdA 4) of the *leccese* fringe of the SCU, illustrates the extent to which he had angered his subordinates and indicates the gravity of his mistakes.

However, the ensuing confusion over the identification of the perpetrators of the crime

is yet another example of poor organisation and communication within the organisation. Moreover, a statement made by Cagnazzo tells us that the move made by the Tornese-Padovano branch caused inter-*cosca* relations to deteriorate further, as a passage from the primary data reveals:

Cagnazzo confirmed that, following Dodaro's murder, De Tommasi [with whom he had remained in contact via respective relatives] told him that he was not responsible for the triple homicide, a crime that he suspected had been committed by affiliates of the Tornese group: De Tommasi maintained that he was very much against what had happened and angry about it in as much as physical participation in Dodaro's elimination clearly had symbolic value in the criminal underworld, allowing Dodaro's successor [profiting as a result of the crime] to become the new *capo* of the criminal organisation. Cirfeta's version of events was identical, having confirmed that he received a *sfoglia*³⁵ from De Tommasi informing him that he had not killed Dodaro, as well as from Macchia who, some time later, was informed by Cagnazzo about what had really happened (Sen. CdA 4, p. 1366).

An additional statement made by *pentito* Franco Vincenti tells us that Dodaro had already been wholly eliminated, even if not yet physically. Vincenti states 'Antonio Dodaro did not need to die to let Giovanni De Tommasi enter into power; even alive, Giovanni De Tommasi had set him aside, given that he was such a nuisance' (Sen. CdA 4). The fact that Dodaro's ousting from the organisation in all practical terms was not enough, but rather all parties felt that killing him was necessary, indicates that punishment and retribution were core enduring values within the SCU. There is no doubt that, in the continued absence of serious structural intrusion, agency played a crucial role in these events.

Here we see the end of an era; the fall of Dodaro's reign, followed by the predictable battle for succession. This marks the beginning of the end for Rogoli as *capo* in charge, but also marks the advent of the De Tommasi *vs.* Tornese years. Dodaro's murder demonstrates the emerging agency-related factors of short-termism and greed, and these traits emerge as the SCU has begun to develop into a distinctive organisation with defined characteristics. At this stage, we can see the profound effect of personal decisions and behaviour on the organisation, as yet almost entirely untouched by structural factors; the external organisations which once rivalled

³⁵ A small note, often featuring instructions which *mafiosi* traditionally use to communicate and then burn to destroy the evidence.

the SCU have all but disappeared and no serious state repression was yet in place. The elimination of Dodaro represents the behavioural traits of fragmentation as each split, divide, quarrel and faction demonstrate just how fractious the organisation had become. The overarching hierarchy is essentially absent as each faction is battling against the others and no respect for the levels in the hierarchy are observed. What we have instead is far closer to a loose network, albeit one featuring autonomous, localised hierarchical groups; a series of *cosche* bound by local or ethnic ties and kinship values, featuring very little, if any, central organisation and made up of individuals who control much of their own activity. We know not only that Dodaro was murdered as a result of his own greed and short-termism, but Dodaro's murder *per se* reveals these same models of behaviour in those who carried out the murder and led to the resulting war for territorial control.

3.4. The state takes action: can the SCU sustain both agential and structural pressure?

The preceding period is best characterised by agency-influenced factors of sub-regional loyalty, greed and short-termism. The period here in question, spanning 1988-1991, can best be defined as one of emerging structure-influenced factors in the form of repression as serious state intervention overshadows internal disagreement. The aftermath of Dodaro's death is the starting point, followed by a focus on resulting battles for territorial control, the build-up to the first *leccese* maxi-trial and the trial itself (1990-1991). The formation of the Rosa Dei Venti clan (RDV), allegedly on the eve of the trial, and the trial itself represent a new era for the SCU in many respects as structural obstacles emerge alongside pre-existing, persisting agency factors. Let us recall that the trend towards fragmentation began much earlier, just a year after the SCU's official foundation with the birth of the Famiglia Salentina Libera. Two years later, we witness the emergence of the Remo Lecce Libera organisation, a further example of factionalism. However, as we shall see the newly founded RDV clan changed Rogoli's role in the organisation forever, irrevocably challenging his authority and reputation. At the beginning of the maxi-trial, dramatic organisational breakdown took place. Rogoli was eventually ousted by De Tommasi and his closest affiliates, indicating that fragmentation had reached breaking point. The patterns of localism, greed and short-termism certainly persisted during this period but factionalism proved to be more detrimental at this stage. We shall investigate the influential factors behind these events as we seek to identify how and why these pressures emerge, how Rogoli and his affiliates react, and the ultimate consequences for the organisation.

When questioned about the aftermath of Dodaro's death by one of the prosecutors during the second maxi-trial, *pentito* [collaborator] Prinari claimed:

[There were] cries of joy...We heard it on the news and there was a collective cheer from all the cells, from ours and everybody else's (Sen. CdA 3, p. 367).

With Dodaro dead, a battle for succession quickly broke out as rival clans sought to take his place and grasp control of the Lecce territory. As we know, although De Tommasi and Cagnazzo had decided to kill Dodaro, it was actually Tornese and his affiliates who carried out the murder. This alone was enough to instigate an attack on Tornese territory on the part of the De Tommasi clan. Once both *cosche* subordinate to Dodaro had co-existed in relative peace, yet now inter-*cosca* relations reached breaking point and the rivalry escalated. The first maxi-trial data indicates that, following Dodaro's murder, 'the positions at the vertices of criminal activity were assumed by Macchia, Tornese, Guerrieri and De Tommasi' (Sen. CdA 1). Don Raffaele Bruno told the author

Tornese and De Tommasi had emerged as the most important figures. The power of these two men was borne of the death of ...Antonio Dodaro. When he died, there was a period in which the two poles battle, great instability, and deaths. I'm not saying people died every single day, but almost. (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006)

It is clear that the climate in Puglia at this time was extremely dangerous. Affiliates were already in a phase of heightened conflict. Indeed, *pentito* Leone described some key events of the period immediately following Dodaro's death, stating that 'De Tommasi's group closely linked to Brindisi boss Buccarella...soon invaded Tornese's territory' (Sen. CdA 1). The 1997 trial data tells us that the emergence of a bloody battle for succession following Dodaro's death lasted from 1988 to 1992 and resulted in the murder of Ivo De Tommasi, the brother of Gianni, ultimately contributing to more dramatic organisational breakdown.

The aforesaid war over territorial control is well documented in the statements from the trials, as Cirfeta maintains:

After Dodaro's murder...when I got to Lecce prison and I met Cagnazzo who was

already inside, everyone already knew that Padovano had spoken to Pino Rogoli, given that he wanted to take Dodaro's place, I mean be in charge of the SCU. But, basically, we didn't agree. De Tommasi had already been promoted under Rogoli; I had done the same under De Tommasi, and so the conflict was born from that because the initial agreements had been broken twice; once in terms of the suppression of Dodaro and again regarding the figure we had decided to eliminate. When I say figure I mean *capo*...the one responsible for Lecce and the surrounding areas (Sen. CdA 1).

The desired effect of Dodaro's elimination was to gain territorial control and punish him for his own poor behaviour, thus sending a message that this conduct would not be tolerated. However, the act of carrying out the murder demonstrated in the perpetrators *just* the type of behaviour that they claimed to be punishing him for. The trend towards strict sub-regional loyalty, greed and short-termism therefore clearly persisted.

The plan to eliminate Dodaro represented high-risk taking on the part of affiliates from both rival clans. Further internal conflict was inevitable following the murder, as was some form of retribution. Moreover, had the plan been discovered, both the De Tommasi and the Tornese clans would have been at high risk of a pre-emptive strike. That Tornese's clan killed him before De Tommasi had the chance also illustrates a lack of forward planning, an absence of any centralised control and reduced accountability on the part of De Tommasi for failing to carry it out. The Tornese clan was also guilty of the same errors for not considering the potentially devastating consequences of the deed. The first maxi-trial data states:

It is clear that almost all *leccesi* affiliates chose De Tommasi as their leader following Dodaro's death. This act formalised the movement of detachment and distance from Rogoli... [as he had demonstrated a preference for Tornese and Padovano during the trial] ... This [separation of the *leccesi* from Rogoli] is further demonstrated by the absence of Brindisi and the *brindisini* within confiscated documents [taken from the cell of the *capo* himself], the area from which Rogoli came and which he had always considered to be his true ascendant (Sen. CdA 1, p.1338).


That *leccesi* affiliates chose to join the ranks of the De Tommasi clan is somewhat predictable, given that he was the dominant force at that time. This is in spite of the fact that Tornese's affiliates accomplished the mission of eliminating Dodaro before his own could. However, it is

significant in that it represents further deterioration of Rogoli's domain and widens the sub-regional divide, Rogoli having long been accused of favouring those from the Brindisi fringe.

Towards the end of 1988, there was a mass issue of arrest warrants (Sen. CdA 1) of defendants for the first maxi-trial and this, along with an already tense climate punctuated by vicious in-fighting, caused alarm among the troops. Large sums of money are still being made by affiliates, as Cagnazzo's informing De Tommasi that the Surbo and Trepuzzi *bische* were producing sums in the range of 60,000,000 *lire* (Sen. CdA 1, p. 150) is testament. Indeed, on 24/10/1988, Cagnazzo told De Tommasi that the Surbo *bisca* was making approximately 6,000,000 *lire* every day (*ibid.*). The second maxi-trial data explicitly outlines the chain of events and further organisational fragmentation which took place in the aftermath of Dodaro's elimination:

The rivalry in Lecce meant that both groups began to be able to exercise more significant control in pre-determined areas of Salento; whilst De Tommasi and his associates were able to impose their supremacy predominantly in areas to the north of Lecce (namely Campi Salentina, Salice Salentino, Squinzano, Trepuzzi, Surbo and Novoli) as well as, under Macchia, the city itself...the Tornese group were active in the towns of Monteroni di Lecce, Arnesano, Leverano and Carmiano. ..Let us also consider the Padovano and Giannelli groups which, already linked to Rogoli's SCU, had retained some level of autonomy in relation to Dodaro and, following his death, only retaining links with the Tornese group, had control of activity in *Basso Salento* (in particular the zones of Gallipoli, Taurisano, Parabita and Matino)...and therefore an area of the province which was far enough away from the *capoluogo* (Lecce) to enable them to avoid the rise of serious conflicts with the De Tommasi group. (Sen. CdA 3, p. 428)

Figure 7: Map of *Basso Salento*



The map above indicates the relevant areas. Source: google.co.uk

The death of Dodaro led to increased fragmentation among already antagonistic *cosche* [clans] albeit clans that allegedly made up part of the same organisation. However, the fragmentation in itself served to strengthen the *cosche* internally and also to expand and consolidate their territorial control. In yet another example of strong, sub-regional ties, the period following Dodaro's death is characterised by a deepening of the north-south Salento divide. The data suggest that individual bosses were able to exert greater power following the further disintegration of any of the overarching hierarchy that remained. The more fluid, market characteristics of network-based relations offered them both the territorial control they as individuals were looking for *and* the opportunity for further economic gain through a monopoly over their own small markets.

Concrete statistical data related to SCU earnings is scarce but the trial data can go some way with providing us with figures to allow us to gauge the scope of the phenomenon. In intercepted telephone calls from this period, there is evidence of Alessandro Macchia and Francesco Cafiero discussing drug deals, referring to 200 grams of cocaine 'worth £ 20,000,000 [lire] ...[and we're getting] as much as 650 grams' (Sen. CdA 1, p. 141) so we are clearly dealing with an organisation used to handling large quantities of drugs and money. Long discussions are undertaken about the cutting of drugs to maximise profits and we can see the evidence of the entrepreneurial side of the organisation as conversations demonstrate that they were increasing their profits 4-fold with such deals (Sen. CdA 1, p. 145). Drug dealing is, evidently, responsible for a large part of SCU income at this stage in time. References are made,

however, to raids on illegal gambling dens during which 200,000,000 *lire* in cash was confiscated (Sen. CdA 1, p. 125). This demonstrates that there were other sectors in which the SCU was raising, exchanging and possibly laundering money. Details about robberies ('I'll send you the 1,250,000 *lire*, comrade', Sen. CdA 1, p. 156), extortion ('The sum of 5,000,000 *lire* was passed to Cagnazzo for the bomb attack on Giovanni Fiorentino's car show room' Sen. CdA 1, p. 162), money laundering ('Comrade, I burnt the mechanic's *brevetto*, he says he'll give it to us for 60,000,000 *lire* but it's worth hundreds of millions', Sen. CdA 1, p. 166) all demonstrate that large sums of money were passing through the organisation, at least at the higher levels. Whilst the SCU, at this stage at least, was doubtless smaller in size and scale than its contemporaries, it is clear that the organisation was succeeding in raising funds for operations and quickly turning vast profits through pluralistic means.

This new structure seemed to offer the under-bosses that which they were hungry for in terms of sub-regional autonomy and subsequent opportunity for increased economic gain. Further statements made by *pentiti* offer us much information in terms of internal conflicts. Macchia states

We went to see Padovano again and he let us know that maybe we could...well, up until now we had been doing things on our own, he basically told us that he could maybe supply us with some heroin. Nino Padovano wanted to take Dodaro's place and he told us that he could supply us with heroin, that he had this heroin at a good price; the price was 100 thousand *lira* per gram, something that, for us...actually Salvatore Balla had told him "Look, I can do it for 90" so we told him we could get a better price. So, that's where it finished. Then, in another meeting, we went around the clubs, because he had suggested them to us...He wanted to get organised there...he told us that he wanted all of the proceeds from these clubs, then we were going to do the maths and divide the profit. There was no way I was agreeing to that so I kept the club to myself. At that time we're talking about Balla, Pagano, myself, De Tommasi, Consalimme [Micaglio]. That was it...that's when things started to break down with Padovano, and Tornese was getting closer to him...And that's when the split came [Macchia, De Tommasi and Cagnazzo] (Sen. CdA 3, p. 1333).

This statement cites the role of conflict over drug supply prices following Salvatore Padovano's attempt to take the reins in the post-Dodaro era. What this indicates is not only another expression of greed on the part of the bosses, but also an increasingly independent attitude on

the part of local under-bosses. They simply refused to bow to their superiors' demands. A further attempt at achieving some degree of strategic planning fails to come into fruition as affiliates refuse to respect the pre-assigned hierarchical roles which were still officially in place. Macchia states that Padovano tried to get De Tommasi on side but he refused (Sen. CdA 1). This demonstration of Padovano's attempt to appease De Tommasi, or rather to bring him into the proverbial flock, and De Tommasi's refusal to be absorbed into the Padovano axis, marks yet another event in the history of the fragmentation of the SCU. At this point, the organisation is almost entirely divided into independent, autonomous *cosche* operating on their own home turf with no respect for central leadership or hierarchies.

3.5. The preparations for the first maxi-trial in Lecce are underway

As the period progressed, more arrests were made as many SCU fugitives were eventually tracked down in order that they could be tried during the maxi-trial in Lecce. This period is characterised by the role of structural pressures overshadowing the organisation. De Tommasi, for example, was arrested in Gallipoli on 23/12/1989, alongside 6 associates (Sen. CdA 3). The trial data states that:

From 1989, the organisation was still operating on the basis of orders from the *capi* detained in prison (Cagnazzo and Macchia were arrested in December, 1988 and De Tommasi in December, 1989) to the boys who were still on the outside. (Sen. CdA 3)

The pressure placed on all levels of the organisation had a considerable effect on bosses and affiliates alike, making their continued activity more complicated as a result of incarceration and acting as a catalyst for further in-fighting.

In May, 1989, the Anti-Mafia Commission officially declared Puglia to be an 'at-risk' region in terms of the threat of organised crime. Only on 26th March, 1990, did the judges admit the *mafiosità* of the organisation for the first time. Whilst the verdict of the first grade of the trial failed to acknowledge the *mafiosità* of the organisation, the Court of Appeal in Lecce overturned the decision, and harsh sentences were eventually handed down. This represents the first serious step on the part of the state in the battle against Rogoli's organisation. At this time, all *cosche* were, however, still making considerable sums of money, so clearly incarceration


proved no serious obstacle. Cagnazzo states:

The expenses for the detainees and the gambling stuff were divided, in 1988-1989, in three parts: one to me, one to De Tommasi and one to Rogoli and also a sum of 15 million...for Rogoli's wife, Mimina Biondi...there was nothing left because Angelelli had taken some first. (Sen. CdA 3, p. 502)

This tells us that operations both within and beyond the prisons were ongoing. Further, Rogoli was still considered to be the *capo* and enjoyed some level of respect, at least among the De Tommasi *leccese* fringe. Undoubtedly, the reputation, credence and resonance of the Rogoli name was something that affiliates were keen to maintain, given the purposes they served in terms of potential for territorial control and intimidation. As Gambetta explains, what is important is 'the externality of reputation: to be seen to be associated with a powerful symbol enhances one's credibility' (1996, p. 130). The utilisation of Rogoli's name is no exception to this.

By this stage, we still witness a broad range of under-bosses and affiliates continuing to use the SCU and Rogoli names, but with little actual connection to the central 'power' structure, or that which remained of it. Nevertheless, whilst they continued to give Rogoli a percentage of the profits, they had already begun to distance themselves from him in a more practical way. As such, the boss's role in decision-making processes declined further. In-fighting continued as some saw De Tommasi as obvious heir to Dodaro's reign. However, there were those who preferred Padovano from Gallipoli, including Mario Tornese. In 1989, Greco stated that the majority of affiliates had sided with De Tommasi's gang and described the upper vertices of the fragmented organisation as follows.

Figure 8: De Tommasi vs. Tornese division




(Sen. CdA 3, p. 174)

This diagram illustrates that there is an enduring, established divide between the De Tommasi and Tornese groups. Moreover, it tells us that the Tornese axis was characterised by strong links with Padovano (from southern Salento), increasing his territorial control and further distancing him from De Tommasi. The second maxi-trial data states:

From the second half of 1989, the conflict between the De Tommasi and Tornese groups was strengthened by emerging conflicts of interest in towns where the two groups had begun to co-exist, namely Copertino, Leverano and Veglie...and there were also personal matters entering into the situation, such as the murder of Ivo De Tommasi, Giovanni's brother, which took place in August, 1989....These are significant in terms of a rivalry between the clans which were all [officially] 'members' of a unified association, and this is illustrated by Cagnazzo's own statements in which he states that the results of the clash were symptoms of a net 'division' of the SCU into these two, distinct groups (Sen. CdA 3, p. 1331).

The map below indicates the relevant areas

Figure 9: Map of De Tommasi and Tornese territories



Source: google.co.uk

The fact that there were areas in which both *cosche* are active tells us that there were *some* attempts at co-existence but that lead only to further conflict. Moreover, the murder of important boss De Tommasi's brother illustrates the heightened tension and rejection of his authority. Given how important kinship ties had become, it is also illustrative of an unscrupulous move, certain to cause further harm and increase inter-*cosca* fighting. This was not to have an effect, however, on organisational earnings, as the murder of drug dealer and Cagnazzo affiliate Valerio Marcucci over an unpaid sum of approximately 2,000,000,000 *lire* is testament (Sen. CdA 3, p. 487).

Additional attempts were clearly made, however, to eliminate the risk of conflict, as *pentito* Cinfeta states:

[De Tommasi] sent Caracciolo to tell Tornese basically that at that point everyone should stick to their own turf because he [Tornese] hadn't respected the initial agreements and anyway that things could be cleared up if he [Tornese] could meet with De Tommasi, which Tornese said he wanted to do anyway. From the moment that Dodaro was killed, he [Tornese] had only told De Tommasi what was going on via

other people; he himself had never personally met with De Tommasi (Sen. CdA 3).

This statement illustrates that the rival clans had made initial agreements in terms of territorial activities, indicating some form of organisational strategy and an attempt at forward planning. Furthermore, it tells us that, following Dodaro's death, De Tommasi and Tornese no longer physically met, indicating an element of personal risk related to meetings, doubtless due to the possibility of being apprehended. The influence of structural pressure endured. In spite of the many problems by which the increasingly fragmented SCU was blighted, representatives of the organisation *a cielo scoperto* [outside the prison system] successfully enabled two *capi-zona* to communicate in such a way as to allow them to continue to manage their own *cosche*'s affairs. Once again, however, communication did not result in agreement and the organisation continued to move further away from that which Rogoli had originally envisaged. Moreover, we see the presence of agency-influenced factors affecting organisational traits as rivalry prevents any positive collective action from taking place.

3.6. The trial draws closer: the rise and fall of the Rosa dei Venti clan

During this period, the region of Puglia was undergoing dramatic economic growth, with regional GDP hitting 4.1%, in comparison with a national rate of 2.7% (*Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*, 15/10/1991, p. 7). This expansion meant that an inevitable response on the part of the criminal underworld was to take place, and expanding, diverse illegal networks provide evidence for this. At this time, the Chamber of Deputies concluded that there were 34 criminal groups operating in Puglia, with 2,542 affiliates individually identified (*Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*, 15/10/1991, p. 8). The Mayor of Lecce claimed that 'There is no *mafia* [here] but we are in its waiting room' (*ibid.*, p. 15), and so the notion of organised crime *vs. mafia* emerges once again, and we shall discuss this as the chapter progresses. The majority of these criminals are considered to have made up, or be affiliated with, the Sacra Corona Unita at that time.

Statistical data can help us to gauge the scale of the *fenomeno pugliese*, so let us examine the findings of a report published in 1995 by EURISPES³⁶.

Table 4: Drugs confiscated by region, 1989-1991, EURISPES

| Eroina | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 |
|---------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Puglia | 8,489 | 11,395 | 41,459 |
| Campania | 16,252 | 46,092 | 30,271 |
| Calabria | 5,153 | 8,414 | 3,592 |
| Sicilia | 4,690 | 14,228 | 14,128 |
| Italia | 684,052 | 901,213 | 1,555,844 |
| Cocaina | | | |
| Puglia | 8,570 | 5,325 | 30,066 |
| Campania | 21,584 | 20,317 | 225,914 |
| Calabria | 1,491 | 1,706 | 7,104 |
| Sicilia | 1,129 | 0,822 | 7,569 |
| Italia | 667,547 | 801,518 | 1,300,095 |
| Cannabis (a) | | | |
| Puglia | 38,730 | 42,011 | 1,052,04 |
| Campania | 48,757 | 2,990,506 | 244,769 |
| Calabria | 2,068,283 | 32,781 | 5,402,578 |
| Sicilia | 54,815 | 80,414 | 341,061 |
| Italia | 22,977,427 | 7,877,243 | 9,722,351 |

The figure above outlines kilograms of drugs confiscated in the four ‘at-risk’ Italian regions, including heroin, cocaine, and cannabis. As the table shows, growth was steady in Puglia in terms of both heroin and cannabis, with cocaine dropping slightly in 1990. The statistics indicate that, in fact, cocaine represented the smallest section of the *pugliese* drug market, with both heroin and cannabis reaching phenomenal heights in comparison with the other organisations of which the SCU was considered to live in the shadows. This provides us with confirmation of exponential growth of the organisation, as well as helping us to gauge the scope of the organisation within the Italian criminal landscape. However, we must also seek to identify the reasons behind growth patterns. It is probable that an increase in state intervention is responsible for a subsequent increase in drug confiscations. Further, the growth in the *pugliese* economy can go some way to explaining the growth in the illegal markets.

Documentation was confiscated from affiliate Francesco Taurino during the lead up to the first maxi-trial. Letters referred to large sums of money earned through drug deals and set aside for consignments (‘The first figure is 193,135,000 *lire* is accompanied by the + sign along with the following figures: 2,650,000 *lire* half a kilo of hashish, 1,325,000 *lire* hashish,

³⁶ Rapporto Italia 1995, *Percorsi di ricerca nella società italiana*, EURISPES, p. 282, http://www.eurispes.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=575:rapporto-italia-1995&catid=47:rapporto-italia&Itemid=222 . Accessed 01/03/2012.

2,460,000 *lire* hashish, 2,750,000 *lire* hashish, 5,640,000 *lire*, 2,400,000 *lire*, 2,300,000 *lire*, 5,750,000 *lire* hashish, with a total, for these figures alone, of 217,410,000 *lire*', Sen. CdA 1, p. 234). If one considers this is a single affiliate's personal accounts for a single type of drug, this illustrates that, by this stage, Rogoli's SCU had expanded and was dealing with considerable sums of money. These figures, in combination with the EURISPES data, represent proof the organisations' growth, status and earning capacity.

When the first maxi-trial in Lecce began in 1990, however, the subsequent chain of events would truly mark the death knell of Rogoli's original model for the SCU. *Pentito* [collaborator] Cirfeta claimed:

Initially, as soon as we (myself, De Tommasi, Cagnazzo, Conte, all of us) were put into the first section [of Lecce prison]...and the Tornese-Padovano-Giannelli group in the second- Rogoli still hadn't arrived, so we were waiting for him...we were sure that, as soon as he arrived, he would sit with us, we'd saved him a place, right?...That wasn't what happened, though, because he went into the second section, not where we were, right? Basically, we were really angry about this, Rogoli's behaviour, because he'd gone to sit with our potential rivals (Sen. CdA 3, p. 118).

This episode is a tangible demonstration that Rogoli could no longer claim to be the head of a unitary, cohesive, single organisation. He necessarily *had* to take sides. In splitting the *cosche* [clans], the prison staff doubtless aimed to avoid conflict. What this decision also indicates, however, is a refusal on the part of the authorities to define the SCU as one single, unified organisation. Indeed, the 1991 Chamber of Deputies report stated that 'Rogoli maintains the role of charismatic leader who does not, however, hold any real power within the organisation' (*Camera dei Deputati, XI Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documenti*, 15/10/1991, p. 18). Not only did Rogoli's snub come as a total shock to the De Tommasi *cosca*, but it was particularly insulting given that the Tornese clan had admitted responsibility for the murder of De Tommasi's brother the year before. Cirfeta, an affiliate of De Tommasi, continues:

So, the decision was made, eventually, to break away from Pino Rogoli, because he was treating us badly...and we told him so. We asked how he would have felt if we'd done the same to him. So, we decided to detach from Rogoli and we told him "From this moment we want nothing to do with you..." So, the last *sfoglia* we sent to him was

a bit on the *heavy* side, and it was Padovano who responded, as disrespectful as ever, saying we weren't showing Rogoli respect. And that was it, Rogoli stayed where he was and so did we. So, basically we decided to form a separate family. The components of this family were myself, De Tommasi, Macchia, Pulli, Conte, Stranieri and Mele, and we decided to write up a statute. We were sat together, the big boys, to write it, and to give us very precise rules and regulations, like the *fondo cassa*³⁷, the fact that letters were forbidden... all for this new family called the Rosa Dei Venti... Basically, there were the *capo cardini*, De Tommasi and Stranieri... they had, let's say, an apparently more important, responsible role... De Tommasi for Lecce and the surrounding areas because his boys had already branched out there, right? Like Macchia in Lecce... and Stranieri, he was in charge of Taranto, Manduria and Sannicandro ... so decisions had to be made on the basis of the statute, there was always a *consiglio* [council meeting], right? I mean to say that it was always me, De Tommasi, Cagnazzo, Conte and Pulli, all of us together, making the decisions (Sen. CdA 3, p. 1340).

This decision to form a separate, rival group, totally casting the founder aside on the basis of his perceived poor behaviour, is a bold move by Rogoli's former disciples. As well as indicating that Rogoli did not have the requisite qualities to act as a successful boss to a unified organisation as he had desired, it also shows us another example of in-fighting. Cirfeta's statement appears to contradict one element of our theories on the weaknesses of 'dark networks' when he states that letters were forbidden, implying that they had *not* fallen victim to the problem of failures to learn (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2010). Rather, they had recognised the heightened risk associated with the written word, unlike Cutolo and Rogoli before them. Moreover, his comments relating to their desire to draw up strict rules and regulations illustrate that they aspired to be more centrally organised and authoritarian. The existence of a communal petty-cash shows some capacity for forward planning. However, when we continue reading Cirfeta's statement and he states that a statute was being written up, we see that affiliates of this new organisation had not perhaps learnt as much as initially appeared to be the case. Furthermore, what this reliance on tradition also appears to demonstrate is that the founding members of the RDV appear to have learnt very little from Rogoli's key mistake. They sought to impose the same sort of rigid hierarchical structure as the SCU founder years earlier, which we know had all but disintegrated.

Let us consider what we know about the RDV organisation. According to the second

³⁷ Petty-cash.

maxi-trial data:

The new power dynamics within the organisation were formalised on the eve of the first maxi-trial with the constitution of the RDV taking place in Lecce prison. According to this, the founders were looking to stabilise both the strengthened bonds with the Lombardo and Bellocco 'ndrangheta *cosca* as well as the act of detachment from the other *leccesi* affiliates who had continued to take orders from Padovano, Giannelli and Tornese (Sen. CdA 3, p. 118).

There is some predictable debate, however, over the actual date of birth of the RDV. Whilst the RDV affiliates claim the organisation was founded on the eve of the first maxi-trial in a Lecce prison cell, the trial sentence states that the dates do not confirm this as Rogoli was transferred on 5/9/1990 and the maxi-trial started on 11/9/1990. (Sen. CdA 3) Once again, it is likely that the aspiring founders of this new organisation were attempting to provide some sort of symbolism in terms of the date³⁸. Further, it appears that they hoped to diminish responsibility for their own separation from Rogoli as they cite his own conduct as accountable for the decision. This is not the first instance or event which has instigated a discussion on the role of symbolism for SCU affiliates; let us remind ourselves of the religious imagery applied to Rogoli and the citation of Christmas Day as the date of birth of the organisation. Here, however, the claim that the RDV splinter-group was founded on the first day of the trial appears to represent the founding members desire to enter a new era; a period in which they became the *capi dei capi*, and a manifestation of their abandonment of Rogoli. The foundation of this organisation doubtless provided them with the opportunity for a fresh start; a new name, a new organisation, a new set of rules, all on the day of Rogoli's perceived betrayal. Moreover, this resulting ambiguity over the date of birth of the organisation doubtless indicates that this splinter group had been a longer-term project, and the considerable planning outlined by Cirfeta supports this theory.

The second maxi-trial data also indicates that the founding RDV members had to inform Umberto Bellocco of the decision to detach from Rogoli. This illustrates just how crucial the role of the 'ndrangheta remained in Puglia, almost 10 years after the autonomous *pugliese* group was born (Sen. CdA 3). The *calabresi* were already aware of the difficult relationship between Stranieri and Rogoli. De Tommasi and his affiliates sided with Stranieri, as Cagnazzo states:

³⁸ Let us recall that the SCU was allegedly founded on Christmas Day.

Stranieri was at war with Rogoli, whilst we were still linked to him...As soon as we detached from Rogoli...I went to Stranieri, looking for promotion, well Stranieri and Mico Lombardo (*calabrese*), because he was his *padrino* [Godfather] (Sen. CdA 3).

This attempt to seek approval from the *calabresi* is further evidence of their enduring role as overarching ‘sponsor’ of and point of reference for organised crime in Puglia. Moreover, with the decision to work together with Stranieri, already a rival of Rogoli, the De Tommasi groups were taking measures to increase their own power and territorial control, consolidating links with other, anti-Rogoli allies. This demonstrates some form of organisational planning, and appears to be a rather shrewd move. However, as had been the case with the splinter groups throughout earlier SCU history, any success was to be short-lived.


Cagnazzo was outspoken about the organisation during the second maxi-trial, by which time he had already collaborated with the authorities:

The RDV was this *cool* thing, the fact that we detached from Rogoli...so, when we got to Lecce for the first grade [of the trial], as I said, we all had...we were with Rogoli’s group ...because Rogoli was De Tommasi’s *padrino*...When, though, Rogoli arrived ...and he went in the section with all of those people who were against us...it was, yeah, straight away, in the heat of the moment, let’s break away from Pino Rogoli...because, yeah, he was saying “What! We’re at war with this lot, and instead of sitting with us you sit with them?...and so Stranieri...who had already fallen out with Rogoli...he said “Comrade, this sort of behaviour has been going on for a while...I already detached from Rogoli, right? I did it on my own, yeah. Wherever he sees profits, he’s straight in there” So, we formed the RDV straight away (Sen. CdA 3, p. 151).

Cagnazzo is describing some attempt at strategic planning on the part of affiliates, and a rejection of greed at the upper levels of the organisation, both significant in terms of the subsequent evolution of the organisation. That said, it seems that their plans were not as sophisticated as they appeared to be initially, at least on-paper, and things quickly begin to unravel.

Along with the motivations behind the formation of the RDV, the organisational structure of the splinter group may help us to better understand our case study. According to the second maxi-trial appeal data (Sen. CdA2) the RDV statute was signed on 11/9/1990. This document was signed by the 7 *capi*, and was found in a Lecce prison cell later in the same year. This is yet another example of the affiliates short-termism and lack of professionalism, which Motta attributes to the fact that members ‘were not used to keeping quiet, to not writing things down...it was not part of their culture...they wrote it all down and it was perfect for us.’ (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006) According to the recovered documents, the internal RDV hierarchy was outlined as follows.

Figure 10: Rosa dei Venti hierarchical structure



The planned structure apparently represents a hierarchy. However, the concentrated power core indicates that the rule at the heart of the organisation was oligarchic, with true control resting in the hands of just a few key members, with the other affiliates subordinate. Cirfeta's stated 'we all contribute to the *Fondo Cassa Comune* [petty cash] for all RDV activities' (Sen. CdA 3, p.1335) and this is just one example of the attempts at strategic planning on the part of the RDV bosses. They also assigned roles of *capo contabile* [chief accountant] for the cities of Taranto and Lecce. These members were to be responsible for the *fondo cassa*, in to which each member had to put 10% of earnings (*ibid.*). They were, according to the statute, answerable to the *capi cardine* in terms of income and outgoings.

A long list of rules, prohibited activities, and norms illustrate the attempt to build a sophisticated, organisational structure. For example, in the first instance of breaking a rule a fine of 10,000,000 *lire* was payable. However, the second time the punishment was more severe. (Sen. CdA 3, p.1335) Cirfeta also cited key locations (Manduria, Campi, Salice, Lecce, Surbo, Veglie), the role of the poles of north, south, east and west, and the application of a system of a closed circle whereby members had to ask permission to the *capi cardine* before acting alone on individual territories. The *pentito* also made reference to the sign of a tattoo of a masked woman with the RDV symbol on her chest and he claimed that 'The statute stated that we would not invade other *capi cardine's* or *cardini's* territories without letting them know beforehand', another example of forward planning and professionalism. Perhaps this represents an attempt to avoid the mistakes made by Rogoli. However, it soon becomes apparent that this established structure, with its roles, rules and normative characteristics, is yet another example of classic *pugliese* criminal history; one of a vast discrepancy between the situation as it appears on-paper and as it unfolds in reality.

It is clear that the RDV contained a variety of elements present in the SCU. These included an agreement on structures and plans, an internal hierarchy, pre-assigned divisions of roles and responsibilities, procedures in terms of forming new groups and subdivisions of under-groups in pre-defined areas (Sen. CdA 3, p. 2). However, Cirfeta also reveals some elements of the structure of the RDV which indicate a new development and are even more interesting in terms of our theoretical framework. Cirfeta claimed:

The RDV is different to the SCU, the role of *capo cardine* is considered more...let's say, has more decision making powers on paper but, eventually, for any decision to be made the *capi cardine* had to meet with the *cardini* to deliberate...We decided to create


this hierarchy when forming the RDV, to avoid that in the moment in which an order was given, as soon as an order came out, that everybody knew where it came from. So, the *capi cardine*, together with the *cardini*, deliberated and decided together and delegated orders down to the *poli* [poles] to put these into practice (Sen. CdA 3, p. 1335).

This statement indicates that the founding members of the RDV sought to follow tradition in creating a rigid, internal hierarchy. However, the structure they had put in place dictated that the highest members, or *capi cardine*, actually met with sub-regional bosses and made collective decisions. Moreover, Cirfeta refers to the hierarchy being put in place to avoid it being obvious who had put out specific orders. This demonstrates that what they refer to as a hierarchy is, in fact, far closer to a network. There is no true central authority, decisions are made collectively, and the organisational governing body is characterised by fluidity as opposed to rigidity. Seemingly, SCU affiliates had, by then, realised that a hierarchical configuration was ineffective and problematic and that a more collaborative structure might address the difficulties they had experienced. Whilst it is unlikely that this was as a result of a rational choice decision-making process, it is probable that, whether the bosses realised it or not, weaknesses of a hierarchical configuration had become apparent and they therefore took steps to avoid those pitfalls.

Throughout SCU history we have seen examples of bosses and affiliates putting hierarchies, rules, and norms into place, only to promptly refuse to obey and fail to observe any of the pre-assigned roles or instructions. Something different is taking place here. Just as the SCU previously, the RDV aspired to be a hierarchy. However, while the RDV bosses explicitly declared themselves to be a hierarchy, in fact, rules they *themselves* had put into place *necessarily* would have transformed the organisation into a network configuration. Yet the network configuration that they appear to have formulated was worth little more than the paper upon which it is outlined. Accordingly, the organisation once again failed to make the necessary qualitative leap; that which they planned and the final product remained vastly different. We need to consider if this is really a question of ability or whether other factors come in to play, possibly in the form of structural pressure or influence.

The diagram below represents the organisational structure of the entire SCU at this period in time.

Figure 11: SCU organisational structure (I)



Cirfeta stated that ‘each *capo cardine* had a pre-assigned *capo contabile* but disputes soon broke out over drug suppliers’ (Sen. CdA 3). In court Cagnazzo was questioned by the prosecutor on the nature of the organisation:

P.M. ‘I just want to clarify this point, something that you said in 1993, “The only moment in which the denomination of this association, the RDV, can really be referred to, as named by Stranieri, was at the opening of the maxi-trial, in October, 1990.” But, in spite of the drawing up of a statute, and the signature of this, in spite of the risks this entailed in judicial terms, and the specific rules, the organisation was never operative under the name the RDV, and all subsequent criminal activities were carried out according to the original structure [of the SCU]’

Cagnazzo ‘Exactly’ (Sen. CdA 3, p. 1346)

Cagnazzo’s statement represents one of the founding members acknowledging that the RDV never really existed. Macchia reiterates this:

Sure, we signed statutes. But if you look at the RDV...well it never really existed because, soon after, the arguments started between all of us, most of all between me and Cirfeta...and Cirfeta was kicked out and we reorganised ourselves without him. (Sen. CdA 3, p. 1346).

That even the founding members of the organisation openly state that the organisation was not to be taken seriously is quite remarkable. Cagnazzo continues, stating

Cagnazzo 'It was never operative... [I mean] it always operated...in the same way, all that changed was...'

P.M. 'Did the RDV ever exist beyond...?'

Cagnazzo 'No, let's say the only change was...the drugs, the stuff, we didn't get it through Rogoli anymore, but from certain *Calabresi* who were already supplying Stranieri. But, we were already going ahead and getting our own stuff organised, it's just that before we were linked to Rogoli.'

P.M. 'Beyond these few people, did anyone on the outside know anything about this [new organisation]?'

Cagnazzo 'No'

P.M. 'In terms of relationships with the outside, what did people know about this association, what name did they give it?'

Cagnazzo 'Nothing. It was just stuff we had come up with. On the outside nobody knew anything'

P.M. 'And the name RDV was never in operation on the outside?'

Cagnazzo 'No'

P.M. 'And as for the RDV and its statute...and who was it who chose the name?'

Cagnazzo 'Vincenzo Stranieri'

P.M. 'That's right. So, there was a name given. Beyond this case was there ever a denomination, in inverted commas, of the organisation?'

Cagnazzo 'No' (Sen. CdA 3, p. 1346)

On the basis of these *pentiti* statements, it is clear that the existence of the RDV was largely

symbolic. *Pentito* Dario Toma's statement supports this view:

This organisation...never really existed, in the sense that nothing had changed; what I mean is that, rather than saying the De Tommasi group, they were called the RDV for 15 days, a month at the most, then this passed...and didn't remain on anyone's mind, because soon in-fighting broke out among the group itself, the very same participants who had founded the group, therefore the RDV does not exist...Let's just say that the De Tommasi group remained as it always had been... it's united...it was never abolished (Sen. CdA 5, p. 81).

The organisation was not operative beyond the prison where the founding members were incarcerated and, even then, it was only considered to exist for a matter of weeks. The second maxi-trial data states:

There are also traces of this in the statements of Cagnazzo, Macchia and Cirfeta, when they claim that, beyond the label, those belonging to the group continued to occupy themselves with the same illegal activities as ever; the constitution of the RDV, officially confirming their detachment from Rogoli and the Brindisi fringe of the organisation, only truly signalled a change in their drug suppliers! (Sen. CdA 3, p. 61)

Whilst, in theory, much had changed, acquiring drugs from a different source was the only tangible difference. The affiliates and judges state that Rogoli had been ousted, but Macchia claims 'Rogoli had nothing to do with it, we were acting on our own...Rogoli was in charge and that was that.' (Sen. CdA 3). It seems that, whilst Rogoli had been cast aside in practical terms, he was still considered to be '*quello che è sopra di tutti*' or 'he who is above all others'. The founder therefore remains in control of this mystical sceptre of power and influence, whether simply as a spiritual figure or otherwise, reigning over affiliates who ultimately still consider themselves to be part of the SCU.

We must consider how and why Rogoli maintains this reputation when, in practical terms, he no longer wields any *de facto* control. Undoubtedly there is, once again, a place for the matter of resonance and reputation; he was a feared and respected leader and his name provided the SCU, as well as the off-shoot organisations, with a reputation and a brand which

people recognised. With reference to the Sicilian Mafia, Gambetta states:

[The name] supplied outsiders with a label to identify an ill-defined conglomerate, thereby making it possible to speak and think of it as a whole (and also, of course, making it possible to think of it wrongly as a mythical whole). More important, the word created a brand name, thereby making it possible to ally oneself to an entity with a threatening and resonant reputation. (1996, p. 137)

This is surely the case with the *pugliese* model as *capi* and affiliates alike recognised the importance of a name and reputation. However, in the absence of tradition, organic growth and shared history, the missions fail as affiliates simply do not have the requisite skills to become *mafiosi*. During the 1997 trial, the prosecutor stated:

Let us not be deceived by the assertions of those collaborators (particularly Cagnazzo and Cirfeta) who claimed that the RDV was an attempt to detach which never came into fruition. All that means is that the new denomination and the new organisation model were never used, particularly beyond the inner circle of *capi*; that is not to say, however, that the pre-existent criminal organisation did not continue to operate, because on the contrary, the adherents carried on doing exactly what they had always done. (Sen. CdA 3, p. 1347)

Here we see an acknowledgement that, rather than undermining the role of the RDV founding members on the *pugliese* criminal landscape, we must remember that they were as influential, brutal and ferocious as ever. In spite of the failure of the RDV mission, their criminal activity endured.

In terms of the post-RDV reality in Puglia, Pino Rogoli himself referred to the demise of the SCU:

[The] SCU existed from 1st May 1983 until the appeal of the maxi-trial...but, in reality, that which had existed up until that point was simply an initial associative experience, and little more, destined to be totally revamped. (cited in Massari, 1998, pp. 30-31)

That the historic founder would claim that the advent of the maxi-trials indicated the effective dissolution of his model of the SCU organisation is an early indication of the crucial role that judicial intervention played. At this stage we witness the true rise of the influence of structural factors in the form of state repression following a long period of predominantly agency-based events.

In short, the emergence of the RDV is a further indication of a clan aspiring to re-organise according to an ideal-type organisational model. The adopted model is still a hierarchy, even though its functioning is predicated on a network-based structure (collective decision making, consultation and collaboration). As on previous occasions, the projected model fails to come into fruition, as illustrated by the *pentiti* statements. It seems clear that what may work for one organisation or *cosca* may not necessarily work for another, due both to environmental and agency factors. In terms of structural factors, the pre-existing *pugliese* underworld, characterised by a market-like plurality of groups, resists the imposition of a model imported from the outside and proves resilient even in the face of seemingly powerful and ruthless bosses. In terms of agency, the *pugliese* criminals appear to be lacking in the necessary skills, or indeed in a shared vision, to facilitate the adoption of a chosen model.

3.7. The first *leccese* maxi-trial: structural influence takes hold

The maxi-trial officially opened in October, 1990, and came to a close seven months later on 23rd May, 1991. There were 134 defendants, all contained within a divided *aula-bunker* (a high-security court room used for *mafia* trials) at Lecce Court House. Defendants included Rogoli, along with his wife Domenica ‘La Mimina’ Biondi, Gianni De Tommasi, the Tornese brothers, Maurizio Cagnazzo, and representatives of all of the primary *cosche*. Of the defendants on trial, 37 were incarcerated in Lecce prison, 26 were still at large, 12 were under house arrest, 4 were dead and many more had refused to appear at the trial. Most were charged with 416bis, but other crimes included law no. 685/75, or drug-related offences, and law no. 628, or robbery. The trial was largely based on judicial and police investigations and made widespread use of telephone wire-tapping, as well as letters and other written evidence which had been confiscated by investigators while the case was being prepared. Given that this trial took place before the law relating to collaboration with the authorities, the judges had to rely on their own investigations, as well as those of the previous trials, to inform proceedings.

Following 10 days of deliberation by the judges, the court officially recognised the *mafiosità* of the organisation and, accordingly, handed down heavy sentences; Rogoli was given 22 years and 7 months, and his wife Domenica Biondi, was sentenced to six years in prison. However, in spite of the widespread guilty verdicts and harsh sentencing, the SCU continued to recruit new affiliates, its numbers growing, as unaffected in practical terms by this trial as it had been of the trials of the previous decade. Massari writes:

As the other sentences prove, the life of the organisation, whose existence had been accepted, did not come to an end when the first trial was over but, on the contrary, a true evolution of the associative phenomenon took place and there was a progressive affirmation of the violence of the *mafia*-model. However, the internal organisational order- the individuals and the power of those detained- remained unchanged. Many of the names contained within the list of defendants of the first trial against the *criminalità pugliese*- the Bari trial- appeared also in this new proceedings (1998, p. 53).

The sentences handed down at the close of the maxi-trial had little effect on the affiliates' ability to operate. However, the in-fighting and fragmentation that the trial caused following the De Tommasi and Tornese split played a profound role in the eventual breakdown of the organisation. The Rosa Dei Venti clan emerged during the trial. The cleavages became even more pronounced as Rogoli lost overall control of the collection of *cosche*. Not only had Rogoli's earlier flouting of *omertà* caused him to lose support, but his choice to 'side' with the Tornese power axis ousted him from his pedestal of *capo dei capi* in any real, practical terms. The opposing side rejected him and his leadership as a result of his behaviour. Moreover, the state of flux which persisted reiterates the weakness and uncertainty surrounding the organisation, particular at the upper echelons. The notion of a centralised, vertically organised power structure seemed a distant memory.

These events were all taking place in a southern Italian region against a backdrop of growing anti-*mafia* sentiment, with both a legislative and a social engagement with the phenomenon. As *cadaveri eccellenti* [illustrious corpses³⁹] continued to be discovered, serious steps against these organisations began to be put into place, and the SCU was no exception. As soon as the state counter-offensive was under way in the region, dramatic changes were made which would affect the organisation forever. Firstly, the acknowledgement of the *mafiosità* and

³⁹ 'Illustrious corpses' refers to high-profile victims of the *mafia*-style organisations, predominantly in Sicily, such as politicians, judges and police chiefs.

subsequent application of 416*bis* resulted in harsh sentences being handed down. While not entirely preventing the affiliates from operating, this at least represented a symbolic move by the judiciary and law enforcement bodies together in the fight against the organisation. It was the events which took place between the two maxi-trials which so dramatically contributed to the ultimate downfall of Rogoli's organisation.

When the first maxi-trial closed in May, 1991, the bedrock of the SCU was severely shaken by events. The period leading up to and during the trial, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, saw heightening tensions and violence in Puglia. Between 1988 and 1991, murder rates rose from 118 to 188, attempted murders rose from 217 to 269 and 2949 robberies took place in 1991 compared to 1944 in 1988 (*Libera*, 2004, p. 120). Vast sums of money were still being made, as Macchia's revelation that extortion of the *Banca del Salento* had raised 200,000,000 *lire* (Sen. CdA 3, p. 1312) is testament. Rogoli's role and influence had declined considerably by this point, and new factions were vying for domination of the territory. The region entered another bloody period, characterised by lethal bomb attacks and murders, including the attack on the Lecce Court House and the Brindisi police headquarters. With Rogoli's sentencing for 416*bis*, along with many of his key leaders at the vertices of the organisation, the bloody battle for succession which ensued gripped the territory. This ensured that the hierarchical model became even more distant. What emerged following the trial appears to be even closer to a market model; disconnected *cosche* and affiliates battling for a monopoly over the local territory and illegal business and appearing to represent the SCU only in name. As we enter the next, and final, period (1991-1999), we will examine the role of continued structural pressure in the form of the legislative counter-offensive on the struggling organisation. This will allow us to assess the impact of both structural and agential factors in terms of the rapid changes taking place in the *pugliese* criminal landscape.

3.8. Conclusion

In the first empirical chapter we examined the role played by external rival/sponsoring criminal organisations in relation to adopted organisational configuration of newcomers gangs. Our findings suggested that the predominant influence over chosen structure did, indeed, come from exogenous sources in the form of external clans, whilst response to other factors played a lesser role. The next phase saw the rise of agential influence, as affiliates repeatedly refused to follow the traditional values and rules which Rogoli had attempted to put into place. As the time period upon which the thesis is based progresses, we need to examine the focus of the other research

questions and hypotheses; does the adopted configuration remain stable or is it likely to fluctuate, and what influence does the chosen structure have on organisational progress and, ultimately, success and failure?

In this chapter we have outlined the history of the SCU from the days of the aftermath of early splits, divisions and offshoot emergence. By this stage we understand how and why Rogoli chose the organisational configuration that he did, and the vital influence of external criminal gangs is clear. Examining the role and significance of some of the key players of the organisation, we considered the increasing effect of agency factors on continued organisational progress *vis-à-vis* themes of fragmentation, greed, short-termism, and sub-regional loyalties as emerging organisational traits. With structural pressure having been temporarily relieved, we are able to see just how crucial the role of the agent was to be. This works in conjunction with both our second and third research questions; we can see model fluctuation taking place, as Rogoli's planned, on-paper hierarchy seems a distant memory, and the disadvantages of particular configurations are becoming apparent. The focus then shifted back, in the last phase, from agency to structural factors, as the state counter-offensive began to take hold in the form of the mass issue of arrest warrants, widespread police investigations and the advent of the first maxi-trial in Lecce. The period immediately following the trial was touched upon, as we concluded our investigations on this era of SCU history.

Early on we witness the continued overarching role played by the 'ndrangheta. However, a gradual detachment is underway, and this results in the declining influence of structural factors in the earliest section of the time period and makes way for agency-related problems to re-emerge. Repeated splits, the birth of offshoot clans, increased in-fighting and the dominance of sub-regional loyalties meant that Rogoli struggled to maintain any genuine control over many sections of the organisation. Whilst in Chapter One we find examples of Rogoli's shrewd behaviour, by this stage he makes further mistakes for which he was to pay a very high price. Although the state response was initially weak, Rogoli still failed to capitalise on this opportunity as agency factors dominated. But it was not only Rogoli to act as an influential agent; both his close collaborators and the rank and file foot soldiers' activities also began to affect the organisation. Mistakes made by those affiliates also indicate that the structure they had adopted by this stage suffered as a result of its weaknesses. As Judge Motta argues, the 'pyramidal structure which existed at the birth of the SCU is now in question because the lack of respect for hierarchy and tendency towards transversality is [manifest]' (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006). Just as earlier evidence appeared to suggest, Rogoli's

hierarchical model was not workable. This is largely as a result of poor decision making, incompetence, high risk taking and the abovementioned fatal flaws of localism, greed and short-termism that emerged at every level of the organisation. What is interesting, however, is what this represented for the SCU at this time; in spite of problems caused by these characteristics of the organisation, they symbolise a period in which the SCU was developing its own organisational traits, even if it was these very traits which led to further breakdown. These emergent attributes of the organisation are simply not in keeping with Rogoli's mission and his repeated attempts to accommodate the traditional values he aspired to with the modern traits and trends of his foot soldiers are doomed to fail.

However, Rogoli's organisation repeatedly managed to regroup and overcome these difficulties. Despite the SCU at this stage being far closer to the loose, kinship-based end of the broad spectrum, Rogoli was still able to transmit a message of union and cohesion, and this is doubtless as a result of his and his affiliates' recognition of the value the *façade* of unity represented for them as an organisation. To reveal to your rivals and the state that you are a disjointed band of warring factions would surely increase vulnerability to attack. As such, in spite of the frequent problems met by both Rogoli and his foot soldiers, they constantly regroup and reabsorb. This cyclical fluctuation, from on-paper unity to day-to-day sub-regional autonomy and back again, or rather unified organisation reduced to conflictual factions which subsequently return to harmonious relations, illustrate that our second hypothesis is correct; in light of complex socio-economic conditions, configurations are almost certainly subject to change. Indeed, *pentito* Scarcella states

There had always been splits, there had been tonnes...but, the genesis, the mother, is one, its unified, it was one and then loads of little groups were born who were always at war without any religion...But, what I mean is that they had always been *mafia*-style and...each one just tried to provide itself with a name (Sen. CdA 4).

Indeed, the primary data further states that '...it still remains *SCU*...if one wants to imply that the finished criminal product is diverse...but they remain 'children of the same mother' (Sen. CdA 4).

If we take the case of the RDV, we can see that it was a very small-time mission, operative only for a brief period. There was seemingly no need for *capi* and affiliates to follow the strict rules and guidelines they themselves had chosen on the basis of mimicry of the 'ndrangheta and the SCU. Maintaining a pre-defined structure, whether hierarchical or network-based, is not a vital necessity when we consider the type of illegal activities the organisation was carrying out: drug dealing, extortion and illegal gambling circuits. We can conclude, therefore, that whichever configuration is adopted, for whatever reason, is not *necessarily* important; SCU affiliates demonstrate that they reject traditional *mafia* values which Rogoli attempted to impose upon them as part of his process of mimicry, and they act on the basis of individualistic opportunism, in the hope of maximising return, minimising risk and with little consideration for *mafia*-style procedures. If Rogoli himself is incapable of observing key values, his affiliates are highly unlikely to do so. Had either the SCU or the RDV been capable of entering into the semi-legal world of the construction industry, and therefore infiltrating the mainstream, power elites or upperworld as per Von Lampe's definitions (2008) in any meaningful way, such rules, regulation and roles would have facilitated cooperation. The nature of operations as it was, such restrictive observance was simply deemed unnecessary.

Embeddedness in the mainstream has never truly been the case in *pugliese* criminal history. Let us consider infiltration of local politics as an indicator; only 2 local councils were ever dissolved for *mafia*-infiltration in the sub-region of Salento, neither of which led to any prosecutions.⁴⁰ SCU affiliates were unwilling or unable to maintain and follow rules and regimes that they themselves had outlined and doing so would have likely been a complex process with potentially little return in the short-term. At this stage, as we know, the principal economic activities of the SCU were drug-dealing, gambling, extortion, and tobacco smuggling. In the sub-region of Salento, only Gallipoli and Surbo were dissolved for *mafia* infiltration in 1991 (*Sportello Scuola e Università*, Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia ⁴¹) following legislative change of the same year, but neither lead to any prosecutions. If we compare this to figures of Campania, Sicily and Calabria respectively at 7, 6, and 7, we can see that the scale of the problem is considerably smaller. The figures for the following year, 1992, display a similar trend, with Puglia having no town councils dissolved, compared to 9 in Campania, 10 in Sicily and 3 in Calabria (*ibid.*) This not only indicates the differing scale of the phenomenon on a region to region basis, clearly indicating that the SCU is smaller in comparison to the other criminal syndicates, but also that, regardless of scale, the nature of criminal organisation differs

⁴⁰ http://www.liberliber.it/biblioteca/i/italia/verbal_i_antimafia_xi_legislatura/html/violante01/28_00.html. Accessed 12/09/2010.

⁴¹ http://www.camera.it/_bicamerale/leg15/commbicantimafia/documentazionetematica/23/schedabase.asp#dati_%20statistici. Accessed 14/01/2011.

from one area to another across the *Mezzogiorno*.

The SCU was predominantly occupied with low-level criminal activity, namely drug dealing and extortion and so we can broadly define it as falling within Von Lampe's (2008) second configuration. Just as Von Lampe argued, 'actors can rely on social support structures...still essentially set apart from mainstream society and institutions...[with] Smuggling, storage and distribution of heroin'(2008, p. 8) typically organised via network ties. Conversely, the SCU's counterparts across the Italian south had been successful in making the qualitative leap into semi-legal business, and were doubtless reaping the benefits in terms of greater territorial control, market monopoly and increased economic gain, all key indicators of success as per our theoretical framework. The ability to infiltrate local politics and to influence decisions made by representatives on town councils can facilitate growth and evolution of a criminal organisation, guaranteeing contracts and providing opportunities for money laundering. Where the SCU failed, at this stage at least, to make this leap undoubtedly contributed to its stagnation as an organisation. *As per* our second research question and hypothesis, fundamental change on the basis of complex adaptation is taking place at the very core of the clan and its organisational configuration is no exception. This continued state of flux, as Rogoli remains unable to accommodate tradition and modernity under one organisational umbrella, results in the maintenance of a factious criminal landscape in which no single, unified group is able to make considerable progress.

When looking to achieve quickly what other organisations took decades to do, having adopted Judge Motta's defined strategy of 'business for business' (In conversation with the author, 30/01/2006), Rogoli and his affiliates paid an ultimately higher price. SCU bosses and affiliates alike failed to appreciate that the eventual gains of territorial control and increased economic benefits could, potentially, have been far greater. It is clear that the name of Rogoli and association with the SCU afforded the affiliates some form of reputation in its resonance and recognisability. However, what we see in Puglia at the end of this period is so far removed from the original model that they repeatedly attempted to transplant that it bears very little comparison. We do witness an organisation which is beginning to demonstrate its own distinctive operational characteristics, but it is these very traits which contribute to its organisational decline. Rogoli's SCU suffered from fatal flaws at the heart of the weak "dark networks" thesis (Tucker, 2008; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2010). They took excessive risks, they planned poorly, they displayed failures to learn and suffered from communication breakdowns, as illustrated by frequent blunders and mistakes. Affiliates were unwilling, or

unable, to follow the very structures, traditions and values that they themselves had put into place. This can help us to understand and respond to our final research question and hypothesis at this stage of the thesis on the basis of the role played by organisational configuration on potential success and failure. There is no doubt that a hybrid hierarchical-network emerged in Puglia in conjunction with external organisations and as a result of adaptation to local conditions. This adopted configuration changed over time, predominantly due to agency-influenced adaptation. However, as the network model dominated the landscape, so too did its pitfalls, and this resulted in stalled organisational progress and sewed the seeds for greater long-term difficulties. Had the advantages of the network model led the way, Rogoli's mission may have had a different outcome. However, unfolding events demonstrate that the negatives outweighed the positives and the SCU struggle was ongoing.

As we have seen in the course of this chapter, once an organisational structure is in place it will both impact on individual behaviour and be influenced by it. In the case of the SCU, individual members struggle to adapt and conform to the structure put into place by Rogoli in response to the influence of external organisations and react by behaving in ways which fundamentally subvert it and put the SCU at risk. As we enter the next period, 1991-1999, we will examine the role that increasing judicial and state intervention had in terms of the further evolution of the SCU and the splinter-groups and begin to draw final conclusions in relation to our hypotheses and research questions.

Chapter 4. 1991-1999: The state counter-offensive and the decimation of Rogoli's SCU

4.1. A brief history of anti-*mafia* legislation

In order to best understand the role the state played in altering *pugliese* organised crime, we must first understand steps taken by the Italian state in the wider battle against the *mafie* and then examine their application in the region. When these legislative acts have been outlined, we can attempt to assess the way in which they have been applied in the region and the role this played in the SCU and its evolution as an organisation.

Among the earliest legislative steps taken by the Italian state relate to powers of special surveillance (*sorveglianza speciale*), a preventative measure introduced by law n. 1423 in 1956. The law included a clause which intended to prevent *mafia* associates from carrying out illegal operations via their removal from their own territories.⁴² Of the measure Varese writes:

Based on a naïve view of the mafia as a product of backward societies, forced resettlement (*soggiorni obbligato*)...was predicated on the assumption that, away from their home base and immersed in the civic, law-abiding culture of the north [or other reputedly non-at risk areas], mafiosi...would abandon their old ways. Since the mid-1950s, this policy has brought hard-nosed lawbreakers to northern regions of Italy...The mafioso-turned-state-witness Gaspare Mutolo commented that the policy of forced resettlement “has been a good thing, since it allowed us to contact other people, to discover new places, new cities” (quoted in Massari 2001: 12). In selecting individuals with mafia skills for forced migration, the *soggiorni obbligato* unintentionally enabled them to expand their networks and knowledge (2006, p. 417).

Varese concludes that, rather than hindering the abilities of *mafiosi* to continue to operate, the programme often served only to provide opportunities for expansion, both in terms of contact and in terms of skills. As such, the task of creating and applying functional anti-mafia legislation was a complex process.

⁴² http://www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/normative/L.1423-56.pdf. Accessed 2/12/2010

The Anti-Mafia Commission (*Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia*: CPA) is a bicameral commission of Italian parliament which was established by law on 20th December, 1962 (*legge* n. 1720)⁴³ and consists of members from both the upper and lower houses (the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate). The first commission was set up in order to address the problem of the Mafia Wars in Sicily, although later models were aimed at all *mafia*-style organisations across Italy. Seven additional commissions have been set up, most recently in 2006. These take the form of a sort of select committee, with the aims and objectives of:

Study[ing] the phenomenon of organized crime in all its permutations and to measure the appropriateness of existing measures, legislatively and administratively, against results. [Furthermore] The Commission has judicial powers in that it may instruct the judicial police to carry out investigations, it can ask for copies of court proceedings and is entitled to ask for any form of collaboration that it deems necessary. Those who provide testimony to the Commission are obliged to tell the truth. The Commission can report to Parliament as often as desired, but at least on an annual basis (Jamieson, 2000, p. 52).

In order to ensure that the CPA was able to act as an effective body in the battle against organised crime, however, further legislative innovation was necessary.

Shortly after the foundation of the CPA, the first major legal step towards combating organised crime in Italy was taken on 31st May, 1965.⁴⁴ Mitsilegas (2003)⁴⁵ writes:

Law number 575...which was the first to use the term ‘Mafia,’ extended 1956 legislation based on the concept of ‘socially dangerous individuals’ (Zeid, 1998: 520) to include those ‘suspected of belonging to associations of a Mafia type, to the Camorra or to the other associations whatever their local name, which pursue objectives or act with methods corresponding to those of Mafia associations.’ Although no legal definition of a Mafia-type association was included, the law granted, inter alia, special surveillance powers and the possibility of judicial or police identification and freezing of assets belonging to a person suspected of involvement

⁴³ <http://www.parlamento.it/bicamerale/43775/48736/48737/48738/paginabicamerale.htm>. Accessed 1/12/2010.

⁴⁴ http://www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/normative/L.575-1965.pdf. Accessed 1/12/2010.

⁴⁵ From Beare, M, ed., 2003. *Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering, and Corruption*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

in a Mafia-type association, as well as the power to suspend licenses, grants, and authorizations issued publicly (p. 56).

In fact, the law ultimately had little effect on state efforts to combat the Mafia, and neither did it contribute to the debate over terminology or definitions. Rather, it was more of a symbolic step, indicating that the Italian authorities had recognised the threat posed by these organisations, and was willing and able to take action against them. The 1963 commission passed no further legislation (Mitsilegas, 2003). It was only in the 1980s that the judicial response to the phenomenon of organised crime began to take shape when ‘...a draft law, including a definition of a Mafia-type association, was introduced in 1980’ (*ibid.*). This took place following Mafia expansion as the Italian state focussed, at that time, on anti-terrorist legislation. This is the first time that we witness a relationship between terrorist and anti-*mafia* legislation, and this correlation will be examined more closely as the chapter progresses.

It was undoubtedly the murder of one of the men responsible for drafting the aforementioned law (n. 575) to change the face of the Italian state’s battle against the *mafie* forever; the assassination of Pio La Torre⁴⁶ on April 30th, 1982. In document number 1581 on law proposals presented to the Chamber of Deputies on 31st March, 1980, the law relating to *mafia* association was outlined; 416*bis*. The proposal stated that, whilst the pre-existing Article 416 law was able to cope with criminal organisations on a small or local scale⁴⁷, it was necessary to introduce legislation which would be sufficient to combat the criminal organisations which existed in Italy at that time. The proposed law stated::

- Art. 416-*bis*.- Mafia association. Anyone who is a member of a *mafia* association or group, consisting of three or more people, will be punished with 3-6 years imprisonment.
- Those who promote, manage or organise the association or group will be punished...with 4-8 years imprisonment.
- The association or group may be considered *mafioso* when members therein aim to commit crimes or make profits or benefits for themselves or others, making use of intimidation and force which comes as a result of the strong *mafia* bond.

⁴⁶ La Torre was a PCI politician and member of the CPA.

⁴⁷ http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stampati/pdf/15810001.pdf. Accessed 2/12/2010.

- If the association or group is armed, imprisonment is increased to 4-10 years in the first case listed above or 5-15 years in the second.⁴⁸

1982 not only saw the death of La Torre, but of another of the men responsible for drafting the law; Palermo prefect Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, murdered on September 3rd of the same year. (Bocca, G., 1982, Il generale nel suo labirinto, *la Repubblica*, 4 September ⁴⁹). These deaths were met with public outcry and, only ten days after Dalla Chiesa's murder, law 646, or the Rognoni-La Torre law, was passed on 13th September 1982. This law included the pioneering article 416*bis* for the first time in Italian legislation, known as '*associazione di tipo mafioso*', or *mafia*-type association. Mitsilegas writes:

It was one of the first international attempts to introduce the concept of an organized criminal association in criminal law. According to this new provision, a Mafia-type association consists of three or more persons, and 'those who belong to it make use of the power of intimidation afforded by the associative bond and the state of subjugation and criminal silence which derives from it to commit crimes, to acquire directly or indirectly the management or control of economic activities, concessions, authorizations or public contracts and services, either to gain unjust profits or advantages for themselves or for others (2003, p. 57, cited in Beare).

This 'ambitious attempt to translate the social, economic and political role of the Mafia into a workable legal provision' (*ibid.*) represents arguably the most symbolic yet effective step taken by the Italian state in its struggle against the phenomenon of organised crime. The change led to far more effective arrest and sentencing opportunities.

A vital tool in the fight against organised crime comes in the form of *pentiti*, or collaborators, as their statements provide the judiciary and police with inside information crucial to securing prosecutions in return for protection and reduced sentences. Anti-*mafia* judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino were long-time campaigners for the introduction of legislation related to collaborators. They recognised their value in terms of securing prosecution but understood the difficulties these individuals were to face should they decide to

⁴⁸ http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stampati/pdf/15810001.pdf. Accessed 2/12/2010

⁴⁹ Ucciso Dalla Chiesa Il generale nel suo labirinto, *La Repubblica*, 4/09/1982, <http://www.repubblica.it/online/album/ottantadue/bocca/bocca.html>. Accessed 1/12/2010.

assist the authorities. Through their work with the Ministry of Justice in creating the National Anti-*mafia* Division, they began to put pressure for changes to be made. Falcone stated:

On the one hand we need clarity in the areas of judicial treatment and of sentencing, and on the other we need to be able to guarantee minimum conditions of personal security for collaborators and their families. Above all we must continue to be able to use what I consider to be an irreplaceable investigative tool, because only the voices from inside can help us to understand properly what is happening...Our system permits a whole series of sentence reductions quite separately from collaboration so that sometimes the absurd thing happens that those who collaborate often receive worse treatment than those who do not. This simply must stop otherwise we won't have any more collaborators (1989, cited in Jamieson, 2000, pp. 102-103).

Legislation on collaboration was officially passed in 1991, with law n. 8 5/01/1991, converted with modification N. 82 on 15/03/1991⁵⁰. However, for two years afterwards '[it] was technically unworkable because corresponding modifications to the criminal code had not been made' (Jamieson, 2000, p. 103). Legislative decree 119/1993 was eventually passed in 1993 which introduced the possibility of changing identity for collaborators and protected witnesses (De Nicola and Birolini, from Vermeulen, G., 2005, EU standards in witness protection and collaboration with justice, IRCP; University of Ghent, pp. 79-82). Nevertheless, judicial investigations against *mafia*-style organisations had relied on *pentiti* statements long before this legislation became effective since the days of Cosa Nostra boss Tommaso Buscetta during the 1980s.

The cost of the assassinations of Falcone and Borsellino were to have more far-reaching consequences for *mafiosi* than the perpetrators could ever have imagined. Of collaborators, Falcone stated:

I have become a sort of defender of all *pentiti* because, in one way or another, I respect them all, even those who had disappointed me...I shared their painful journey, I sensed how difficult it was for them to talk about themselves, to recount wrongdoings when they ignored possible personal repercussions, knowing that both sides of the barricades

⁵⁰ http://www.camera.it/_bicamerali/leg15/commbicantimafia/documentazionetematica/25/schedabase.asp. Accessed 4/12/2010.

enemies were lying in wait to make them pay dearly for the violation of the law of *omertà*. Try to put yourselves in their place: they were men of honour, revered, on the pay-roll of the most serious organisation, more solid than a sovereign state, well protected by their own infallible police force, who suddenly found themselves having to confront on the one hand an indifferent state, and on the other an organisation enraged by betrayal (Falcone, 1991, cited in Padovani, M., 1993, p. 68).

Falcone recognised the contribution *pentiti* could make to the anti-*mafia* battle, and his compassion and empathy are striking. He was killed before he was able to witness the impact and contribution *pentiti* were able to achieve.

The final and arguably most controversial legislative step taken in the fight against *mafia*-style organisations in Italy comes from law number 354, initially passed on 26th July, 1975.⁵¹ Article 41*bis*, or *Regime detentivo speciale di cui all'art. 41 bis O.P.* commonly known as *carcere duro* (literally 'hard prison'), is a prison regime of strict confinement which was initially enshrined in relation to the Prison Act No. 354, designed to reform imprisonment of the most dangerous detainees as part of the anti-terrorism movement.⁵² Article 41*bis* itself was passed in 1986, and was considered to be an emergency measure which '...applies to prisoners who have committed – or who are suspected of having committed – an offence in connection with *mafia*-type, terrorist or subversive organisations, and who are thought to be maintaining links with such organisations'⁵³.

It was, however, the continued appearance of *cadaveri eccellenti* [illustrious corpses] in Sicily and beyond which ensured that *mafiosi* were to be subject to the same difficult prison conditions as their terrorist counterparts. The Capaci massacre, in which Falcone was brutally murdered in a bomb attack along with three of his security staff, took place on 23rd May, 1992. The attack shocked the nation and the Italian authorities had to demonstrate strength in the face of the threat posed by the Sicilian Mafia. Falcone's friend and colleague Borsellino was murdered shortly after in Palermo, on 19th July, 1992. Before the second massacre had taken place, however, emergency measures had already been taken and the 1986 law had been adapted to be applicable to organised crime associates. The primary objective of the change in the law

⁵¹ http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_15.wp?previousPage=mg_7_7&contentId=LEG49585. Accessed 3/12/2010.

⁵² <http://www.altrodiritto.unifi.it/ricerche/misure/fontanel/cap2.htm#h3>. Accessed 4/12/2010.

⁵³ <http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/ita/2010-12-inf-eng.htm>. Accessed 3/12/2010.

was two-fold: on the one hand, just as with terrorists before, the intention was to prevent the criminal associates from communicating with one another and operating their organisations (a similar goal to that of the *soggiorni obbligati* programme, and one which was certainly more restrictive); on the other, the Italian authorities wanted to send a message to *Mafiosi*, *'ndranghetisti*, *Camorristi* and *Sacristi* alike, asserting their own authority and putting their hitherto state of impunity in question.

In a rare evocation of sympathy, prisoners subject to the Article 41 regime have been at the centre of much controversy. In relation to the application of the regime to Rosario Gambino, a dangerous Italian mobster who migrated to the US in 1962, Judge D.D. Sitgraves stated in 2007 that ‘...coercion [which] is not related to any lawfully imposed sanction or punishment... constitutes torture’ (Popham, P., 2007, Fears of torture for Italian gangster, *the Independent*, 17th October⁵⁴). P. Joseph Sandoval, Gambino’s lawyer, concurred, stating that the judge was ‘...100 per cent correct... It’s a humanitarian issue. The prison conditions in his specific case will be life-threatening and life-shortening’ (*ibid.*). A report was also presented to the Italian government during a visit to Italy carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 14 to 26 September 2008. It was reported that:

This special detention regime applies to prisoners who have committed – or who are suspected of having committed – an offence in connection with mafia-type, terrorist or subversive organisations, and who are thought to be maintaining links with such organisations. At the end of the aforementioned visits, the CPT made several recommendations regarding these prisoners’ detention conditions, their regime and the procedures applied to them (<http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/ita/2010-12-inf-eng.htm>. Accessed 3/12/2010).

The report acknowledges that ‘the 41-*bis* regime was introduced in 1992 as a temporary emergency measure which limited out of cell activities, family visits, telephone access and group activities’ (*ibid.*). It clearly was not treated as temporary in reality. Recommendations included:

⁵⁴ <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/fears-of-torture-for-italian-gangster-397064.html>. Accessed 9/12/2010

Persons who have been detained – for whatever reason – are fully informed of their rights as from the very outset of their deprivation of liberty...The CPT calls upon the Italian authorities to take effective steps to ensure that all persons deprived of their liberty by law enforcement agencies are granted the right to notify a close relative or third party of their choice of their situation and the right of access to a lawyer, as from the very outset of their deprivation of liberty. These rights should be enjoyed not only by criminal suspects, but also by anyone who is under a legal obligation to attend – and stay at – a law enforcement establishment... The CPT calls upon the Italian authorities to take steps to improve the opportunities given to “41-bis” prisoners to maintain genuine human contact, whether with relatives (in particular children), fellow prisoners or members of staff. Such steps should be able to be taken without jeopardising the security of the establishment, and without facilitating contact between prisoners and the organisations to which they belong (<http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/ita/2010-12-inf-eng.htm>. Accessed 3/12/2010).

Furthermore, in 2003 Amnesty International published a report on the refugees’ human rights regime in Italy, focusing on the Italian prison system. In a section of the report on the subject of Article 41, it is stated that:

There was concern that the so-called 41-bis high-security regime, allowing a severe degree of isolation from the outside world, and applicable to prisoners held in connection with organized crime, could in certain instances amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3edb47d8c.html>. Accessed 9/12/2010).

Examining the evidence, it is clear that the ‘knee-jerk’ response to the assassinations of Falcone and Borsellino made way for legislation which contravened prisoners’ human rights. The establishment of the Guantanamo Bay detainment facility by the Bush administration in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks in 2001 was condemned by supranational bodies, including the EU, the Organization of American States, and non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International. Similarly, the Article 41 prison regime has come under attack. However, it *was* accepted publicly as a strong, authoritative response to a perceived threat which led to a general consensus, irrespective of the human rights issue at the core of the debate. What remains to explore, however, is the role that this judicial change had on Rogoli and his closest affiliates, as this will allow us to move closer to responding to our research

questions and hypotheses.

4.2. Early anti-*mafia* legislation applied in Puglia

Chapter Two illustrates the way in which, as a result of the *soggiorni obbligati* [forced resettlement] programme, Puglia became a proverbial breeding ground for members of the traditional *mafie*. Representatives from Sicily, Campania and Calabria were transferred to the region in a misplaced attempt to curb their operations. In fact, members of Cutolo's NCO were transferred to Puglia as *soggiornisti* directly as a result of the war with the rival Zaza clan (for more detail see Chapter Two), as judges ruled *only* separation would prevent further activity and avoid more deaths. However, this served only to instigate not only consolidated contacts with members of the local criminal underworld, but also to catalyse the birth of the first, true home-grown example of organised crime in the region.

Transferring members of the other *mafia*-style organisations into Puglia served to provide the locals with opportunities to learn and evolve, benefitting from this form of cross-organisational interaction. SCU *pentito* Annacondia claimed:

The *pugliese* criminal underworld is pretty dangerous and more advanced than the other three [*mafie*] because it absorbed all of the different mentalities, from the Sicilian Mafia, the *calabrese* 'ndrangheta and even the *campana* Camorra. Puglia was a field open to everyone. In all these years the association with these people meant that we absorbed their mentality and that is how the SCU came into being (*Commissione Parlamentare di Inchiesta sul Fenomeno della Mafia e sulle Associazioni Criminali Similari, Seduta del 30 luglio 1993, p. 2457*).

We can see the way in which the criminal underworld in the region was interacting with structural pressure in the form of the state counter-offensive move of transferring *soggiornisti*. The SCU counterparts across the *Mezzogiorno* succeeded in making the very programme which the state had introduced in an attempt to combat them work to their advantage. We must consider why it is that the *pugliesi* associates and Rogoli in particular, were not able to exploit this system and form a unified, cohesive and truly successful organisation. This is doubtless attributable to a failure on a more micro, or agency-influenced, level and our earlier findings

certainly support this notion. Puglia quickly transformed from an area considered not at-risk in terms of *mafia*-infiltration to one which was considered officially *at-risk*. We know that the SCU was finally declared to be a true *mafia*-style organisation in 1990. State intervention in the battle against organised crime has proven extremely effective in Italy. Nonetheless, the initial legislative project of *soggiorni obbligati* actually facilitated transplantation into the region and provided just the advantages which *pentito* Mutolo referred to. As the chapter progresses, we will investigate how and why further steps taken by the state to combat organised crime took their toll on the SCU and its associates, and, *in fact*, appear to have played a crucial role in the downfall of Rogoli's model.

The application of 416*bis* was highly efficient in Puglia, as closer inspection of the trials will illustrate. There was, regrettably, some delay in terms of state response to organised crime in the region. However, it was, ultimately, the application of 416*bis* which allowed for severe sentences to be handed down to affiliates of the organisation, Rogoli included, as of 1991. The mere application of this law was not enough, however, as SCU associates continued to be fully operative from their prison cells, as had been the case previously with the NCO and during the early years of the SCU. As such, further legislation was required to attempt to combat the persisting problem of *pugliese* criminality.

We know that a failure on the part of the state at least to some extent contributed to the growth of the phenomenon of organised crime in Puglia. Members of the local magistrates derogated the issue to one of 'local gossip' (*Commissione Parlamentare d'inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni similari*, p. 14, cited in Massari, 1998, p. 6), a vast underestimation which Massari argues meant that:

The SCU seemed almost to be aware of the level of impunity it enjoyed. The scarce care taken in relation to maintaining secrecy around the *sodalizio* [society] and its activities was well represented by the sheer volume of letters, documents, statutes and orders written by affiliates whilst incarcerated which were quickly confiscated when investigations into the organisation began (1998, p. 51).

Whilst this demonstrates an element of indifference in the face of the law, let us recall that it is also a demonstration of SCU affiliates' carelessness and disregard for crucial *mafia* values such as *omertà*. This trend of employing the written word continued from the days of Cutolo through

to Rogoli and his closest comrades. This amateurish approach provided the state with crucial evidence required to be able to prosecute on the basis of the new legislation which had been introduced.

The CPA had begun to investigate Puglia in an official capacity in 1989. Only in 1994 was the region declared to have developed from an 'at-risk' area to a zone which was inserted on 'the list considered to be characterised by 'traditional settlement' (Massari, 1998, pp. XV-XVI). Of the 1989 statement of concern on the part of the CPA, Massari writes:

Certainly, the level of danger of those local groups didn't lead one to think that what we were witnessing was a criminal occupation of the territory comparable to that of the traditional settlement areas. However, the statement was overdue, in order to ensure that "under-estimations, laziness, [and] dormancy" may be indefinitely overcome by an approach that was both necessarily cautious and adequately responsible (1998, p. 51).

The period between the introduction of 416*bis* and the application of the law to the SCU spanned a decade. During this time, there was a simultaneous growth of the organisation and a building case against it. Following the introduction of 416*bis*, Italian judges were far better equipped to deal with the phenomenon of organised crime. The case in Puglia was more complex than that of the so-called traditional *mafia* regions of the Italian south. The previous chapter outlined the most important events taking place in relation to SCU evolution as an organisation during this period so here we will examine the legal aspect of the debate; legislative steps and trials against Rogoli and the SCU, and the effect these had on the organisation itself.

If we consider legislation related to collaboration, we can consult statistics in order to construct a snapshot of the effect that legislative innovation had in the region. In numerical terms, the Camorra has suffered the most, losing 268 affiliates to *pentitismo*⁵⁵. Cosa Nostra comes next, having lost 230, followed by the 'ndrangheta with 101, the SCU with 85 and other criminal organisations with 101 in total⁵⁶. Cosa Nostra has an estimated 5,500 members, the

⁵⁵ http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2008/luglio/22/Nuovi_pentiti_piu_camorra_che_co_8_080722024.shtml Accessed 4/12/2010.

⁵⁶ http://www.camera.it/_bicamerale/leg15/commbicantimafia/documentazionetematica/25/schedabase.asp. Accessed 4/12/2010.

Camorra 6,700, the 'ndrangheta 6,000 and *pugliesi* groups 1,951⁵⁷. As such, from these figures we can see that the SCU has a high level of collaboration considering the size of the organisation in comparison with its contemporaries. The newly introduced legislation relating to *pentiti* caused a rise in collaboration, offering affiliates better security and guarantees in terms of treatment. It was, though, the application of counter-terrorist legislation to *mafiosi* which would have the most profound effect on Rogoli's SCU, and this shall form an integral part of our analysis of this period of the organisation's history.

These factors are all crucial to our understanding of the process of the state counter-offensive in relation to the SCU. We are trying to establish whether it was the eventual cohesion and determination of the judicial effort, representing structural influence, which prevented Rogoli's SCU from reaching the level of the other *mafia*-style organisations. Conversely, is it the case that more internal, agential factors were responsible? In the preceding period, before the judicial battle had really begun, we know that Rogoli had not achieved the qualitative leap required to enter into the mainstream. His organisation remained embedded within the marginalised criminal underworld. The organisation continued to evolve, seeming to return to its original configuration on the basis of local, ethnic, and kinship ties, as opposed to a centrally-organised hierarchy. Perhaps there was an opportunity for the organisation to adapt further still, and this may have facilitated the infiltration of the legal or semi-legal strata. For Rogoli, however, this was not to be the case as further analysis will demonstrate.

4.3. The early inter-maxi-trial period: collaborators begin to emerge as legislation comes into force

Shortly after the close of the trial (02/10/1991), two of Cosimo Cirfeta's boys, Fernando Manca and Dino Bruno, were killed as a result of the theft of a sum of money in the region of 700,000,000 *lire*, profits from drug dealing and illegal gambling houses (Sen. CdA 3, p. 57). As such, we can see that the organisation was dealing with increasingly large amounts of money. Further evidence for this is provided in an intercepted telephone conversation during which Cirfeta tells De Tommasi that they are awaiting payment of 30,000,000,000 *lire* to be reinvested into drug dealing (Sen. CdA 3, p. 1403). Further statistical data can also help us to gauge the scope of the organisation, as well as organisational activity, at this stage in time. The

⁵⁷ Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, 1998, cited in Jamieson, 2000, p. 105. Figures correct for 1997

EURISPES 1995 Report⁵⁸ provides us with further information in relation to drug confiscation across the Mezzogiorno, as illustrated by the following table:

Table 5: Drugs confiscated by region, 1992, EURISPES

| Eroina | 1992 |
|---------------------|-------------|
| Puglia | 191,285 |
| Campania | 28,187 |
| Calabria | 4,882 |
| Sicilia | 13,173 |
| Italia | 1.352,571 |
| Cocaina | |
| Puglia | 5,884 |
| Campania | 33,112 |
| Calabria | 4,858 |
| Sicilia | 4,394 |
| Italia | 1.387,339 |
| Cannabis (a) | |
| Puglia | 62,942 |
| Campania | 1.040,073 |
| Calabria | 188,146 |
| Sicilia | 2.149,154 |
| Italia | 23.203,693 |

The data refers to the confiscation of heroin, cocaine, and cannabis, this time during 1992, across the ‘at-risk’ regions of the Italian south. Although cannabis confiscation levels are very low in comparison with the other regions, cocaine is slightly higher than both Calabria and Sicily, but all are far behind the behemoth organisation operating in the field in Campania at that time. Heroin confiscation is interesting, however, as we can see that Puglia is far higher than all of the other regions. This spike could be explained by a resurgence in activity following the repressive maxi-trial period. However, it indicates the gravity of the *pugliese* situation, and helps us to understand that the organisation was certainly comparable to its contemporaries.

However, in more general terms following the first Lecce maxi-trial, *mafia*-related violence declined in Puglia in 1992. Some saw this as a demonstration of some form of pact between bosses, or a return to *pax mafiosa*. However, some *pentiti* attributed this to the state counter-offensive. Although murders began to decline, criminal activity was still rife. This is illustrated

⁵⁸ Rapporto Italia 1995, *Percorsi di ricerca nella società italiana*, EURISPES, p. 282
http://www.eurispes.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=575:rapporto-italia-1995&catid=47:rapporto-italia&Itemid=222 . Accessed 01/03/2012.

by the attempted bomb attack on the high-speed train service from Lecce to Zurich on the 5th January, 1992. Disaster was averted only because the bomb went off just seconds before the train was due to arrive (Anon, 1992, Bomba sui binari tra Lecce e Brindisi appena dopo il Milano Zurigo, *Corriere della Sera*, 6th January ⁵⁹). According to a study carried out by anti-*mafia* association *Libera* (2004), the aim of the attack was two-fold: to weaken Rogoli and his men by attributing the attack to them; and to punish the judges for the heavy sentences they had handed down (p. 120). According to the 1997 data from the second maxi-trial, Surbo boss Angelo Vincenti and his affiliates were responsible for the attack as a general act of revenge against the judges, as well as for the arrest of his son Giuseppe (Sen. CdA 3, p. 2835). In fact, it was as a result of *pentiti* statements that the authorities came to know the truth about events and subsequent charges were filed.

Nonetheless, the anger felt by the SCU associates did nothing to slow down the offensive on the part of the local judiciary; in the Lecce Appeal Court in 1992, the sentences actually increased as Rogoli's term went up to 25 years and many other non guilty verdicts were overturned (*Libera*, 2004, p. 120). The judicial data provides further information about the end of the first maxi-trial and the inter-trial period:

Between 1990 and 1992 the *sodalizio* underwent two important changes, but the positions held at the vertices never really changed at all. In September, 1990, wanting to formalise a sort of detachment from Rogoli's *leccesi* groups which had demonstrated his preference for the Padovano clan... De Tommasi and his affiliates gave life to the new organisation [the RDV] which represented an attempt, albeit one which went no further, to give the very same organisation a new guise. During the period between the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992 (during the maxi-trial second grade/appeal) there was an additional process of re-structuralisation of the organisation with the creation of two collegial organisms, the '*camera di controllo*' and the '*consiglio direttivo*' (or the Board of Control and the Board of Directors respectively, both derived from the 'ndrangheta with the aim of resolving conflict) and the simultaneous exclusion of Cirfeta who had been guilty of acquiring a large sum of money which belonged to the consortium (Sen. CdA 3, p. 150).

Although the first maxi-trial resulted in a definitive recognition of the SCU as a *mafia*-style

⁵⁹ http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/1992/gennaio/06/bomba_sui_binari_tra_Lecce_co_7_9201061481.shtml. Accessed 10/12/2010

organisation, it did little to quell the violence by which the region was blighted in the long term. Nor did the trial and its aftermath prevent individual *cosche* from operating. Already adept at running their clans from prison cells, the various *capi-zona* continued as before. This can be partially attributed to lax prison rules, but also to the fact that they had been acting undetected for so many years that they had been able to develop vital survival skills. Furthermore, what the data tell us about this period provides further detail on the re-structuralisation of the organisation, following on from our own analysis of the RDV. The introduction of more collegial organisms represents yet another attempt of SCU associates to mimic the traditional *mafie*. However, this attempt to regroup and reorganise was to be short-lived, as external or structural pressures interfere and deliver a crushing blow to Rogoli's SCU forever.

The aforementioned collaboration with the authorities and the introduction of the Article 41 prison regime played a crucial role in SCU progress, or lack thereof. The first SCU affiliates chose to collaborate 'in May 1991 [when] the *mafiosità* of the SCU was finally recognised by the Lecce Court of Assizes...[and] The first [steps towards] collaboration took place the day after this historic sentence was handed down' (Massari & Motta, 2003, p. 165). The significance here is patent as 'early deflections were facilitated by...heavy sentences passed down by judges' (*ibid.*). Moreover, with the introduction of the rigorous prison regime which was being rolled out, including in relation to SCU members, even those at the very top of the organisation began to 'turn'. In 2006, Judge Motta told the author:

Alessandro Macchia was the first SCU *pentito* in July 1992. 1993 saw Luca Picone, Maurizio Cagnazzo and Cosimo Cinfeta collaborate...From the vertices of the SCU, they all collaborated: De Tommasi, Cagnazzo, Cinfeta, Macchia, and Dell'Anna. Out of five of the main bosses, three collaborated (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006).

Pentiti statements also led to the discovery of large arms stores which were subsequently confiscated, including arsenals of bombs, anti-tank weapons, rifles, machine guns, pistols and ammunition (*Libera*, 2004, p. 121). Rapid changes took place at the heart of the organisation as they began to lose further control. Collaboration cannot simply be attributed to judicial pressure, however. The act of collaboration instigates further collaboration; once the chain of *pentitismo* begins to emerge (Motta, in conversation with the author, 30/01/2006), an affiliate understands, particularly if those close to him have given information to the authorities, that he is sure to receive a very harsh sentence. This may lead him to seek to collaborate, thus ensuring his own relative liberty. A more in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of *pentitismo* will be presented as

the chapter progresses.

Here let us examine some of the statistical data related to collaboration with the authorities and the Article 41 regime in order to search for emerging trends and patterns⁶⁰. The aforesaid polemic surrounding the harsh prison regime has done nothing to halt its advancement. In 2010, there were 681 prisoners held under the Article 41 regime in Italy, among which 678 were men, including 267 members of the Camorra, 210 Cosa Nostra affiliates and 22 *pugliesi* representatives.⁶¹ Jamieson (2000) writes:

The number of collaborators grew exponentially throughout 1993 and continued to rise for the following two years...the trend is attributed to three specific factors: the Supreme Court verdict of January 1992 which conferred juridical validity on the testimonies of the state's witnesses in the maxi-trial, the incentive to collaborate provided by new legislation and the harsh prison regime which the 41 *bis* regulations imposed....From July 1992 until 30 June 1996 over 5 per cent of all 41 *bis* prisoners had decided to collaborate (Source: *Direzione Investigativa Antimafia*, semi-annual report, June 1996, p. 22. Cited in Jamieson, 2000, p. 104).

Jamieson explores the statistics and motivations behind collaboration, and her assessment of the phenomenon can be linked to our own analysis of the effect of structural pressure on organised crime in Puglia. Indeed, already driven to collaborate following improved legislative support for *pentiti*, the introduction of the prison regime drove more affiliates to collaborate from across the *Mezzogiorno* as a result of its harsh nature, and Puglia was no exception. Jamieson states

If the estimates...are accurate...in 1997 Cosa Nostra collaborators represented 6.6 per cent of the total membership of the organization, those of the United Holy Crown⁶² 4.76 per cent, of the 'ndrangheta 2.73 per cent and of the Camorra 2.67 per cent, figures which belie the popular view of Cosa Nostra as the most impermeable and disciplined of the four crime groups. (2000, pp. 104-105)


⁶⁰ http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_15.wp?previousPage=mg_7_7&contentId=LEG49585, accessed 12/03/2011; <http://www.altrodiritto.unifi.it/ricerche/misure/fontanel/cap2.htm#h3>, accessed 30/04/2011

⁶¹ Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, 1998, cited in Jamieson, 2000, p. 105. Figures correct for 1997

⁶² The English translation of the name Sacra Corona Unita.

Combining data sourced from the Parliamentary Antimafia Commission⁶³, we have been able to create the graph below, indicating trends in collaboration of the four Italian *mafie*.

Figure 12: Collaborators, 1995-2007



Whilst the data has its limits, it does provide us with some useful information about collaboration within the rival organisations, as well as the SCU. The data indicates that Rogoli's organisation had considerably fewer collaborators than the other three organisations. Considering the size difference, that does not come as a surprise as the SCU is the smallest in terms of membership.

The same can be said for the number of prisoners subject to the Article 41 regime, but proportionality must be borne in mind. The figures relating to the percentage of members of each organisation subject to the Article 41 regime are revealing in that we can see that Cosa Nostra has a somewhat higher percentage in comparison to the other associations, and particularly in relation to the SCU. However, if we consider the difference in time span of one to the other, it is clear that the severity of crimes committed may be vastly different. Another possible conclusion to be drawn from the data can be made for the year of 1997, when the highest percentage of collaborators came from Cosa Nostra at 6.60% with both the Camorra and

63 http://www.camera.it/_bicamerale/leg15/commbicantimafia/documentazionetematica/25/schedabase.asp#datistatistici. Accessed 9/01/2011.

'ndrangheta at less than half this figure, at 2.67% and 2.73% respectively. The Sacra Corona Unita came mid-way between these extremes at 4.76%. This gives credence to earlier assumptions that Cosa Nostra and the SCU as organisations are more susceptible to collaboration in comparison to the Camorra and the 'ndrangheta. Jamieson writes:

[These figures] suggest that proportionally, Cosa Nostra has been more damaged by the efforts of law enforcement and by internal conflict, or by a confluence of the factors described above, than the other organizations. The strategy of divide and rule practised successfully by Totò Riina to win supremacy for the Corleonesi after the second Mafia war and the strategy of massacres undertaken in his name in 1992-1993 may contain the seeds of Cosa Nostra's temporary or even definitive fragmentation. The higher percentage of UHC [or SCU] collaborators may be related to the fact that it is relatively new within the organized crime spectrum- having been founded only in 1980- and therefore has less tradition to defend. The low percentages of the Camorra and 'ndrangheta may be due to the extreme fragmentation of the former, such that would-be collaborators are less able to provide relevant contribution to investigations; in the case of the latter, the fact that biological families form the core of the 'ndrangheta has created a greater impermeability and reluctance to collaborate (2000. pp. 105-106).

Jamieson's claims are interesting, and go some way to helping us to understand the connection between the organisations themselves and their susceptibility to the phenomenon of collaboration. However, if we are to analyse the role the anti-SCU state counter-offensive played on the evolution of Rogoli's organisation, we need to look beyond the statistical data and examine the *pugliese* situation more closely. When this has been done, we can assess if there is a direct link between structural pressure and Rogoli's demise, or if his situation was already so vulnerable before legislative change took place to render these factors less relevant.

4.4. Rogoli's SCU and its collaborators: why did they decide to turn?

Currently (2011), 22 *pugliesi* prisoners are subject to the Article 41 regime, including SCU founder Pino Rogoli. Motivations behind a prisoner's inclusion under the regime include a refusal to collaborate, potential danger to the public, likelihood of recidivism or significance of role in the criminal organisation. In Puglia, by the time the law had changed, hundreds of defendants had already been tried for crimes related to *mafia*-association and SCU membership.

However, the introduction of the prison regime caused ructions among detainees and, as threats were made to *pugliesi* prisoners, the *catena di pentitismo* (Motta in conversation with the author, 30/01/2006), or chain of collaboration, began to unravel. It is not enough, though, to simply attribute collaboration and organisational difficulties to judicial pressure. Rather, a more thorough investigation of factors accounting for *pentitismo* is necessary to create a full picture of this period of SCU history.

In terms of a broad list of motivations behind SCU affiliates' collaboration, an analysis of our empirical material has led to the conclusion that the principal motivational factors are:

- Response to judicial pressure and legislative change;
- Disillusionment with organisational changes;
- Fear, be it for one's own life or that of family members, or of undue punishment;
- Notion of morality (doing the 'right' thing) and a desire for normality; and
- Influence of the family, in particular wives and mothers.

When attempting to assess the nature of the connection between judicial pressure and organisational decline, it is crucial that we identify all of the relevant factors behind the decision to collaborate within the SCU, and the effect this collaboration has on the organisation as a whole. Massari & Motta (2003) state:

The SCU attempted to shroud itself with an identity inspired by traditional *mafia* culture, [but] close investigation has revealed an insight which is quite different as a result of the extreme socio-cultural heterogeneity of the affiliates, scarce secrecy, low-level hold of the associative bond, [and] a deeply utilitarian vocation....These factors have been...partially responsible for the origins of a growing feeling of disillusionment on the part of many affiliates who then chose to collaborate with the authorities (p. 164).

The authors indicate that agential variables may have determined the decision to collaborate. Nonetheless, the organisational configuration of the SCU may also be part of the explanation.

Let us recall that, according to our statistics, Cosa Nostra affiliates were most likely to collaborate. As Jamieson suggests, this contradicts the accepted notion of the oldest of all of the Italian *mafie* as the most impenetrable, and in which the fear of punishment for betrayal would be the greatest. However, we must consider the organisational structure of the clans as relevant to the decision to collaborate; perhaps the organisational configurations of those clans with a smaller percentage of collaborators do make a difference to the decision-making process. We must also examine if fragmentation means collaboration is less likely simply because, as Jamieson suggests, they can offer less relevant and useful information so are less likely to be offered a 'deal'. If it is truly the case that strong, blood ties by which the 'ndrangheta is underpinned mean that affiliates are far less likely to collaborate, we must investigate how best we can interpret SCU collaboration. As Massari & Motta note, its members are heterogeneous. We consider that the shared experiences within the prison system were enough to provide the earliest affiliates with some form of collective identity. Perhaps, though, a more extensive recruitment programme did indeed lead to the creation of an organisation within which the members had so little in common beyond their own *cosche* to render any associative bond non-existent. Did the move further away from a hierarchical model, as per Rogoli's initial mission, to a more network-based, fluid and *ad hoc* organisational configuration mean that there was simply not enough of a connection between members of the wider organisation to prevent the emergence of turncoats? Perhaps the very nature of such organisations is just as relevant as these other variables. A closer inspection of collaboration within the SCU from a qualitative perspective will allow us to draw some useful conclusions.

4.5. SCU collaborators speak for themselves

When asked of his opinion on other collaborators, *pentito* Maurizio Cagnazzo responded:

When Cosimo Cirfeta collaborated, I found out and sent some of my men to his home town, Salice, under instruction to kill any of his family if they saw them. To me, they were a disgrace, worthless. If someone collaborates, it means they were *always* on the other side! Before I collaborated, I had never even spoken to a copper (Interview with Maurizio Cagnazzo, 30th October 1990, p. 496, cited in *Dalla mafia allo stato*, Gruppo Abele, EGA, Torino, 2005).

Cagnazzo is brutally honest in his admission that he had previously ordered the death of a

collaborator before he himself turned state's witness. This is indicative of the degree of conflict surrounding the issue of collaboration, and supports our theory that fear of death is rife within the organisation. Further, it illustrates some of the norms and values by which the SCU is underpinned as the decision to collaborate is punishable by death. Cagnazzo continues, stating:

[After]...Falcone and Borsellino were assassinated...We knew straight away that this would be a turning point, the state was never going to stand back and let it happen. It was after the first maxi-trial that the prosecutor made an important move against the *Leccesi cosche*; they sent me, De Tommasi and Cirfeta to Buoncammino prison in Cagliari, where they only have tiny cells and little walkways. We were already under strict AGS surveillance, because we were considered highly dangerous, but it was far worse there. I was in Cagliari prison when, watching the TV, I saw minister Martelli talking about the law of Article 41*bis*: strict confinement. It was incredible. After two hours, the director called me and said "Look, we have this piece of paper with a long list of names: Cagnazzo, Calò, De Tommasi." They had decided on the first group of fifty or so prisoners, those they thought were the most dangerous, and they took everything away from them. We already had next to nothing, but they even took my coffee away, meetings were only once a month, as a result of which life had become really hard. And I was in isolation, no-one ever saw anyone: if I called the guard, they would only come after two or three hours. I think that's what they were told to do, but I only got that later. I used to get chairs or stools and throw them at things, so then I was just left without a chair or stool, but nobody ever came. After that, Cirfeta left to go to trial but he never came back. After a while we found out that he had started to collaborate. De Tommasi was moved into a special prison, too, and I stayed there for three or four months totally on my own. That was when I started to reflect (Interview with Maurizio Cagnazzo, 30th October 1990, pp. 494-495, cited in *Dalla mafia allo stato*, Gruppo Abele, EGA, Torino, 2005).

Cagnazzo's candid statements are revealing and can help us to better understand the process of collaboration within the SCU. He states that members at the vertices of the *leccesi cosche* were approached directly by members of the prison authorities. This indicates some form of strategy on the part of the director of the prison, and one which the affiliates had recognised was in place. Cagnazzo specifically cites the brutality of the Article 41 prison regime as relevant to his decision to collaborate, having already experienced harsh prison conditions and struggled to cope. Moreover, he states that, on hearing the news that a close affiliate had chosen to

collaborate, he himself began to reflect. This gives credence to the theory concerning the chain of collaboration. Further considering the motivations behind his collaboration, Cagnazzo claims:

I must admit that 41*bis* did influence me, given that I could never see my son again, that I couldn't manage my own life. But it was also because of the law on collaborators: that gave me faith, I realised it was something serious because, honestly, given my position, if I ended up out on the streets I would be meat for the butcher. I also found really humane people working in the protection services. First of all, I was in a different place and there was a guy from the service who was near retirement age, around 62-63 years old, and he was someone who truly helped me. Above all, there was no prejudice. Straight away they told me "You, stay in your place, do what you have to, behave, and nobody will judge you for what you have done" Really professional and that was important (Interview with Maurizio Cagnazzo, 30th October 1990, p. 496, cited in *Dalla mafia allo stato*, Gruppo Abele, EGA, Torino, 2005).

Cagnazzo cites not only the role of Article 41 but also the aforesaid legislation relating to collaborators as factors behind his decision to become a *pentito*. This is crucial as it indicates that the legislative steps inspired by Falcone and Borsellino were effective and achieved the goals that they had aspired to. Moreover, his acknowledgement of the difficulty posed by the prison regime is more evidence supporting its role in SCU collaboration which struck such a crucial blow to the organisation in the lead up to the second maxi-trial.

Along with legislative change, other possible reasons behind collaboration are numerous, and interviews with SCU associates can provide us with greater insight. Data from the second maxi-trial states that Alessandro Macchia, the first SCU *pentito*:

Decided to confess his crimes and accuse his friends for a series of motives "...surely including the prospect of serving a very long prison sentence handed down during the maxi-trial...We can also add to this a plausible belief in the knowledge that his role within the organisation had been lost. In fact, Macchia himself claimed 'it didn't exist any more, that hierarchy let's say that used to exist...those values didn't exist...the hierarchies...where everyone stuck to his own role.'" (Sen. CdA 3)

This demonstrates Macchia collaborating in response to his perceived notion of loss of control and organisational decline, reflecting his disillusionment with what the SCU had become. Furthermore, his explicit reference to the structure of the organisation tells us two things: firstly, that affiliates themselves considered the earliest form of a SCU to be a hierarchy; and, secondly, that they themselves were aware of structural changes that had taken place. This indicates that the changes that had taken place in terms of organisational configuration did not necessarily occur as a result of a conscious, collective decision. Indeed, there were some affiliates who disliked the disintegration of the hierarchy that made way for the emerging network structure. Macchia also refers to the loss of key values, and this is interesting in that it is an expression of an affiliate resisting change, longing for the ‘old days’ when there was order, strict rules and regulations and clear guidelines.

An additional SCU affiliate was interviewed in 1999 and his perspective on the phenomenon of *pentitismo* in the SCU can provide further evidence for motivational factors behind the decision to collaborate. Antonio Tagliente, who collaborated in 1994, was born in Brindisi and affiliated to the SCU in 1990 (p. 508, cited in *Dalla mafia allo stato*, Gruppo Abele, EGA, Torino, 2005). When asked what reasons had pushed him to collaborate, Tagliente responded:

I had lost trust in a lot of the people around me. Eventually I was able to say enough’s enough. At the end of the day we are all being used by other people just to commit terrible crimes...I even had to keep an eye on my best friend, who had come to kill me. That was when I lost trust in the organisation. In that sense, they were the traitors, not me, because they betrayed my trust. They talked about coherence, compatibility, [and] loyalty, but I never saw any of that (*ibid.* p. 512).

Tagliente had less of an important role than Cagnazzo within the organisation. That is not to say, however, that his views are not of equal value in terms of our understanding of the SCU. In an organisation which has developed and appears to be bound ever more by social ties, rather than by those of a traditional hierarchy, fear of betrayal among best friends must have had a devastating effect on internal relations. What Tagliente’s statement tells us is that he, too, had become disillusioned with what the SCU had become, as trust had broken down and he feared for his life. Perhaps affiliates also felt that they had lost a sense of belonging as any cohesion which was in place originally, even in an extremely heterogeneous group, had been destroyed. The market-style model which appears to have emerged, within which rival factions appeared to

be only very loosely linked with very little observance of any overarching authority was not what all affiliates wanted. This was another problem faced by the wider organisation in relation with the decision to collaborate. Moreover, as established hierarchies fell apart, as Macchia stated, individual affiliates lost their roles, and subsequently their authority; we must consider what was left for them to gain at this stage. We can see that there does indeed appear to be a link emerging between organisational configuration and collaboration. Cagnazzo, however, contradicts this notion stating:

I'm the only one, in my group I mean, who was still firmly in his role when I decided to collaborate. I never thought 'I've already lost my group', or anything like that. The initial push was my family (Interview with Maurizio Cagnazzo, 30th October 1990, p. 496, cited in *Dalla mafia allo stato*, Gruppo Abele, EGA, Torino, 2005).

The collaborator refutes the notion that organisational breakdown influenced his decision, citing the importance of his family in the first instance. However, this most likely reflects his own status within the organisation. As one of the founding members and a feared and respected boss who, at this early stage, would have been less susceptible to the effects of the organisation's gradual fragmentation, Cagnazzo plays a very specific role.

Aside from structural pressure in the form of legislative innovation and the threat of the harsh prison regime, fear of death can be responsible for collaboration. Cosimo Capodieci was an early SCU *pentito*, and he claimed:

I knew in my case, that is to say my death sentence, was going to be *lupara bianca*⁶⁴ (*Memorale del collaboratore di giustizia* Cosimo Capodieci, s.d., p. 65, cited in Massari, 1998, p. 55).

Fear for personal safety (and for that of one's family) is clearly a motivational factor behind the decision to collaborate, as affiliates feel the burden of strong psychological pressure. As such, *Pentito* Spagnolo said:

⁶⁴ *Lupara bianca* is a term used in Italy to refer to a *mafia*-related murder when the body is never found.

I didn't feel safe any more so I decided to collaborate [in January, 1993]...I wanted out... I was afraid of what was going on inside, [of the murders]. (Sen. CdA 3, p. 130).

Additional factors emerge from further analysis of *pentiti* statements, such as fear of undue punishment, betrayal and, ultimately, death. *Pentito* Salerno said:

I decided [to collaborate]...more than one of the other defendants who was close to me....said they were ready to grass, if Cafiero had started talking he was definitely ready to grass. So, given that I thought I was just a tiny bit, not loads, but a tiny bit more intelligent than they were, I thought that was the moment that I should do it, too, also the fact that I was the only one that had never killed anyone...By that point I was really disappointed in everybody, because I reckon betrayal, it doesn't just mean being a disgrace like I am being here now. Betrayal also means trying to kill your friends...They wanted to kill Gianfreda, and Totò Rizzo because he owed them money, they were talking about killing Fanelli because he didn't want to carry the drugs around...Me and Mazzotta got out of there, we said "It's every man for himself now."...In prison we all pretend to stand together, so people see you together and don't attack you, but I'm not on their side anymore...I didn't do it to not do 10 years behind bars. That's what I'm going to do as a *pentito* anyway...I don't want to be part of anything, because I've got it now...there are too many dirty tricks, so I thought it was better to change paths and I am happy that that is what I did (Sen. CdA 3, p. 98).

Salerno cites the notion of a *catena di pentitismo* to which Motta referred. Further, he indicates that he was afraid of being punished for more serious crimes than those which he had committed. Salerno's statement tells us that the concept of betrayal lay at the heart of his decision to collaborate, as did his desire to return to a 'normal' life. His statement about pretence is also interesting; in prison they lead others to believe that they were united but, personally and beyond the prison walls, it was no longer the case. This represents another example of SCU affiliates appreciating the resonance and weight the reputation of the organisation could afford them. It also supports our findings in the earlier chapters in relation to a lack of organisational cohesion and a preference to transmit the *façade* of unity. *Pentito* Mazzotta claimed:

[Salerno] asked me to collaborate [with him]...because so many of the other defendants

were... They were all trying to find out who wanted to 'sing'. Some in secret, but others talked openly about it... [Salerno] kept telling me over and over that he couldn't get his head around what was going on in the cells any more. 'Cause they were talking about betrayal and disgrace...I decided to collaborate...'Cause I couldn't be in the middle of all of it any more... [Salerno] told me he hadn't started to collaborate yet and after I said "Ok! Let's grass. Make the call" and then he tells me he had already done it. [He kept it hidden, even from me] Just in case I said no (Sen. CdA 3, p. 105).

From Mazzotta's statement we may ascertain that there was at least some form of openness surrounding the decision to turn state's witness. He and Salerno made the choice together, and he also supports our theory that the desire to remove oneself from a life of crime was pressing affiliates to take the ground-breaking step. Indeed, Mazzotta and Salerno both indicate a desire to 'get out', or return to normality. Statements made by Gianni Tornese reiterate this:

[I spoke to my wife before I got arrested] I was talking to her and I said 'Is this really gonna carry on? You'll see sooner or later it's gonna blow up in our faces and well all be in prison for stuff we haven't done"...Alright, I could've got three years for cocaine, a couple more for the gun but not one hundred years for murders I didn't do...that changed everything. (Sen. CdA 3)

Tornese reiterates the desire to avoid prosecution, and subsequent harsh prison sentences, as affiliates recognised how they could potentially have been affected by the *catena di pentitismo*. The notion of self-preservation and survival emerges once again. Moreover, the discussion he had with his wife which he refers to indicates their shared desire to leave it behind and return to normality.

4.6. The role of women and the family in SCU decline via collaboration

In an article written in 2003, Massari & Motta consider the role of women in the SCU, stating that their principal functions are those of debt-collector and messenger or postwoman. It is clear that, on a day-to-day basis, women did indeed carry out these roles, according to which they passed messages and picked up and collected deliveries of money, narcotics, or other goods according to demand. However, Cagnazzo is one of many SCU collaborators who explicitly

state that women in their family had a relevant part in their decision to collaborate. It is thus apparent that a combination of judicial repression, which had brought about the harsh prison regime, along with pressure from female family members, be they wives or mothers, increased collaboration in the organisation. Clearly the two causes are interconnected; women were more likely to encourage affiliates to collaborate directly as a result of the likelihood of them being subject to Article 41, which would have a profound negative effect on family life. We also need to consider attitudes towards collaboration generally, as members of other *mafie* do not appear to have come under the same pressure from female relatives as SCU members. This is possibly simply as a result, as suggested by Jamieson, of a lack of tradition and entrenchment, and accordingly less history to protect. Conversely, one could argue that it is more closely connected with the organisational structure; the by-now warring, loosely connected conglomerate of *cosche* was not bound by the same loyalty ties.

Let us look again to the *pentiti* statements which can offer us an internal perspective on the role of women and the family in the process of organisational breakdown. When asked how he made the decision to collaborate, Cagnazzo replied:

I remember my wife came to visiting hours on Christmas Eve. Given that she missed her flight, she spent Christmas Day on the train to come to see me. My son was 5 years old and he asked why his uncle was at home and I never was. So, it wasn't that my wife told me to do it, particularly given that she knew what I was about. But, when she came she used to say "It's every man for himself now". So, suddenly, I decided to collaborate. In March, 1993, I decided to take the first step. Actually, it was when my wife came to see me [again] that I told her to go to the prosecutors to tell them. I had thought about it for two months, and I can assure you that I was shaking like a leaf the first time I went to talk to the judge. I was doing something that not even I knew how to deal with. I was also really embarrassed, because it was Dr. Motta, and Dr. Mandoi, who I had threatened over and over again during the trials. My wife told me she went to the prosecutors' office where she was well known. There was a *Carabiniere* in the corridor and she told him she wanted to speak to Prosecutor Stasi, just as I told her to do. The prosecutor wasn't there, though, so Judge Mandoi came forward, with a cigar in his mouth, and asked her "What is it, madam?" to which she replied "My husband asked me if you might want to go to talk to him". Straight away he seemed a bit off, then he made a few phone calls...He was definitely saying "Cagnazzo has decided" and initially they treated me very *carefully*, let's say (Interview with Maurizio Cagnazzo,

30th October 1990, p. 496, cited in *Dalla mafia allo stato*, Gruppo Abele, EGA, Torino, 2005).

Cagnazzo's statements are of significant value to our research. He begins by stating that his wife didn't try to convince him to collaborate as she knew what sort of man he was. Motta told the author that 'he was just as serious a collaborator as he was a *mafioso*' (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006), so the decision to betray the organisation which he was so committed to was not one to be taken lightly. However, Cagnazzo mentions his wife repeatedly, and talks empathetically of her suffering. This indicates that, whilst she did not attempt to coerce him into collaboration, she certainly influenced his decision to do so.

Tagliente also refers to the role played by his wife:

All she wanted was to see me out of it all...She absolutely supported my choice...Sure, [I discussed things with her] but not specifics. A while after I started to collaborate they tried to kill my wife's brother, who only just survived. They did it to try to get my wife to turn against me. The famous *manoeuvres*, that's what I call them; trying to get her to turn against me, up to the point that my wife asked me to stop collaborating, 'cause she thought they were going to kill her whole family (Sen. CdA 3, p. 513).

The collaborator restates the role of a female family member in his decision-making process, just as Cagnazzo had before him. He also cites fear for the safety of his family, and so we are again presented with evidence which can help us to understand the reasons behind collaboration in the SCU. Tagliente continues:

My mother was so, so happy. She never told anyone anything. She was ashamed of us; myself and my brother. Both my mother's and father's families were good people, they were poor but sound...My mother came with me [when I had to move], and so did my sisters. They came from a good background, they had homes, jobs, they had to leave it all behind. (Sen. CdA 3, p. 514)

Thus, the role of family ties is again made clear, as his reference to his mother's satisfaction relating to his decision to turn state's witness.

Further examples of SCU affiliates citing family, or specifically wives and mothers, behind their decision to collaborate include Luca Picone and Vincenzo Cafiero. The latter states

I saw my wife and children when I was in prison...what else was I supposed to do?...So I told my wife, I said when I was out I couldn't come home because they would've killed me, I carry on killing or they'll kill me, so I decided to collaborate (Sen. CdA 3, p. 75).

Similarly, Picone said:

I did it because I wanted out...it wasn't a sudden decision, I had decided in Lecce prison in 1992...I had had the chance to take a look at myself, at what I had done, in a different light, to really get to know those around me, to get to know them properly...I hadn't spoke to my parents for years... but my mother did everything she could to get me out of there because she's an honest person, someone who had always followed the law...I always told her I was innocent...I promised her it would end...but I knew deep down that I couldn't have kept the promises, they would never have let me...I wanted to try to get out, to go somewhere else, to make something of myself...Luckily they put me under house-arrest, but I was still in contact with them all of the time...They wanted to arrest me for bombing the court house...I've gotta say I didn't want to collaborate straight away, because I didn't want to destroy my father's life, he had worked for so many years, got himself a house, I didn't want to make him have to leave it all behind...Also I didn't want to because I knew they would interview me...My mother would find out everything I had done, all the crimes I had committed...But she told me to go ahead and do it (Sen. CdA 3, p. 141).

Our primary data supports the theory that family influence has more of an effect in the case of the SCU, given that affiliates are less bound by the ties of their own organisation, particularly after the demise of the hierarchy which had originally been put into place. Moreover, given that at this stage the SCU lacks any serious form of central authority and much of the activity carried out is opportunistic and *ad hoc*, affiliates who collaborate are tempted to ensure their own safety and security, at the cost of that of the organisation. Furthermore, the statements of various *pentiti* indicate that in many cases they were first-generation criminals, therefore their parents were not prepared to support continuing adherence to a criminal organisation. Here we see how

a newcomer organisation, when faced with judicial repression at a relatively early stage, is unable to rely on strong inter-generational ties of support, unlike more traditional and long-standing *mafie*. This is a reminder to the state that newcomers need to be contrasted effectively even when they seem to present fewer dangers than other criminal groups precisely because the rate of successful repression is higher in their case, as criminal values have not sedimented across generations.

This SCU trend is very much at odds with the notion of the role of the mother in Camorra members or associates, for example. We need only recall the case of Rita Atria⁶⁵ to understand that the decision to collaborate with the authorities is not always met with such joy by female kin. Indeed, if we compare the example of the SCU with the other traditional Italian *mafie*, above all Cosa Nostra and the 'ndrangheta, we can see anomalies emerging. For these organisations, the role of one's *mafia* family is considered to supersede that of your blood family. When the so-called '10 commandments' of the *mafioso* (Anon, 2007, I dieci comandamenti del mafioso, *la Repubblica*, 7th November⁶⁶) were discovered in 2007, the dictum which states 'Always being available for Cosa Nostra is a duty - even if your wife is about to give birth' indicates that blood family ties are to be overlooked in the face of loyalty to your own *cosca* or organisation. In fact, Dickie (2004) states:

Mafia families and blood families are distinct entities...Indeed, since Cosa Nostra is a secret organization, it has a rule that its members must not tell their blood family members anything about its affairs (p. 11).

We can see that secrecy is paramount to Italian criminal organisations, even at the cost of betraying your own family. If it is indeed the case, in Cosa Nostra at least, that '[as] Investigators...learned...the Brotherhood regarded the bond between its members as more sacred than family ties' (Dickie, *ibid.*, p. 80), then we need to consider where the fundamental differences lie between the SCU and its contemporaries.

All of these statements have provided us with a more in-depth understanding of the

⁶⁵ Rita Atria was the daughter of Mafioso Vito Atria and sister of Nicolò Atria, both killed as a result of their criminal activity, whose gravestone was destroyed by her own mother after her suicide in 1992. Source: http://archivioistorico.corriere.it/1992/novembre/22/affronto_Rita_pentita_suicida_tomba_co_0_921_12211071.shtml Accessed 12/01/2011.

⁶⁶ http://www.corriere.it/cronache/07_novembre_07/decalogo_mafia_palermo.shtml. Accessed 12/1/2011

phenomenon of *pentitismo* in the SCU. It now remains to examine what effect this had on the organisation during the lead up to the next maxi-trial in 1997. This will allow us to analyse what the consequences were of the widespread decision to collaborate and the outcome of this *svolta* in organisational terms.

4.7. Preparations for the next trial are underway as fragmentation continues

Following the wave of collaborators which emerged after the first maxi trial closed, local judges began to build a case for the second maxi-trial on the basis on the *pentiti* statements. In the period following the first trial, Judge Motta reported that the Tornese faction took the upper hand and became the dominant force over the territory, although the De Tommasi clan had been expected to do so. (Motta, cited in Mariano, 2002, p. 112) Nonetheless, after the end of the first trial, we see the rise of the De Tommasi clan in and around Lecce and to the north of the city, the Tornese clan to the west, and the Padovano clan in southern Salento.




Figure 13. Map indicating Puglia



Figure 14. Map of Salento (Source: google.co.uk)

The De Tommasi clan suffered from widespread heavy sentences when the original maxi-trial came to a close and this meant, in practical terms at least, that they were less capable of organisation and subsequent criminal activity during this period. As such, Tornese and his affiliates were able to seize control from their rivals (Motta, cited in Mariano, 2002, p. 112). Motta attributes this to organisational structure and make-up; unlike the De Tommasi clan, the

Tornese *cosca* was made up of affiliates who were blood relatives, similar to *calabresi cosche* [Calabrian clans]. This undoubtedly rendered them more cohesive and impermeable (Motta, cited in Mariano, 2002, p. 112).

It was not only as a result of heavy sentences handed down in the aftermath of the first trial that caused the De Tommasi clan to disintegrate. The strict prison regime encouraged affiliates to collaborate, instigating further organisational breakdown. Motta stated that the De Tommasi clan lost $\frac{3}{4}$ of the members at the upper vertices of the organisation, and many others who had made up the lower levels of the 'hierarchy' (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006). Conversely, the Tornese clan's losses were only marginal, with just two peripheral members collaborating, who were relatively unimportant members and whose contribution [to the state counter-offensive as *pentiti*] was to be minimal (*ibid.*). As a result of the widespread collaboration in the De Tommasi clan, it was practically destroyed during the second trial. The Tornese clan came out relatively unscathed. In fact, the Tornese clan was so well insulated that it was almost impossible to identify individuals responsible for the 45 murders they were charged with (Motta, cited in Mariano, 2002, p. 112). It was only when the second maxi-trial was almost over that an important member of the Tornese clan finally decided to become a *pentito*, leading to further collaborations of close affiliates. This is in keeping with our earlier findings on the chain of *pentitismo*, and the investigations into that group were able to be effectively carried out, and individual criminals identified for specific crimes. (Motta, cited in Mariano, 2002, p. 112).

The 1995 EURISPES⁶⁷ Italy Report outlines clandestine *bische* [illegal gambling houses] discovered between 1989-1993 and the figures can reveal more information about the *pugliese* situation during the period leading up to the second maxi-trial.

⁶⁷ Rapporto Italia 1995, *Percorsi di ricerca nella società italiana*, EURISPES, p. 267.
http://www.eurispes.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=575:rapporto-italia-1995&catid=47:rapporto-italia&Itemid=222 . Accessed 01/03/2012.

Table 6: Clandestine *bische* discovered by region, 1989-1993, EURISPES

| Regioni | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Abruzzo | 3 | 14 | 22 | 60 | 23 |
| Basilicata | - | - | - | 1 | 2 |
| Calabria | 7 | 5 | 14 | 9 | 1 |
| Campania | 122 | 126 | 127 | 140 | 149 |
| Emilia Romagna | 25 | 31 | 27 | 26 | 28 |
| Friuli V.G. | 1 | 4 | 2 | - | 1 |
| Lazio | 4 | 138 | 168 | 221 | 237 |
| Liguria | 5 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 7 |
| Lombardia | 23 | 4 | 18 | 27 | 28 |
| Marche | 17 | 17 | 21 | 17 | 38 |
| Molise | - | - | 1 | 1 | - |
| Piemonte | 13 | 14 | 9 | 6 | 9 |
| Puglia | 44 | 99 | 20 | 61 | 49 |
| Sardegna | - | - | - | 1 | - |
| Sicilia | 92 | 39 | 151 | 210 | 73 |
| Toscana | 14 | 13 | 23 | 21 | 37 |
| Trentino A.A. | - | - | 2 | - | - |
| Umbria | 13 | 5 | 12 | 7 | 9 |
| Valle d'Aosta | - | - | - | - | - |
| Veneto | 7 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 8 |
| Italia | 390 | 525 | 630 | 823 | 707 |

Fonte: Elaborazione Eurispes - Osservatorio permanente sui fenomeni criminali su dati Criminalpol.

The data indicates that *bische* were an integral part of criminal operations in Puglia during this period, and certainly comparable with the other areas of the Italian *Mezzogiorno*. There was a peak in *bische* discovery in the region in 1990, doubtless as a result of heightened judicial intervention in the lead up to the first maxi-trial. Further, we can understand that the phenomenon of these illegal gambling houses was far more significant in Puglia than in Calabria. The 'ndrangheta is more closely associated, generally speaking, with crimes related to narcotics and weapons. This indicates that pre-existing illegal operations continued in Puglia under the *aegis* of Bellocco, in spite of their absence within the *calabrese* organisation by which Rogoli was inspired. The figures confirm that the *pugliese* criminal underworld was undoubtedly reaching the levels of its counterparts across the Italian south, at least in terms of activities.

The next set of useful data which appears in the EURISPES⁶⁸ 1995 report outlines the value of money confiscated by region in Italy between 1991-1993.

⁶⁸ Rapporto Italia 1995, *Percorsi di ricerca nella società italiana*, EURISPES, p. 268.
http://www.eurispes.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=575:rapporto-italia-1995&catid=47:rapporto-italia&Itemid=222 . Accessed 01/03/2012.

Table 7: Value of money confiscated (in *lire*), 1991-1993, EURISPES


| Regioni | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 |
|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Abruzzo | 9.325.000 | 28.374.400 | 26.881.000 |
| Basilicata | 10.000.000 | 339.000 | - |
| Calabria | 15.487.000 | 38.552.760 | 31.880.000 |
| Campania | 590.056.100 | 1.729.721.000 | 1.255.732.000 |
| Emilia Romagna | 437.124.000 | 921.804.000 | 991.507.500 |
| Friuli V.G. | 7.000.000 | - | 50.000 |
| Lazio | 48.597.058 | 1.866.759.000 | 1.057.943.000 |
| Liguria | 59.710.000 | 115.770.000 | 40.721.000 |
| Lombardia | 212.950.000 | 4.587.000 | 97.001.000 |
| Marche | 10.230.000 | 36.750.000 | 78.824.000 |
| Molise | - | - | - |
| Piemonte | 5.676.000 | 67.330.500 | 292.915.000 |
| Puglia | 208.030.000 | 70.003.500 | 121.820.000 |
| Sardegna | - | 500.000 | - |
| Sicilia | 182.190.650 | 810.534.215 | 1.306.203.840 |
| Toscana | 241.566.000 | 413.271.000 | 1.253.988.000 |
| Trentino A.A. | 134.850.000 | 850.000 | - |
| Umbria | 76.450.000 | 288.250.000 | 9.137.000 |
| Valle d'Aosta | - | - | - |
| Veneto | 30.150.000 | - | 880.000 |
| Italia | 2.277.391.808 | 5.910.121.875 | 6.565.483.340 |

Fonte: Elaborazione Eurispes - Osservatorio permanente sui fenomeni criminali su dati Criminalpol.

As we can see from the table, the largest confiscations occurred in Campania, indicating the size of the Camorra and the money making capabilities of the organisation during this period. Next we find Sicily, with figures almost reaching the levels of Campania in certain periods. Puglia trails behind, but is still subject to confiscations of a far higher value than Calabria. In 1992, there was a decrease in confiscations in Puglia, and a subsequent rise, which can possibly be attributed to a difficult period for the criminal organisations following the first maxi-trial which was alleviated as time passed. Whilst the data is not exhaustive, it can help us to gauge the scope of the phenomenon in Puglia, as well as to provide us with some indications of money-making activities and crucial operations occurring during this period. It is useful in that there is no doubt that Puglia was undergoing a period of significant criminal activity, predominantly in connection with the SCU. Perhaps the belief that Rogoli's organisation was the least significant organisation of the *Mezzogiorno* was somewhat premature; these figures indicate that the *pugliese* underworld was a force to be reckoned with.

In 1994 the *pugliese* criminal underworld appeared to be changing. Given that Rogoli had essentially lost control, it appears that the *cosche* are acting more or less independently. Yet again, it appears that any evolution or expansion made was short-lived. The diagram below represents the organisational configuration of this period.

Figure 15: SCU organisational structure (II)



In the same year (1994), Police Operation ‘Puma I’ led to many arrests around Brindisi, including Rogoli’s father Angelo, Francesco Prudentino and Giuseppe D’Onofrio. Widespread arrests were taking place across the territory, including many key bosses, predominantly relating to the period of the late 1980s and the aforementioned battle for succession following Dodaro’s death. The state continued to investigate the organisation and the war against the SCU showed no signs of relenting. We can see the foot soldiers are still available; it is the organisational structure, overarching authority, or lack of, and the role of the bosses which is in question.

1995 is characterised by a continuation of murders, above all in southern Salento relating to the persisting battle for Dodaro’s domain between the De Tommasi and Tornese clans. The rise of the Padovano clan in *Basso Salento*, or southern Salento, did not go unnoticed. The boss and his affiliates, close to the Tornese clan, became another *cosca* of feared figures on the criminal landscape. In 1996, the Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia stated that *pugliese* organised crime and made ‘an extremely worrying qualitative leap, citing it as now comparable, in criminal terms, to the traditional *mafie*’ (cited in *Libera*, 2004, p. 123). Profound changes take place and Rogoli appears to have next to no control: he does not even appear in the trial sentences in relation to any of these events. However, whilst we see that the original organisation, Rogoli’s SCU model, is almost entirely fragmented with no apparent cohesive sense of unity, we must examine whether this helped or hindered the progress of criminality in Puglia in general.

4.8. The second maxi-trial and its aftermath

Shortly before the beginning of the second maxi-trial, the SCU founder claimed:

“The Sacra Corona Unita? It’s dead. Actually, it never existed.”...

[Massari writes] Giuseppe Rogoli, founding father and charismatic leader of the *pugliese sodalizio*, allowed himself to get close to the journalists who filled the court room, answering their questions and strongly maintaining his thesis of defense [he said] “We are victims of a system. If we were truly *mafiosi*, the situation would be decidedly different...I’m not saying we haven’t committed crimes, but here there is no *mafiosa* culture like in Sicily or Calabria, and nor do we have their means.”

(Article published in *La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno*, 13/11/1996, cited in Massari, 1998, p. 5).

This statement is in stark contrast to Rogoli’s earlier audacious claims about the nature of the SCU. The founder’s words are partially attributable to an attempt to avoid receiving more serious sentences. However, Rogoli’s acknowledgement of the inferiority of the SCU marks a period during which the organisation continued to struggle in the face of considerable structural pressure.

On 17th January, 1997, the second maxi trial against the SCU opened in Lecce with 77 defendants, 18 *pentiti*, 84 lawyers, more than 200 *carabinieri* and policemen (Libera, 2004, p. 124). Of the 77 defendants, the majority were already incarcerated, as had been the case with the 1990-1991 trial. Charges were largely based upon 416bis, as well as the case of a bomb attack on a train line and drug-related offences. Judge Motta attempted to reconstruct the history of the SCU from the end of the 1980s to the mid-1990s, including bloody territorial battles and fatal attacks on even the most important members and their families, including Emanuele Rogoli, the founder’s brother, who was murdered in 1989. Judge Motta told the author ‘It was a great trial!’ (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006) as

Collaborators allowed the judges, for the first time, to investigate the organisation from the inside out...whilst the first trial was law enforcement officials and judges looking in, the second was from the inside, with facts about extortion rackets, bomb attacks, 46 murders and so on (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006).

When the trial closed, Motta and his colleagues were satisfied with the result. All defendants were found guilty of 46 murders and 12 attempted murders and this move saw numerous life sentences handed down (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006). Motta himself attributed some of this success to the role of the collaborators, particularly Maurizio Cagnazzo. This tells us that the influence of the state counter-offensive against the SCU persisted, as the collaborators which emerged as a result of earlier legislative changes were directly responsible for the decimation of Rogoli's already-diminishing stronghold. The statements of collaborators from such high levels of the organisation meant that the prosecutors had a wealth of rich material and evidence to use against the defendants. This approach, from the inside, and the subsequent sentences which were handed down were simply too harsh for Rogoli to withstand. Already in a tenuous position, these rulings saw the advent of newly emerging bosses, determined to definitively break away from Rogoli and assert their own autonomy in their local areas, and an assessment of the following period will be presented at the end of the chapter.

In July, 1998, Rogoli is finally sentenced to life imprisonment in connection with his SCU crimes, namely the murder of Antonio Antonica, along with many others. Later that same year, Rogoli's son Angelo is attacked and badly beaten in a bar in Mesagne in August, 1998, yet another sign of his diminished role, an absence of authority and the lack of respect for him as a boss as new *capi* attempt to assert their own authority. In 1997 and 1998, we also witness two more attempts at forming rival offshoot clans, with the emergence of the Sacra Corona Libera (SCL) and the Nuova Sacra Corona Unita (NSCU).

In a move aimed at ousting Rogoli once and for all, the old guard were disregarded and the new bosses attempted to take the reins. Consisting of *mesagnesi* [from Mesagne] former affiliates of Rogoli, the founding members of the SCL, Massimo Pasimeni, Massimo D'Amico and Antonio Vitale, had decided to freeze Rogoli out, stating that 'the *cupola* had changed' (Libera, 2004, p. 129). Employing language normally reserved for the Sicilian Mafia, it is clear that the affiliates who attempted to rival Rogoli with the foundation of the SCL had aspirations to go beyond what Rogoli had achieved. They clearly saw his departure as having already taken place. Interestingly, Vitale and his men still sought approval from the *calabresi* and *napoletani*, and he succeeded in opening 'a privileged channel' (Libera, 2004, p. 129) with the *camorristi* and to receive investiture from the *calabrese* Lorele family.

The state counter-offensive against the organisation, or *organisations*, continued. In 1999, new police operations were launched, aimed at capturing fugitives still in Montenegro, and Rogoli's wife Domenica Biondi, was incarcerated again. More collaborators continued to emerge, and the original *cosche* [clans] were beginning to find it difficult to operate as a result of harsh sentences and yet more arrests. What this indicates is that Rogoli's SCU remained under attack, both internally and externally. Rogoli, as we know, was imprisoned under the Article 41 regime, where he remains today (2012). His wife was also handed down a long prison sentence, and she is also still incarcerated. The founder of the SCU had truly been abandoned by even his closest affiliates. It is easy to comprehend why this would likely have resulted in a sea-change in terms of the criminal landscape, and the power vacuum was soon to be filled by ambitious new bosses, eager to seize the opportunity for some genuine, autonomous control. This, however, would take some time.

4.9. The post-Rogoli years: the SCU 1999-2011

Whilst our analysis focuses on organised crime in Puglia from 1979 to 1999, an overview of the period from Rogoli's aftermath until the present day will be outlined here in order to inform our wider conclusions. An analysis of biannual reports published by the *Direzione Investigativa Antimafia* (DIA) allows us to create a historical narrative of *realità pugliese* from a policing perspective, outlining the principal investigations into crime in the region, as well as economic activities and key trends. The potential bias of these accounts is understood, but they provide an invaluable source of data for the project at this stage. In the aftermath of the second maxi-trial, the SCU was considered to be dead to all intents and purposes. Only more hesitant state representatives, Judge Motta included, were not so quick to cast judgement, as he said 'They all talked about it being over, but we knew that wasn't the case' (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006). That is not to say, however, that state repression was halted, as the DIA reports are testament.

In the immediate post-maxi-trials phase (1999-2001), the DIA reports suggest that transnationalism is on the rise, particularly with reference to Albania. The increasing role played by the influx of clandestine immigration is outlined, which is attributed to the advantageous geographical position of the region. The *tabacchi lavorati all'estero* (TLE or contraband tobacco) business is cited as remaining crucial to operations, as are extortion, subsequent usury and the management of illegal gambling houses (*Relazione semestrale del Ministero*

dell'Interno al parlamento sull'attività svolta e sui risultati conseguiti dalla DIA⁶⁹, hereafter DIA report). Violent clashes are reported throughout Salento as fragmentation continues. In the new millennium, the situation is not vastly altered, although further clashes with representatives of the Albanian underworld are reported (DIA report 2000 Semester 1). An outline of further moves towards transnational agreements are presented, as we see further expansionist attempts taking place. More innovative methods of gambling-related fraud are investigated, as affiliates are relying on video poker machines which have been tampered with to increase profits (DIA report 2000 Semester 2⁷⁰). Attempts at further inter-*cosca* alliances are made, but with little success.

In the next period (2001-2004), the DIA reports focus on the fluid nature of the underworld in the region, citing the abandonment of the hierarchical structure and describing the crucial role played by increased collaboration (DIA report 2002 Semester 2 Volume 2⁷¹). Further attention is paid to continued transnational links, still focussing on interaction with Albania. Economic activities remain as before, but the role of women is cited as becoming more integral to operations, as is that of juveniles. From 2005-2007, the dynamic characteristics of the *pugliese* criminal scene are explained, and expanded transnational collaboration with China is identified as a new trend (DIA report 2005 Volume 1⁷²). The ability of *cosche* to regroup, in spite of state intervention, is outlined, and the increasing exploitation of the Adriatic and Balkan routes is outlined (DIA report 2006 Semester 2⁷³). Localised *cosche* remain fragile and under threat during this period, as successful police operations limit activity, and a trend towards inhomogeneity persists (DIA report 2007 Semester 2⁷⁴). Later reports (2008-2010) continue to describe the key characteristics of the underworld, claiming that it remains polyhedral and magmatic, focussing still on expansionist strategies beyond the territory, and outlining increased weakness following further judicial intervention (DIA report 2008 Semester 2⁷⁵). Along with Albania, Greece is cited as a key location of transnational activity (DIA report 2010 Semester 1⁷⁶).

For the final section of the chapter we can look to journalistic sources to provide us with an overview on criminal activity in Puglia in the most recent period. In November, 2011,

⁶⁹ Available at http://www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/semestrali/sem/99/1sem99.pdf. Accessed 12/01/2012

⁷⁰ Available at http://www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/semestrali/sem/2000/2sem2000.pdf. Accessed 12/01/2012

⁷¹ Available at http://www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/semestrali/sem/2002/2_volume_2_sem2002.pdf. Accessed 03/01/2012

⁷² Available at http://www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/semestrali/sem/2005/1sem2005.pdf. Accessed 04/01/2012

⁷³ Available at http://www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/semestrali/sem/2006/2sem2006.pdf. Accessed 04/01/2012

⁷⁴ Available at http://www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/semestrali/sem/2007/2sem2007.pdf. Accessed 04/01/2012

⁷⁵ Available at http://www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/semestrali/sem/2008/2sem2008.pdf. Accessed 04/01/2012

⁷⁶ Available at http://www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/semestrali/sem/2010/1sem2010.pdf. Accessed 05/01/2012

SCU collaborator Ercole Penna announced in court that Puglia was now characterised by a form of ‘mafia federalism for the *capi-zona*, “democracy” in the division of profits, [with] no more useless and dangerous ceremonies, but [rather a trend towards] economic models applied to affiliations’ (Gioia, S., 2011, Il pentito SCU: “Ora si diventa capi grazie alla fiction tv su Totò Riina”. La Repubblica, 2nd November⁷⁷). The *pentito* claimed that ‘business matters are the glue [that holds the organisation together]... Wherever there is money to be made there is the underworld’ (*ibid.*). Penna said:

The underworld exists and that’s that, it’s not a question of what its name is, it’s the newspapers that name them: Sacra Corona Unita, Nuova Sacra Corona, Sacra Corona Libera or still a group from Mesagne. It’s always the same thing. It is what it has always been: since the days of Pino Rogoli. (Senza Colonne, 2011, La malavita? Si fa e basta: non ha un suo nome. *Senza Colonne*, 3 November⁷⁸)

In an interview following Penna’s statements, Judge Motta argued that:

For some time the SCU has conquered international spaces... In reality, the change took place ten years ago in terms of the relationship with Albania and Albania *continues* to be the primary producer of illegal drugs... [for the region], the main exporter of heroin, cocaine, and, most of all, marijuana into Italy. Random robbery and theft is of no interest to the SCU. The most worrying aspect of which is, surprisingly, the abandonment of the logic of organisational formation, of internal conflict among the clans. There has actually been a sort of pacification... in order to avoid intervention of the part of the state... this confirmed the need to work deep underground. (Manco, P., 2011, La SCU oggi? È la mafia ‘sociale’. *Il tacco d’Italia*, 7th November⁷⁹)

Motta’s description helps us to understand the judicial perspective on the changes which have taken place at the heart of *pugliese* organised crime. The judge argues that there has been a shift in that SCU affiliates are no longer following the philosophy of intimidation; rather they are seeking approval (*ibid.*), which indicates an increasing attempt to embed within the territory. Rather, says Motta, the clans are attempting to move into ‘money-laundering through supermarkets, football teams [and] this level of rootedness creates a consensus that must be

⁷⁷ Available at http://bari.repubblica.it/cronaca/2011/11/02/news/pentito_scu-24323654/. Accessed 2/11/2011

⁷⁸ Available at http://senzacolonne.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14197:lla-malavita-si-fa-e-basta-non-ha-un-suo-nome&catid=90:cronaca-brindisi&Itemid=280. Accessed 04/11/2011

⁷⁹ Available at <http://www.iltaccoditalia.info/sito/index-a.asp?id=18685>. Accessed 8/11/2011

avoided at all costs; this connection between normal people and organised crime must be stopped' (*ibid.*). It is this evolution that Motta argues should be a great cause for alarm, in stating:

We have to pay attention to...behaviour that has taken on a new, attractive character... [Penna] told us about this sort of attitude, trying to meet the people's needs, finding them jobs, lending them small amounts of money without asking for it back, ...little favours. In the long term, this is what can make the difference between a *mafia*-style association that has not achieved territorial domination and, therefore, [remains] easier to combat, and an organisation which, at that stage, would disappear from people's minds because the attention-grabbing events have ceased and the relationship with outsiders has changed. People who would not have spoken out when attacks took place, when they were obliged to talk, would absolutely never talk if there were no external stimulus, and that would mean having spent thirty years fighting against the SCU in vain. (Manco, P., 2011, La SCU oggi? È la mafia 'sociale'. *Il tacco d'Italia*, 7th November)

As we can see, SCU configuration has undergone a final and dramatic shift in the post-Rogoli era. There is no longer any attempt to imitate the traditional Italian *mafie* and their behavioural patterns. Rather, what exists today is a market-based conglomeration of clans, driven by economic forces and constantly seeking new methods to evade capture, whilst the systems Rogoli attempted to put into place are long dead and buried. Let us now consider the conclusions to this chapter as we move towards formulating our conclusions on the thesis as a whole.

4.10. Conclusion

In this, our final empirical chapter, we have mapped the evolution of Rogoli's SCU from the perspective of growing legislative pressure in connection with the state counter-offensive defined as a form of structural pressure. We have established that, during the earliest period, the organisation was influenced by rival/sponsoring organisations and that the role played by agents increased as time passed. It is clear that the organisational configuration was set in place, proceeded to fluctuate and, at the end of this period, reached some form of stability as an accommodation of the old and the new; a market driven conglomeration of sub-regionally based, essentially autonomous actors, with the majority continuing to self-identify as SCU affiliates for reasons which we have established.

By this stage in time, in the immediate aftermath of the first maxi-trial, Rogoli had no tangible control. Decisions were made without consulting him, further splinter groups were formed, many of his underbosses and affiliates collaborated, and his organisation fell apart. Any remaining observation of his imposed hierarchy lay in the distant past. Whilst there are indeed still criminals active today in the region who would refer to themselves as SCU affiliates, our findings indicate that Rogoli's project was unsuccessful. It is this analysis which will inform our understanding of the relative failures and successes of newcomers in organised crime as we try to ascertain what makes one group successful and another doomed to fail.

Our analysis of anti-*mafia* legislation informs our broader research, but also tells us much in terms of the *pugliese* situation. Whilst the introduction and reform of legislation in relation to the Italian *mafie* was often seen as symbolic and somewhat impractical, with some innovations viewed as knee-jerk and controversial, their role in Puglia has differed to that in other regions. What the state had in Puglia, in comparison with earlier experiences across the *Mezzogiorno*, was the benefit of hindsight. Indeed Motta told the author that they 'learnt from mistakes of the other regions' (Interview with the author, 30/01/2006). We can see the effect that legislation had on affiliates and the wider organisation; strict legal moves resulted in widespread collaboration which, in turn, resulted in an implosion at the core of Rogoli's SCU. Let us not forget that Rogoli himself was partially responsible for the lack of cohesion, as he refused to lead by example, flouting fundamental rules, taking sides and refusing to learn from mistakes, all vital elements of the 'dark networks' thesis (Tucker, 2008; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2010). This provides us with further evidence in support of our second and third hypotheses; a fluctuation of the organisational model persists as affiliates choose the path of adaptation and, further, the disadvantageous traits of the adopted configuration dominate, have a negative effect on progress, and this results in failure. Furthermore, we must remember that, in Puglia, the state counter-offensive was so effective partially as a result of the adopted organisational structure; with little shared history and tradition, this heterogeneous group of criminals, refusing to adhere to the hierarchy which had been imposed via a process of mimicry following attempted colonisation, quickly set about destroying Rogoli's organisation from within. The market driven network which had emerged was simply too weak to sustain such structural pressure.

In order to more closely investigate our final research question and hypothesis, we can look to the literature which forms part of our theoretical framework. Varese states that '...a low level of trust reduces actors' ability to cooperate and communicate, inhibiting collective action' (Coleman, 1990; 302) (2006, pp. 419-420). Tucker also refers to the vital role of trust in

criminal organisations, arguing that:

A flattened as opposed to hierarchical structure...does have its flaws, including the possibility of bad decisions being made more quickly, lack of control from the centre to the outer components, decreasing accountability, higher risk levels, critical lack of trust and poor security and strategic direction' (2008).

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones (2010) cite further trust-related disadvantages, stating that '...the prevailing pessimism about the ability of states to combat illicit networks is premature... (overlooking) issues of community and trust, as well as problems of distance, coordination, and security, which may pose serious organizational difficulties for illicit networks (2010, pp. 8-9). This provides us with further support in evidence of our hypothesis that, should the weaknesses of any adopted configuration prevail, an organisation is likely to fail. We can see that, during this period of time, many SCU *pentiti* experienced precisely the problems that these scholars refer to and that this was at least partially responsible for their decision to collaborate. This, in turn, goes some way to explaining the further disintegration of the organisation during the 1997 trial.

However, we must also considerer additional structural and agential variables in connection to state efficiency in the battle against the SCU. Rogoli's affiliates were intimidated by this new legislation and afraid of the effects of the 41*bis* prison regime. Nevertheless, members of the other Italian *mafie* were subject to the same pressures but less likely to collaborate, particularly in the case of the Camorra and the 'ndrangheta. Accordingly, there are clearly other factors involved. Rogoli's SCU lacked cohesive identity, *cultura mafiosa* and true *mafiosità*, in contrast with the other *mafie*. Although from a legal perspective the organisation was defined as one being *di stampo mafioso*, as per Armao's (2003) continuum outlined in our theoretical framework, what we are dealing with here is organised crime; a security threat but non-*mafiosa*. The failure to observe core, traditional *mafia* values weakened the organisation as a unified body, rendering them more susceptible to state intervention and subsequent breakdown. The absence of blood ties as a linchpin to the organisation doubtless meant that individual affiliates were more likely to turn against one another. As per our research questions and hypotheses, we can see that the organisational configuration continued to fluctuate until the end of the period in question (1999) until some form of stability was reached, and that specific traits of the configuration itself influenced progress, or lack thereof.

We know from our analysis in the first two empirical chapters that the cumulative effect of multiple structure and agency-influenced factors was responsible for the initial breakdown of the organisation, and the next chapter will present our final conclusions in more detail. It appears, at this stage in organisational history, that legislative change represented the *coup de grace*. Rogoli and his affiliates were able to regroup and withstand earlier organisational breakdown on the basis of personal errors of judgement, greed and short-termist attitudes in terms of planning. However, the inexperience, lack of trust and fragmented nature of the organisation, coupled with intense state pressure, was simply too much to bear. As such, we can see that this period of SCU history is characterised by a combination of structural and agential factors in the form of judicial intervention and, as a subsequent backlash, the role of agency-influenced collaboration. With most key bosses incarcerated under the Article 41 regime, or having been awarded new collaborator status, Rogoli, himself in solitary confinement, is simply incapable of operating business from his highly-restricted prison cell. The resulting power-vacuum which emerged following Rogoli's demise did allow for the materialisation of some new, ambitious bosses, who had previously been unable to exert any serious control. These new figures, however, cannot be considered as part of Rogoli's initial project.

Indeed, Capoccia (1998) stated that it was this horizontal structure that was ultimately to be the new SCU's strength. In spite of the removal of a number of key figures, the other bosses and affiliates were ultimately able to regroup and continue to operate. Nonetheless, here we must recall the role of self-identification. Whilst emerging leaders have been able to continue to operate in small, localised areas, they are not considered, at least by the state, to be members of the SCU. As per our definition of success and failure in organised crime terms, from 1983, and perhaps even earlier, Rogoli was capable of running an organisation which boasted of considerable territorial control and made substantial economic gains. However, this was not to last. There was little or no attempt to make the qualitative leap into semi-legal business or infiltration of the local political arena. The sub-regional bosses relinquished themselves of Rogoli's control, recognising that they no longer needed him, and that he was possibly hindering their operations. As such, they continued to use the Rogoli name and the SCU title. They were, however, no longer connected to him, they did not answer to him and they did not respect him. Moreover, it is precisely as a result of the fact that there had always been some form of local autonomy that the organisation persisted and survived this judicial pressure in any form at all, even if Rogoli was left with simply the symbolism of his name and no identifiable powers. As such, when considering our diagram on success and failure indicators, it is clear that Rogoli and his one-time closest affiliates certainly fall short;

operational difficulty mean profits decreased, they failed to dominate local markets, there is an almost ubiquitous lack of trust and the rival splinter groups prosper while Rogoli fails.

Having examined the findings of this chapter in relation to our research questions and hypotheses, it is crucial that we now consider our theoretical diagram (Figure 3) at this stage. If the core concepts at the heart of the thesis are structure, agency, organisational configuration and success and failure, this period of SCU history certainly reflects our theory in practice. We witness the expansion of structural interference in terms of legislative innovation and subsequent pressure on the organisation. As time progresses, agency factors come into play as illustrated by the role of female family members in terms of the decision to collaborate. The organisation breaks down further, from a hierarchical network to a market-based system of essentially independent pockets of control. Only at this stage can we truly speak of failure; Rogoli's mission does not succeed, he is definitively ousted and new splinter groups are formed. Whilst individual actors can be said to have been successful, becoming further embedded in *pugliese* society, beating their rivals, and continuing to operate in spite of state repression, the original SCU founded by Rogoli no longer exists.

Perhaps, therefore, we must recall simply that the Rogoli-led *pugliese* model of a newcomer in organised crime, whilst considered now, perhaps mistakenly, to be among the traditional Italian *mafie*, is a history of failure. Rogoli's ambitious project never came into fruition, and there are multiple structural and agential factors to which this defeat can be attributed. Nonetheless, that which rose from Rogoli's ashes, and that which exists in Puglia today, is, in fact, threatening for different reasons, particularly in comparison with Rogoli's model, free of the shackles of a solid organisational configuration, operating in the ethos of an *ad hoc* 'business for business' market (Motta, in conversation with the author, 30/01/2006). Now we must consider what the story of Rogoli's demise can tell us about our research questions, hypotheses and broader theoretical framework, as we seek to form our conclusions on the thesis as a whole.

Conclusions to the thesis


The principal aim of this thesis is to explore the emergence and development of newcomer organised crime groups. A structure and agency approach has been applied to a criminal organisation in order to identify the crucial explanatory factors behind key events and historical development. A case study of Giuseppe Rogoli's Sacra Corona Unita (SCU) in Puglia has been employed as an example of just such a newcomer group. The emergence, early history, make-up and evolution of the organisation have been investigated in order to create a narrative of the SCU to which the theoretical framework has been applied.

The thesis begins with a presentation of the rationale behind the project, the research questions and the hypotheses. It defines key terms and examines the existing literature in the field. The analytical approach of the application of structure and agency to newcomer organised crime groups is presented, along with the methodology. The objectives of the thesis consist of an examination of how and why newcomers emerge in crowded spaces on their native territories and to what extent their organisational configuration is influenced by structure or agency factors. We explore the causes behind the adoption of certain organisational configurations, the fluctuation or stability of this configuration, and the impact this configuration may have upon organisational success and failure. A narrative history of the region of Puglia from the pre-organised crime era up until the early days of the SCU (1979-1985) is presented. The organisation is broken down, with emergent structure, recruitment practices, economic activities and early signs of struggle all addressed and analysed. Considering the role played by external criminal gangs operating on *pugliese* territory, the chapter explains the extent to which adopted organisational configuration is influenced by structural pressures in the form of these rival and/or sponsoring gangs. Further, the strengths and weaknesses of the adopted configuration are considered in light of organisational progress.

Rogoli's SCU in its early years (1985-1991) is presented, and consideration is given to factionalism, further offshoot clans and emerging themes of greed and short-termism, as flaws in organisational configurations surface and come to dominate the criminal landscape for Rogoli and his affiliates. The arrival of an alternative sort of structural pressure in the form of an increasing judicial crackdown is examined, as the SCU begins to falter and further breakdown ensues, resulting in the ousting of Rogoli from one of the key factions. The organisation can no longer be considered as one. Finally, the devastating effect that structural pressure in the form of state intervention has on the SCU is explained. The role played by legislative change is presented, as the events of the inter-trial period (1991-1997) are examined and the chain of

collaborators emerges as a destructive force which proves to be an obstacle to organisational progress. The role of women is deliberated upon and the second maxi-trial is outlined, as is its aftermath. An analysis of the final fall of Rogoli is put forward, and the post-Rogoli period is briefly examined (1999-2012), providing an overview of more recent SCU, or rather *criminalità pugliese*, activity and progress.

Now let us consider what the findings of the thesis reveal to us in relation to our research questions and, in turn, the broader topic in question, contemporary models of organised crime. Let us recall the diagram that represents our theoretical approach, reproduced here:



(Figure 3)

As per the diagram, the principal concepts at the heart of the theoretical approach are structure, agency, organisational configuration and, finally, success and failure. In order to properly analyse the principal findings of the thesis in relation to the theoretical framework, it is vital that we recall the core concepts of our diagram at this stage.

The thesis begins with an investigation into the identification and analysis of the dynamics of emerging, newcomer organised crime groups. The period of territorial cohabitation, during which representatives of Cutolo's NCO and 'ndrangheta members were present in the region, offers us insight into the complex environment in which newcomer gangs can emerge, as members of the local criminal underworld seek to protect themselves and their local territory, but demonstrate their interest and willingness to belong to an externally founded, domineering organisation. However, the role played by the *salentini* locals in preventing the domination of the *cutoliani* is paramount; the presence of local criminal competition, resistant to

Cutolo's methods, made his project difficult and the apparently generous offer of hands-off support made by Bellocco was too tempting to reject. As such, Rogoli set about creating his own organisation, with Bellocco's blessing, and it is the product of this environment that will be examined here.

Our first research question asks if newcomers in crowded spaces adopt their organisational configuration in relation and response to local socio-economic factors or, conversely, in connection with pre-existing rival/sponsoring criminal organisations. The first hypothesis states that there is some autonomy in terms of the development of an organisational configuration, but newcomers are above-all responding to structural factors in the form of rivals or sponsors. In terms of our theoretical diagram, we can see that structural factors are filtering down to influence organisational configuration, and the adopted configuration begins to have a reciprocal effect on said structure as time passes. With reference to the case study of the *pugliese* SCU, we established how the organisational configuration adopted by Rogoli and his affiliates was influenced by the role of Cutolo's NCO and, latterly, Bellocco's 'ndrangheta *cosca*, and the extent to which agency factors, in connection with adaptation to the sub-regional socio-economic situation, played a significant role. During the earliest phase covered by the thesis, we examined the *cutoliana* invasion of Puglia and the NCO following the rolling-out of the *soggiorni obbligati* [forced resettlement] programme, as well as Cutolo's own presence as fugitive in the region, having absconded from a mental institution. Although Cutolo did have some early success, and was able to temporarily subjugate a considerable section of the local criminal underworld, business in his home territory distracted him. Moreover, the resistance on the part of the locals, following the offer of a more hands-off support role from the 'ndrangheta, meant that his offer of affiliation was ultimately rejected.

Our early findings, therefore, allow us to conclude that structural factors, in the form of rival/sponsoring clans *as per* our theoretical diagram, play a dominant role as Rogoli attempts to mimic the organisations by which he is inspired. This is illustrated by the proposed hierarchical structure put in place by the founder that is outlined in Chapter 2. The head of the SCU, at this stage, is trying to create a rival organisation to counter the colonisation attempt, and the earliest SCU model represents Rogoli's *reactive* response to structural influence. If we consider recent research on transplantation and mobility of organised crime groups (Varese, 2011; Morselli *et al*, 2011), we can see parallels emerging with early themes of the thesis. According to this new school of thought on migrating organised crime gangs, globalisation and migration have facilitated an ease of movement and transplantation as much for criminals as for the rest of society. Morselli *et al* found that opportunism plays a role but, ultimately, 'criminal groups are the product of offenders' adaptations to the constraints and opportunities surrounding them'

(Morselli, Turcotte, and Tenti, Report 04-2010:2, cited in Varese, 2011, p. 219). This is in keeping with our early findings in that the authors acknowledge that adaptation is key; in Puglia, local criminals responded to external influence in the form of rival/sponsorship clans and organised their operations accordingly. However, Varese and Morselli's focus is on mobile groups, or non-natives seeking to expand operations into territories beyond their own home turf. Indeed, Varese argues that levels of trust in the new locale, presence or absence of local criminal competition, and size of the locale are the key local conditions which can affect success or failure of attempts at transplantation (2011, p. 225). As such, we understand the way in which Varese's work can help us to understand the process of attempted but failed colonisation. However, this thesis goes beyond the work of Varese, considering what remains following the failure of external actors to invade; we are examining precisely this potential backlash which Varese defines but casts aside, with his focus centring on the mobility problem. The organisation on which this thesis is focused offers a different sort of case. We are dealing with a newcomer gang founded by criminals *on their own territory* but under the influence of a rival clan and its attempted invasion, along with another organisation willing to offer a sponsorship role. It is the product of this, such a distinct environment, that we analyse here in order to develop a greater understanding of the risks posed by contemporary organised crime models.

The clearly defined influence of external organisations upon the configuration of emergent clans is undeniable, but we can also see the way in which agency becomes more vital. Once the parameters have been put in place by rival/sponsorship organisations, particularly in relation to developing configuration, we can see that the agent role develops into something more *proactive*, rather than reactive. In our case study on the SCU, we can see that Rogoli created a sort of third-way, a piecemeal approach to foundation and leadership, borrowing and imitating from clans to which he aspired to become a contemporary. What he did, however, was incorporate some more innovative, individual organisational traits, particularly in terms of concessions of sub-regional autonomy, and these led the way for the development of a new product. As such, we can see that our first hypothesis is correct; there is some autonomy behind newcomer configuration development, but the dominating factor is the role played by pre-existing rival/sponsoring clans.

It is at this stage, however, that we witness the arrival of a period in which the role of the agent truly dominates. If we consider that structural influence in the form of rival/sponsorship gangs has been established but now departed, and there remains an absence of structural pressure in the form of state repression, *as per* our theoretical diagram, the agent is free to take control. It is clear to see why Rogoli chose the mimicry strategy in the case of

Puglia whilst conceding sub-regional autonomy. It was a shrewd, if ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to imitate those clans by which he felt threatened in the hope of becoming a true competitor, whilst maintaining support on the ground. We can see that agency factors indeed persist as the configuration remains in a state of flux via a process of repeated attempts, some successful and others less so, at adaptation to the environment. Whilst emergent clans may seek to imitate their *superiors*, or organisations who have reached the status to which they aspire, if the conditions are not favourable or appropriate, this process of imitation may soon be abandoned, as common sense appears to dictate a more logical path to take. Indeed, Sciarrone cited Catanzaro's concept of social hybridisation (1998), arguing that

One of the fundamental characteristics of the mafia, which goes some way to explaining its persistence over time, consists of its capacity to combine new and traditional values...As such, *mafiosi* initially attempt to resist social change, but when it becomes apparent that these changes are inevitable, successfully exploit them for their own ends (Sciarrone, 1998, p. 27)

Sciarrone's findings are certainly in keeping with those of the thesis. Although consensus holds that *mafie*, old and new, tend to be steeped in tradition and to rely on the conservation of this heritage to maintain power and control, adaptation to new conditions in an inevitability as affiliates themselves recognise the need to be flexible and *move with the times*. The organisational structure, therefore, continues to fluctuate, in keeping with our second hypothesis. Rogoli's initial project demonstrates just this. The boss attempts to reconcile traditional values with his own innovative leadership style as he concedes the need for ground-level support and accepts the subsequent necessity to delegate power to trusted affiliates, as illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3. However, in the absence of many of these affiliates' ability or desire to adhere to the rules, regulations and structures inherent to *mafia*-style organisations, individualistic and opportunistic behavioural traits emerge and come to dominate the criminal landscape. This is also demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3, in which we outline early examples of affiliates' refusal to obey the rules, failure to observe *omertà*, and total lack of respect for the founder himself as illustrated by the emergence of offshoot clans.

Where this agency influence can create further problems for newcomers, however, lies in the outbreak of heightened tension, conflict and infighting. Where an organisation may put a hierarchy and strict rules in place, the choice to abandon these structures can result in both short and long-term operational difficulties. Emerging rival and offshoot clans, seeking to defend their own locales and strategic patterns, materialise precisely because the process of imitation is highly complex, so much so as to be proven unworkable in some cases. Accordingly, unity is

threatened and ties begin to deteriorate. There remains a tension between Rogoli's attempt to accommodate tradition and modernity, but he is in a weak position and, therefore, unable to control the actions of the agents by which he is surrounded. Shared values and internal interaction, *as per* our theoretical diagram, ensure that sub-regional loyalties remain more closely observed than ties to the overarching organisation, and communication among the small localised pockets is more frequent and decisive. What remains, therefore, is an organisation which, at the highest level, is aspiring to be considered *di stampo mafioso*, but the path to becoming a true *mafia* is far from simple. The resulting product must still be considered *simple* organised crime, and non-*mafiosa*. Whilst temporary regrouping/unity is theoretically possible, the persistence of agency-related model flaws means that organisational progress is compromised. As such, we see newcomer organised crime gangs emerging, organising, evolving and adapting from a structurally-induced starting point, but subject to change.

It is this potential fluctuation of newcomers' organisational configuration which forms the basis of the next of our research questions. We have established that structural factors influence the adopted organisational configuration of newcomer organised crime groups, but concluded that agency also plays a role in influencing adaptation to the environment and conditions. It remains to consider to what extent chosen structure continues to fluctuate or remains stable over time. Indeed, our second research question asks just that: is the organisational configuration which newcomers adopt constant or, conversely, is it subject to change as time passes? The second hypothesis states that, in view of the aforesaid necessity to adapt to local socio-economic conditions and crucial interrelations between rival/sponsoring clans, the organisational configuration of newcomers *is* likely to be subject to change. Our findings suggest that internal model-related flaws can threaten organisational progress and unity. Further conflict, catalysed by individual mistakes, greed and poor-planning, can create particular conditions in which newcomers can find it almost impossible to cooperate with one another. In the case of Puglia, the emergence of additional offshoot clans demonstrates just how complex the maintenance of unity can be for newcomer gangs. The evidence provided in relation to the emergence of the Remo Lecce Libera (RLL) clan in Chapter 3 demonstrates just that. Even affiliates found at the lower levels of the organisation can seek to actively punish members of the pre-imposed hierarchy, and this results in a further distancing from the originally-adopted configuration model as harmony breaks down. Although, in the case of the RLL, the resulting multiplicity of actors was to be short-lived and the clan reabsorbed, the risk posed by these groups on the territory persists, particularly given the increased risk of violent conflict and retribution.

The fact that the founding member of a newcomer organisation may be able to regain at least momentary control over the troops following breakdown indicates that further fluctuation of the configuration model does indeed take place. In accordance with our theoretical diagram, it is clear to see just how crucial the role of the agent, in the form of internal interaction, is at this stage. We can, subsequently, see the effect this can have on ultimate organisational success or failure, as genuine unity becomes an almost impossible goal. Rogoli's ability to regroup, however, does demonstrate that affiliates recognise the advantages of reputation and the enhanced ability to control the territory which comes as a result of this. We have before us the example of a newcomer organisation which was founded as a hierarchy, on paper at least, repeatedly breaking down and then regrouping. With each subsequent split, however, the product which emerges from the attempt to regroup becomes weaker and more watered down as affiliates become more disparate and detached from the core than ever. The continued tension between a top-down attempt to impose a unified hierarchical structure and an on-the-ground climate based on distinct behavioural traits of the foot soldiers, including opportunistic, disloyal and unscrupulous patterns, means that Rogoli's mission continues to falter and true evidence of failure begins to emerge. Whilst this stalling of organisational progress may appear to be a positive outcome from a law enforcement perspective, the resulting expanding network of affiliates, loosely connected to a central power core with a fierce reputation, but balanced on the basis of relative sub-regional autonomy, poses a somewhat different threat. Networks can be complex and difficult to combat, and require different processes from traditional, hierarchically-based clans. Further, a fluctuating configuration can make definition and strategy difficult.

A bloody and conflictual atmosphere, itself a result of persisting infighting, clearly increases the security risks to the local territory associated with the presence of organised crime. Frequent violent murders, acts of retribution and significant drug deals all serve to create an increasingly dangerous environment in any given area. In the continued absence of considerable structural influence in the form of judicial intervention or serious state repression, agency influenced factors continue to have a dominant effect on newcomer organisations' progress. In the case of the SCU, failed assassination attempts, extremely brutal murders and frequent, often foolish, mistakes demonstrate just how crucial agent errors can be to organisational advancement. As such, we witness the way this may push the organisation to the right-hand-side of the success and failure continuum of our theoretical diagram. In the absence of a viable and efficient power core, what remains of an organisation can dictate its inability to progress effectively. Underbosses rise through the ranks, only to be brutally eliminated, and the battle to regain territorial control results in an additional shift in terms of organisational configuration. The state of flux persists, offering further evidence of our second hypothesis in play. Fresh power centres emerge to form newly-founded hierarchies which again remain unobserved, as

can be seen in the case of the emergence of the battle for succession following Dodaro's death in Chapter 3. This continued fluctuation of organisational configuration serves to illustrate just how difficult it can be for newcomers to operate coherently in crowded territories.

Where agency takes control in the absence of structural pressure, an increase in the attention of law enforcement officials can change criminal landscapes forever. In the case of Rogoli's SCU, the founder and his affiliates alike were able to exploit an initial underestimation of their activities and expand accordingly. However, as murder rates and profits increase, so too does the likelihood of judicial intervention. Where newcomer groups aspire from the outset to be defined as being *di stampo mafioso*, the concept remains relatively abstract until the state acknowledges that this is the case and subsequent prosecution and sentencing are dictated by these classifications. The way in which the state chooses to approach the phenomenon, however, can have a tangible effect upon organisational configuration and subsequent progress, or lack thereof. The events preceding the emergence of the Rosa dei Venti clan, as outlined in Chapter 3, demonstrate precisely that. Rogoli's obligation to take sides in the period leading up to the first maxi-trial (1991-1992) provides us with evidence to support this theory. The state, as a form of structural interference, constrained Rogoli to publically concede that his organisation was not the highly-ordered hierarchy that he had founded. Rather, he took the role of a sort of floating leader, maintaining control over a certain faction/s, but being effectively ousted by the other power pole/s.

The context in which newcomer actors may find themselves, disunified and ever-more factionalised, increases the likelihood of successful prosecution due to their vulnerability and proves a further obstacle to organisational growth and progress. Sciarrone argues that 'we witness...a proliferation of criminal organisations which provide themselves with an organisational structure, who invent (or copy) tradition, who construct a 'brand' or symbol' (1998, p. 194). His work can aid our understanding of how and why newcomers may choose to attempt a process of mimicry. However, here we have an example of an organisation which tries and fails to create a brand or a symbol of unity, and the aftermath of this malfunction. As such, we have examined what takes place when the created brand is publically destroyed, and our findings tell us that reunification is, by this stage and with this level of structural and agency influence, an insurmountable task. For Rogoli and his affiliates, the result of frequent organisational conflict and resulting deterioration, public humiliation, and considerable judicial pressure create cleavages which are impossible to overcome, and the organisational configuration has fluctuated so greatly as to reach breaking point, never to be the same again.

This leads us on to consider what the findings of the thesis can tell us in relation to our third and final research question, centred on the notion of the success and failure of contemporary criminal organisations. The question asks whether the adopted organisational configuration of newcomer groups has a clear impact on the likelihood of success or failure, and so let us also recall the continuum by which our theoretical diagram is underpinned. Our final hypothesis states that the organisational configuration does, indeed, have a clear impact on the potential to succeed or fail on the basis that each configuration has its weaknesses and, should these prevail, the organisation is likely to fail. As such, we examined the shortcomings of the network model *vis-à-vis* literature on terrorism, having defined the SCU within the final stage (1991-1999) as best defined as a conglomeration of autonomous hierarchical-networks, operating on a sub-regional basis. Indeed, whether a hierarchy, a network, a pure market, or some form of hybrid, it is clear that any given organisational configuration features its own advantages and disadvantages. The configuration shift which has taken place across SCU history can go some way to helping us to understand how this is manifest in criminal organisations.

This thesis focuses on the way in which the distinct features of organisational models can have an effect on organisational progress, or whether other factors, be they structure or agency based, come into play. It is clear that effective legislation is indispensable for the state in terms of successful prosecution of organised crime affiliates and an integral part of the battle against the phenomenon. In the *pugliese* case, a combination of long overdue serious state repression and the role played by the Article 41 strict confinement regime is presented. These are used by the state as vital weapons against the organisation as a newcomer, yet to be entrenched and established as its contemporaries have been and, therefore, more susceptible to structural attempts to break it down. Whilst the response to the phenomenon in the region was slow, once the *mafiosità* of the organisation had been established, in legal terms at least, we witness a period of even greater struggle for the bosses and foot soldiers alike.

In the absence of a strong power core, with no true overarching authority, continued battles over territory threaten further organisational and, ultimately, success. Therefore, we witness further signs of organisational struggle leading towards the ‘failed’ section to the right of the success and failure continuum. That is not to say that individual *cosche* are not still making considerable sums of money. However, Rogoli’s abandonment, alongside further organisational conflict and breakdown, demonstrates that *his* project has failed. Moreover, even the remaining power centres are struggling to remain unified. The resulting structure, a confederation of loosely linked but autonomous, localised networks across Puglia continue to suffer from the potential pitfalls of the network model, proving our final hypothesis to be

correct. In contrast with the consensus on the strength and resilience of networks, the fluid nature of the newcomer organisation is severely threatened by structural interference. With the risk of solitary confinement, and in the absence of blood ties or true entrenchment on the territory, the network quickly falls apart as the chain of collaboration unravels. Newcomer groups by their very nature, without such eminent history to defend, are more likely to be vulnerable to judicial attack. In the case of the SCU, we were able to identify the key factors given by collaborators themselves behind their decision to turn state's witness, and a response to judicial pressure was one of the most commonly cited.

The findings based on the role of women in newcomer disintegration represent another integral part of the analysis of this type of criminal group. In combination with the aforesaid lack of tradition, history, and strong loyalty ties, the influence women have in relation to the threat of harsh prison sentences presents a considerable challenge to newcomers on the criminal landscape. This, in connection with the other disadvantages of the network configuration, present too great an obstacle for the struggling organisation, as illustrated by the emergent *catena di pentitismo* which is outlined in Chapter 4. Faced with lengthy prison terms in extremely difficult conditions, with family life threatened and little hope for liberty in the future, the pressure applied by women, in the absence of the underpinning influence of strong organisational loyalty ties, proves too great and organisations are liable to implode. In the case of Puglia, even representatives of the highest power *strata* of the organisation went on to collaborate with the authorities, and the second maxi-trial (1997) was incredibly successful as a direct result of this extremely widespread collaboration.

Rogoli himself claimed that the organisation was dead, or rather had never existed. The combination of structure, or state repression, and agency factors, or shared values and internal interaction, at this stage truly marks the death knell of the SCU as the founder had envisaged it. The overview of the aftermath of the trial, and so-called SCU, or merely *criminalità pugliese*, activity in the following period, demonstrate that a final and definitive shift has taken place. Indeed, whilst many affiliates remain in operation even today, Rogoli's project can be considered to be a true failure. What remains of the SCU today is a sort of brand of *mafia* federalism, in which the logic of organisational formation has been abandoned, and underground networks work in apparent harmony so as to avoid detection (Manco, P., 2011, *La SCU oggi? È la mafia 'sociale'. Il tacco d'Italia*, 7th November⁸⁰). These definitions can help us to understand what lessons can be learnt via the examination of the first phase of organised crime in Puglia. In a complex environment, a crowded space with a growing economy and

⁸⁰ Available at <http://www.iltaccoditalia.info/sito/index-a.asp?id=18685>. Accessed 8/11/2011

delicate socio-economic conditions, the possibility to found a newcomer criminal gang to rival the traditional Italian *mafie* represents a considerable challenge, and one which Rogoli fails to meet. Although he attempted to impose an organisation which could be defined as *mafiosa* on the pre-existing, market-based *pugliese* criminal underworld, his attempt failed and here what we witness is a reversion to type on the part of the *capizona* and foot soldiers. What remains can no longer truly be defined as being *di stampo mafioso*, but simple, albeit dangerous, organised crime.

This thesis represents a departure from the *en vogue* focus on *mafia* mobility (Varese, 2011; Morselli *et al.*, 2011), and examines the case of newcomers operative *on their native territory* in the presence of external actors. The case study presented is original and innovative, and one which can reveal much to us in terms of the broader phenomenon of contemporary organised crime. That is not to say that the mobility problem, so central to the most recent literature on the topic, is not a grave one, but the *pugliese* case represents a truly neglected example in recent European history. When we consider the trend of recently emergent, market-driven criminal syndicates across the globe, whether their presence is attributable to endogenous or exogenous factors, it is clear that the case of the SCU can tell us much about the dynamics of newcomer criminal groups, their operations, and their evolutionary processes. The study of the SCU can be seen as a focus on a period of transition, from the attempt to impose anachronistic *mafia*-style practices on pre-existing, underground criminal networks, emulating tradition but, ultimately, coming to accept that imitation is not necessary and, indeed, not possible. What remains is a criminal syndicate, but not a *mafia*. If we consider that even the traditional Italian *mafia*-style organisations are modernising, adapting and abandoning many archaic rituals, it is clear to see how and why Rogoli's project was ill-advised and doomed to fail. Further considerations for research could include a comparative study of the Italian newcomer case with a distinct national example, an updated, in-depth analysis of SCU activity and evolution post-1999, or an analysis of the role of juvenile crime in Puglia. Within this thesis, the investigation into the SCU as a backlash response to attempted invasion and its subsequent struggle to operate is an original contribution to the literature on an overlooked topic, but the findings of the thesis are far from limited to an individual case. Rather, they can enhance our understanding of local, national and transnational criminal groups, old and new.

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